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Economist Joseph Schumpeter’s examination into the relationships between 
business cycles and periods of economic expansion defines the government’s role in 
markets as limited. However, he viewed government intervention as a precursor to 
improving the levels of economic growth and expanding an individual’s quality of life. 
This study examines how measures of business and political climate might explain 
variations in the level of economic growth and development across the states. 
Economic growth is gauged from the microeconomic perspective of the individual 
(per capita income) and from the macroeconomic viewpoint of the state’s economy (gross 
state product). Economic development is defined by changes in a quality of life index.  
The state’s political climate has a component of ideology, measured as state tax burden 
and by an index that compares the ratio of public to private sector employment and a 
component that captures the capacity of a state to manage the affairs of government. 
The ability of these non-economic, political variables to predict changes in levels 
of economic growth and development is compared to the explanatory power from six 
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indices of a state’s business climate.  While the institutions that publish these indices 
claim to have identified the socio-economic variables responsible for defining economic 
growth across the American states, none have identified how the richness of a state’s 
political climate might influence its level of economic growth or economic development.  
Each variable is defined in a lagged regression model and used to predict growth 
and development. The findings show that the ratio of public to private sector employment 
is the most reliable indicator of changes occurring across both measures of economic 
growth. While some of the measures of a state’s business climate were superior indicators 
of changes in per capita income, they fell short of predicting changes in GSP. None of the 
indicators used in this study were able to predict changes in economic development. The 
findings highlight how states with a high quality of life enjoy higher levels of economic 
growth. These same states exhibit higher tax burdens and possess smaller governments. It 
appears that lowering taxes is not a panacea for increasing economic growth and 
improving the quality of life.  
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CHAPTER 1: BUSINESS CLIMATE, POLITICAL CLIMATE AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
 Today it is all too common to hear the media express concerns over how 
government policies impact individual freedoms and weaken the integrity of a free 
market system. Many academic studies agree and cite higher taxes and larger 
governments as major impediments to economic growth. So it is not surprising to find 
that across the nation, economists and policy analysts are actively engaged in a search to 
identify and measure the variables that can help explain the variation in the levels of 
economic growth observed across the American states. The difficulty in deciphering 
which variables cause growth begins with the definition of economic growth as opposed 
to economic development, the definition of business climate and the effect that political 
climate has over levels of growth and development.   
The challenges of segregating the variables that cause growth from those that 
represent the effects of growth have popularized efforts to meld these variables into a 
single index. Today several national and regional institutions publish an index that 
purports to have identified the variables responsible for variations in the levels of 
economic growth across the American states. While the titles under which these indices 
are reported vary widely, each claims to having captured the essence of the state’s 
capacity or its potential for economic growth.  This capacity is frequently referred to as 
the state’s business climate.  
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While each of these indices capture the factors commonly used to assess the cost 
of doing business within a state, none acknowledge how the richness that defines a state’s 
political climate influences its level of economic growth or its level of development. This 
study examines whether business climate indices can predict the levels of economic 
growth and economic development. These results are compared to how the non-economic 
factors used to measure a state’s political ideology and its capacity to manage the affairs 
of government influence the levels of economic growth and economic development. 
The Utility of Business Climate Indices   
Today there is very little research examining the claim that adjusting policy in 
response to an index of business climate leads to a corresponding change in the patterns 
of economic growth experienced by a state. Yet this lack of research has not stopped 
states from adopting measures of business climate as one of their benchmarks for 
formulating economic policy.  
The debate over the value that should be assigned to a business climate index has 
led some investigators to criticize the way that the terms themselves are used in these 
reports.  The lack of uniformity in the way some of the terms are defined has evolved into 
tacit disagreements over the methods used for collecting and analyzing these data (CEFD, 
2006; MERI, 2005, and Rooks, 2006). This disagreement has been fueled by a recent 
study that reveals how the definition of the indicators, the selection of measures, and the 
methods employed to determine the criteria for assigning weightings to the measures 
have all been heavily influenced by how well they fit the ideological underpinnings of the 
entity publishing the report (Fisher, 2005). Deller (2004) goes so far as to suggest that 
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these biases undermine the quantitative value that can be ascribed to any of these 
measures.  
As the author of the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) study, Fisher (2005) 
considers such inconsistencies validation that each index is actually measuring something 
different. He highlights these inconsistencies by questioning how the Beacon Hill 
Competitiveness Report (BHI) can rank Massachusetts as the most competitive state, yet 
the Small Business Survival Index (SBSI) ranks it 41st. Likewise, he wonders how the 
BHI can consider Mississippi to be the least competitive place in the nation, yet the SBSI 
ranks it as the seventh best place for small businesses. Finally, the business climate 
assessment made by the Pacific Research Institute (PRI) portrays Kansas with the highest 
level of something it calls economic freedom, a measure they use to gauge the level of 
free-market innovation, yet the SBSI ranks it 31st (Fisher, 2005). 
Fisher’s (2005) critiques are based on the suggestion that because each index 
purports to be measuring “something of critical importance to a state’s economic future 
and its potential for growth”, they should certainly converge around a simple ranking 
(pp.72-73). It is from within that context that Fisher makes his most stinging indictment 
and cautions lawmakers against using these rankings as benchmarks for formulating 
policies. He concedes that while some indices may offer utility in guiding a specific 
dimension of policy, none can claim having established a universal framework suited to 
defining how a shift in policy increases levels of economic growth. Yet, in spite of these 
warnings, one finds numerous references where public officials and state agencies cite 
their desire to improve their performance in one or more of these indices as justification 
for arguing for a change in policy (MDF, 2003), (wwwcfed.org/go/scorecard). 
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Works by Dye (1980) and those of Holt and Turner (1996) expose the Achilles 
heel for adopting measures of business climate as a benchmark for altering policy.  In 
their work, The Political Basis of Economic Development, Holt and Turner (1996) 
examine how political environments drive the conditions that increase levels of economic 
growth.  Dye (1980) offers insights into how differences within state policies contribute 
to the differential in the growth observed amongst the states. These works provided the 
impetus for comparing how a state’s business climate and its political climate might be 
used to explain changes in the levels of economic growth and economic development.  
Before answering the basic question of their utility, the measures of business 
climate must be placed into context. The utility assigned to measures of business climate 
are portrayed within the constructs of a regression model. These models tout how a 
change in the index will translate into a change in the economic performance of a state. 
However, the variables used to construct the indices contain measures derived from both 
economic and non-economic sources.  
Purpose of this Study 
This brings us to the central questions posed by this investigation: how can one 
assess the utility of a business climate index without first considering whether the 
political climate of the state expresses a willingness to change, and whether the state 
exhibits the capacity to produce the type of changes necessary to establish a new level of 
economic growth?  
This investigation tests the hypothesis that variations in a state’s political climate, 
defined from measures that gauge both its capacity to manage the affairs of government 
and its political ideology, influence the level of economic growth and economic 
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development in the American states. It places the Schumpeterian (1934) notion on the 
causes of growth into an analytical framework to decipher whether a state’s approach to 
adopting programs, policies, and laws has influenced its level of growth or level of 
development. 
This is accomplished by testing the relationship that measures of a state’s business 
climate and measures of its political climate have to changes in measures of economic 
growth and economic development. The analysis proceeds along in two distinct stages: 
(1) to examine a gap in the literature, two decades of data are collected that reveal how a 
state’s prevailing political ideology and its capacity to manage governmental affairs may 
have contributed to the levels of economic growth or economic development within that 
jurisdiction, and  (2) tests are conducted to define how a measure of a state’s political or 
business climate influence levels of economic growth and development when the level of 
economic development is high and when the level of economic development is low.  
While it is easy to understand how the conceptual definitions of the terms 
economic growth and economic development came to be used interchangeably, the 
operational definitions adopted by this investigation rely on two very distinct sets of 
measures. Economic growth is measured by quantifiable changes in the level of per 
capita income and by the year over year change in gross state product (GSP). Economic 
development is gauged by measuring the change in a composite of social indicators that 
define the quality of life within each state. The basis for these definitions is explored in 
the literature review. 
Based on the review of the literature, discussed in the next section, we assert that 
assessing the influence that a state’s political climate has on its economic growth and 
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development is the first step in constructing objective, non-partisan comparisons of a 
state’s economic performance.  
Reason for the Dissertation 
The literature reveals a gap in efforts to quantify the relationship between political 
climate, measures of economic growth, and those of economic development.  The 
literature also highlights how past attempts to improve economic growth while 
simultaneously seeking to improve an individual’s quality-of-life (QOL) have produced 
mixed results. Nowhere are these contradictions more apparent than in the work of 
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2003). These authors reveal how increasing levels of 
investments in education failed to sustain the momentum of growth that was underway in 
the technology sector. The literature review expands upon this topic and highlights how 
states vary in their ability to spawn the type of policy deemed critical to actively 
participating in this new global economy. While investigators continue to diagnose the 
causes for these failures, the absence of an objective, analytical framework suited to 
explaining the influence that a state’s political climate has on its pattern of economic 
growth and economic development remains a gap in the research. 
A review of published dissertations failed to uncover an investigation that 
examined the relationship between measures of a state’s business climate, its political 
climate, and the level of economic growth and development occurring within that 
jurisdiction. While Michael Porter’s (1998, 2000) seminal works describe how 
governmental support of economic clusters influences levels of economic growth, he did 
not delve into the interrelationships between a state’s political climate, its business 
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climate, and the incidents of economic growth and development observed across a range 
of states.  
Determining the influence that political climate has on the dimensions of 
economic growth and economic development updates the contemporary theories that 
suggest variations in economic growth are related to changes in the quantity, quality or 
access to human capital, financial capital, and natural resources. While each of these 
factors contribute to the growth and expansion of a traditional economy, we posit that 
these measures have less  influence over the levels of growth and expansion occurring in 
the emerging new or knowledge-based economies (KBE).  
Finally, testing the impact of political climate separate from those of its business 
climate will help arbitrate the debate over whether a specific published index of a state’s 
business climate should be adopted as a benchmark to alter policy in ways that many  
believe help create higher levels of economic growth. 
Contribution to the Body of Knowledge 
Over the past two decades policy analysts have attempted to quantify how 
government intervention in free markets influences the level of economic growth in 
nation-states. Investigations into the influence that the economic actions of government 
actions have over levels of growth continue to be scrutinized (Powell, 2003).  Levels of 
taxation, policies of expenditures and the nature of the regulatory environment are the 
main subjects for these investigations.  In their attempts to expose the underlying cause 
for variations in the levels of growth in developed economies investigators have begun to  
reexamine the empirical models that have been the mainstay of growth theory (Malizia 
and Feser, 1999). Those findings highlight how changes in the interrelationships amongst 
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the factors of production, land, labor, capital, and resource availability have altered the 
character of growth in the 21st century.   
Within the field of development economics a consensus is emerging that the cost 
of admission into the new, knowledge-based economy (KBE) requires abandoning the 
politically expedient remedies that focus on resuscitating vestiges of the old economy. 
This shift in emphasis needs to be accompanied by the recognition that moving public 
investments into programs that improve the social and physical infrastructures will help 
sustain and attract the educated workforce of the future. The management skills needed to 
effectively allocate public resources between the competing needs of improving the 
quality of life for constituents and investing to improve the infrastructure for future 
growth are not evenly distributed across the governments that operate the states (Syracuse, 
2001).  
 As investigators explore ways to quantify the costs and define the benefits of 
shifting the portfolio of public investments, they have unearthed a series of low-cost 
measures that help spawn initiatives in entrepreneurship and technical innovation.  These 
include investing in programs that improve the quality of place and the quality of life.  
Initiatives in each of these areas have had positive impacts on the rate of entrepreneurship 
and on the rate of economic growth.  Kreft (2003) considers initiatives that increase the 
levels of entrepreneurship as a way for states to accelerate future growth while 
simultaneously producing a revenue stream that can fund the programs that elevate the 
quality of life for its constituents. The discovery of a plausible cause-and-effect 
relationship between growth and quality of life has sparked a renaissance to analyze how 
the policy instruments known to promote individual well-being might be modified to 
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improve levels of economic growth and development. It is through this lens that 
investigators have begun examining the interrelationships between quality of life, quality 
of place, and the government’s role in creating economic growth and economic 
development within a state (Brookings, 2006). 
Daly (1994), a pioneer in the movement to define conditions of economic 
sustainability, judges sustainability by how well the body politic endorses policies that 
improve the well-being of individuals.  These include such qualitative measures as access 
to open spaces, levels of happiness, and the capacity to convey this atmosphere of 
happiness to future generations. Several investigations have defined this notion of well-
being as a change in an individual’s quality of life (QOL). A series of quantitative 
measures attributed to the QOL in each state are adopted by this study as the proxy for 
defining changes in the conditions of economic development.  
Quantifying the relationships between a state’s business climate, its political 
climate, and the occurrence of economic growth and economic development is an 
essential step in deciphering whether the policy environment in a state supports the 
conditions of economic growth and economic development, or whether it remains locked 
in a quagmire of economic stasis.   
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Research Questions 
This study seeks answers to the following questions: 
1. Can the indicators of a state’s political climate, defined as its political 
ideology and its capacity to manage the affairs of government, improve 
our ability to explain variations in economic growth as well as those of 
economic development? 
2. Can the index of a state’s business climate explain variations in the levels 
of economic growth and development observed across the American 
states? 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Public Policy in Market Based Economies 
Understanding the factors that affect economic growth and development in the 
states requires an appreciation of the basic economic theories that define the nature of 
interactions between markets and governments. According to Gramlich (1981), 
government’s intervention in a market economy is based on any of three primary 
objectives: (1) improving economic efficiency, often through policies that seek to alter 
the parameters of market pricing and thus influence the allocation of resources; (2) 
redistributing incomes within a society so as to restore or achieve distributive equity; or 
(3) stabilizing prices, employment, and factors that contribute to output so that the rate of 
economic activity is controlled.  
In most instances, the form of a government’s intervention is shaped by the 
behaviors emanating from within specific segments of the market. In markets 
characterized by the production of private goods these behaviors are fairly predictable. 
Efforts by most producers are directed at designing and implementing strategies that help 
maximize profits.  These producers execute this strategy in a manner that balances 
economic risk against a degree of economic certainty. So it is reasonable to expect that 
they will play by a set of rules where price is used to efficiently allocate resources, 
equitably distribute incomes, and temper the pace of demand. Of course each of these 
conditions represents a cornerstone of neoclassic economic theory.  
There are occasions when the efficiency of this system comes into question. 
During such times there is usually a social or economic problem attached to the way 
markets have either over- or under-allocated resources. Under those conditions there is 
12 
 
the expectation that governments will intervene and craft policies that cause the 
producers to absorb spillover costs or stimulate an expansion of outputs to increase the 
benefits.  
Policies designed to repress the impact of a market failure, or what economists 
refer to as an act taken to redress a negative externality, seek to restore equilibrium by 
assessing an incremental cost to the producer. These costs take the form of legislative 
mandates, regulatory policies, or various forms of taxation. In each case, the intent is the 
same: insure that the producer absorbs the social costs associated with the production of 
the private good.  
Likewise, whenever private markets produce spillover benefits, governments can 
use subsidies as a way to encourage higher levels of output. Intervention of this type 
helps drive the market to new, higher equilibrium point. In instances of under allocation 
the objective of the remedy is always the same: encourage an increase in the level of 
outputs.  
Throughout the literature there is near universal agreement of an inverse 
relationship between economic growth and a government’s intervention in the economy. 
Higgins, Levy, and Young (2003) logged over 3000 county based observations and 
concluded there was a strong negative correlation between the extent to which the public 
sector was represented, be it federal, state, or state government, and the conditions they 
used to measure economic growth. When Karabegovic and McMahon (2005) examined 
the influence that government intervention had on conditions of economic growth across 
the U.S. they were able to associate increasing levels of government intervention with a 
reduction in something they referred to as the economic freedom of the individual. They 
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determined that a reduction in economic freedom produced a negative impact on growth 
in per capita incomes.  
Consistent with the findings of Karabegovic and McMahon (2005), Powell (2003) 
determined that a reduction in government intervention increased the economic freedom 
enjoyed by individuals: in this case for citizens in the country of Ireland. Like 
Karabegovic and McMahon, Powell was successful in assigning significance to the way 
that a change in the level of economic freedom impacted levels of economic growth. 
Since market-based systems account for nearly 80% of the economy’s output it is 
imperative that we understand the influence that government intervention plays in 
shaping a state’s potential for improving its prospects for growth. Attempts to quantify 
these relationships have led economists and policy analysts to craft a series of economic 
and non-economic measures into an index that purports to measure a state’s capacity for 
growth. Today, indices of this type are published by a variety of institutions and are most 
frequently referred to as a measure of the state’s business climate. The subject of business 
climate is explored in a later section of this literature review. 
Economic Growth 
All too often the words economic development and economic growth are used 
interchangeably.  Since many economists tend to define the term economic development 
as more economic growth, it is common to find the theories that define how economies 
expand expressing these changes as changes in levels of economic development. Even 
today we find several government and non-government agencies explaining changes in 
their measures of growth in terms that seem better suited to defining the conditions 
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responsible for producing the change. In some cases we even find government agencies 
defining economic change as a change in economic development (EDA, 2004). 
For Friedman (1962) and other neo-classical economists, economic growth is 
defined by quantifying changes in output or changes in the levels of per capita income.  
At this point it is important to acknowledge that regardless of the potential contradictions 
within the lexicon, there are no contradictions with the findings that all who view growth 
through the lens of neoclassic theory share a common belief that markets, not 
governments, should provide the incentives leading to more growth. The neoclassic view 
of the relationship between markets and governments allows that group to stipulate 
measures of growth as the changes that occur at the macro level of a state or nation’s 
economy and as changes occurring within the micro economy as measured at the level of 
the individual. In this section, we examine the logic behind our intent to measure and test 
the effects that political and business climate have over growth measured both ways.  
While Rodrik (2004) is quick to critique the neoclassicists approach to defining 
and measuring measure economic growth, those methods continue to dominate the 
literature. As a result, contemporary thought on ways to measure economic growth 
continue to support the notion that economic growth or improvements in the economy 
should be assessed from changes in output measures such as gross domestic product, 
(GDP) or per capita income (PCI).  
That approach is supported by Vaughn and Bearse’s (1981) suggestion that 
economic growth be defined by changes in output or changes that affect the scale of an 
economy. In acknowledging how these measures might slow improvements in the human 
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condition, these authors suggest amending the neoclassic model so it captures measures 
that define levels of investment and patterns of personal consumption.  
In almost every instance the literature determines economic performance from the 
measures that support the policy agenda of the neoclassicists. This has resulted in the 
development of benchmarks that encourage markets to expand in ways that allow 
individuals to maximize the satisfaction of their preferences. So it is not surprising to find 
many economists endorsing the findings from publications of business climate indices 
that extol the virtues of free market policies. In several cases their basis for assessing the 
efficiency of these policies are captured in the economic construct that touts using 
traditional cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as the tool for evaluating effectiveness.  Naturally 
within the field of growth economics the adoption of CBA has many critics. Most of the 
concerns over the use of this tool center around the methods used to define social costs 
and the way the discount schedule is defined. In each case the underlying issue is whether 
CBA is an appropriate tool for assessing the loss of an intangible or aesthetic element 
such as those found in the natural environment.  
While economists and others that might consider themselves part of a school of 
economic growth concede the notion that government’s role is to intervene to correct the 
inefficiencies arising out of market failures, they are just as quick to assert that when a 
policy adheres to their definition of efficient allocations, measured by maximizing the 
ability of the individual to exercise free choice over a range of preferences, the incidences 
of such failures are minimized.  
Even if scholars can agree on the proper definition and measure of economic 
growth there is not a consensus about how it occurs or why the benefits of growth usually 
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end up being so unevenly distributed. Even the most ardent proponents of neoclassical 
theory accept that the outcome from a cycle of economic growth will always convey 
gains to some and losses to others. In her attempts to explain this conundrum Blanke 
(2003, p.1) points out that while there is nothing more important to the welfare of the 
citizens in a state than the growth and stability of its economy, the determinants of what 
defines growth remains one of the “greatest mysteries” of economics.  
Blanke’s (2003) review of the historical record unveiled the research that has been 
undertaken to define the conditions that enhance or impede economic growth. She traces 
the origins of these investigations to Malthus.  Malthus’19th century work was the first to 
connect the limit on economic growth to the limits of the fixed resources found in the 
natural environment.  By the early 20th century the limits to growth were being redefined 
by a region’s capacity to invest in physical capital and infrastructure. Later these findings 
were supplemented with Schumpeter’s (1934) suggestion that growth was the outcome of 
a cycle in which private enterprise destroyed and then recreated markets. In accordance 
with his theory, the limitation to growth is based upon the extent to which free markets 
perpetuate a cycle of continual renewal. By the middle of the 20th century Solow (1991) 
countered the Schumpeterian notions of growth derived endogenously and began to 
depict growth as the outcome of exogenous technical change. In spite of Solow’s 
suggestions that growth results from exogenous change, most investigators today suspect 
that the rapid pace of structural realignment currently underway in the marketplace 
results from a mix of both factors. This has reignited investigations to understand how the 
endogenous conditions unique to local markets may be influencing economic growth. 
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Increasingly the conditions thought to influence growth are being viewed as a 
combination of economic and non-economic forces.  
Schumpeter (1934) was among the first to uncover the role that endogenous 
change plays in defining growth. Schumpeter (1934) suggested that internal forces such 
as the quality and quantity of human capital, the presence of labor exchanges, and the 
type and level of reinvestments made to establish or preserve market share were among 
those responsible for driving the type of change he observed in an economy, a change he 
characterized as a cycle of “creative destruction”. While his seminal work was titled The 
Theory of Economic Development, he was, in fact, outlining his theory of economic 
growth. Today, investigators have focused their attention on understanding how 
investments in human capital, especially those that help create and diffuse knowledge, 
influence levels of economic growth.  
While research into this nascent field of growth economics continues to advance 
our understanding of the mechanisms responsible for creating growth, at present nobody 
has devised a unified theory capable of fully explaining or predicting periods of growth, 
stagnation, or any of the many transitions that occur between these states of nature. In 
testimony to that statement we turn to the work by North and Thomas (1973) and Hoff 
(2001). Each of these authors suggests that while the models explaining economic growth 
have provided insights into the variables that might be causing growth to occur, they 
consider measuring factors such as innovation, education, and capital accumulations as 
circular reasoning, as these are  “… not the cause of growth but, in fact, are growth” 
(North and Thomas,1973, p.2).  Rodrik (2004), and Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) posit that 
changes in economic growth might be better explained by examining the differences 
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within or across institutional settings. North defines such institutions as: “ ….the rules of 
the game in a society, or more formally, [they are]  the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction” (p.3). It seems clear that these authors are referring to an 
ecosystem of factors which we explore and characterize as the political climate of a state. 
Of course the uncertainty in establishing the underlying cause for changes in the 
frequency and durations that define Schumpeter’s cycles of growth has a direct impact on 
the way policy should be structured and how it should be measured. If indeed a goal of 
government is to facilitate the cycles of growth generated by the private sector while  
monitoring market conditions and intervening to minimize the generation of negative 
externalities, then the obvious cannot be left unstated: if we do not know which variables 
are responsible for causing changes in these cycles and we do not know how to 
objectively measure the impact of these variables then it is easy to understand how we 
have reached a point where nearly all government policies are judged efficient! As a 
result of this uncertainty, policy makers are left without a tool that can help explain how a 
small change in the dimension of one policy might influence levels of economic 
prosperity. The real concern is how this limitation may be preventing lawmakers from 
devising strategies that will prepare their constituencies to adapt to the rapidly changing 
conditions that characterize participating in a global economy.  
Rodrik (2004) suggests that resolving this issue goes well beyond the need to 
simply differentiate the measures that cause change from those responsible for its effect. 
He concedes that while the neoclassic models offer a limited tool set from which to 
evolve policies of growth, their limitations in shaping policies that can sustain growth 
should be the focus of concern. Here we find him making a direct reference in support of 
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defining conditions of economic growth separate from those of economic development.  
Rodrik (2004) uses his description of the complexities inherent in any attempt to establish 
policies of sustainable growth to make his case for interjecting governments into markets. 
Rodrik’s call for government reforms echoes Porter’s (1998) findings. Porter (1998) 
recommends governments develop policies that show preference to distinct industrial 
sectors, something he refers to as clusters. He considers government’s development of 
these economic strategies a precursor to sustaining growth. Like Porter, Rodrik (2004) 
relates our collective failure to converge around an improved economic scenario to 
variations in the way these governmental institutions are arranged and on the differences 
he observed in the social preferences expressed by certain cultures. In highlighting the 
role that these non-economic forces, particularly political forces, play in defining growth, 
Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) and Rodrik (2004) felt that none of the works examined in their 
review of the literature produced a thorough understanding of how political processes 
interact with the economic forces in ways that drive growth in markets.  While the 
authors confirmed that the body of literature continues to view government’s intervention 
in markets as a detriment to economic growth, they felt more was at work here than 
simply the size of government or a set of policies that expressed a willingness to 
intervene. These authors seemed to be making a circuitous reference to our inability to 
understand the dynamics that take place when political cycles and business cycles change. 
Economic Development 
If proponents of economic growth tend to be dominated by economists then the 
proponents of economic development are dominated by planners and politicians. It is 
therefore critical to understand the differences between the way an economist defines a 
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policy to be efficient and the way a politician would make that claim. The variation in the 
way each of these groups defines economic efficiency tells the story of how investigators 
have approached analyzing the influence that politics have on levels of economic 
development and economic growth within the jurisdiction of a state.  
The political culture of a state has a large influence over the nature of planning 
and the implementation of its economic policy (Wiewel, Tietz and Giloth, 1993). At each 
step in that “policy process”, state and local planners must confront the conflicts that 
arise from a desire to create change that is (1) acceptable, (2) necessary, and (3) retains or 
enhances political capital (Dye, 2002, 14.). As a result of their interaction with political 
forces: citizens, interest groups and bureaucratic agencies, state planners are often 
relegated to defining efficiency as the successful outcome of a political process. Naturally 
defining efficiency from such qualitative methods is seen by others as a denial of 
everything that is right with the neoclassic theory: market based equilibrium and 
efficiency defined from cost-benefit-analysis. Given the differences in the backgrounds 
and viewpoints of planners and economists it is easy to understand why investigators 
have struggled to quantify the influence that the non-economic forces associated with a 
state’s political environment have over its economic growth (or development). One 
reason for this struggle is the many different ways that past studies have approached the 
definition of a state’s political environment. The other reason is based on the varying 
approaches to defining efficiency: can this be an efficient outcome if the process used to 
quantify the gains understates the social cost? The inability to resolve these two issues led 
Weiwel, Tietz, and Giloth (1993) to conclude that the adoption of a broadly accepted 
theory of community development ... “ is a long way off.” (p.95). It does not require a 
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leap of faith to extrapolate this statement to include state based economic development.  
In one of the more insightful articles on this subject, Howland (1993) sheds some further 
light on the reasons these two points of view seem so convoluted: they reflect a 
misapplication of the neoclassic theory. She finds the criterion that markets remain self-
correcting does not apply when the economy of a state or region is small. She suggests 
that a market’s resiliency and its capacity to be self-correcting are only observed when 
the economic structures are highly diverse. This would suggest that to the extent a state’s 
economy is less diverse it is simply less able to comply with the theoretical guidelines of 
the neoclassic model. It appears that under those conditions politics step in to fill the gap. 
So while economists tend to extract their theories of economic growth by looking at ways 
to optimize economic systems that operate at a large scale, state planners and politicians 
are forced to examine the issue of growth while addressing a set of conflicts that are very 
local. Naturally, the planners and politicians resolve these conflicts with the tools at hand: 
the political processes. These variations in the perspectives held by economists and 
planners suggest how the investigations into economic growth and economic 
development in a state have emerged. When the literature discusses economic 
development in the context of the political environment of a state it approaches the issues 
from the vantage point of either the politician or the economist but rarely both.  This 
explanation should also shed some light on the conflict that arises between economists 
that believe they know how something should be done and politicians that must settle for 
an implementation that is feasible.  
Turning back for a moment to economic development, Vaughan and Bearse 
(1981) were among the first to overtly suggest that economic growth is something 
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different, and certainly not the same thing as economic development. While they suggest 
that changes in economic growth should continue to be based upon the type of 
quantitative measures that gauge changes in economic output, the measures of economic 
development should rely on qualitative measures of the type used to gauge structural 
changes within the economy: innovations in institutions, behavioral changes, and the 
adoption and development of technology. 
Unlike neoclassic economists, planners, most politicians, and the other proponents 
of economic development view the neoclassic model through a lens that portrays the 
landscape locally, in a state, across a region, or within a tightly-defined locality.  This 
observation is supported by the way the Economic Development Administration (EDA) 
elects to define economic development: as a set of actions that enhance the productive 
capacity of land, labor, capital, and technology of a national, state or local economy 
(EDA, 2004).  Since most economists agree that the policies that lower investment costs 
or provide tax incentives can improve a firm’s productive capacity, the definition from 
EDA underscores the role that states’ governments play in creating conditions favorable 
to improving levels of economic development.  
Blakely and Bradshaw (2002) make the case that the term economic development 
is simply not amenable to being defined by a strict economic model. These authors make 
it clear that economic development should not be considered part of a unified strategy 
that defines economic growth. Blakely and Bradshaw (2002) define the term in the 
context of a ‘movement’. This allows them to avoid the dilemma of having to create a 
unified theory capable of connecting elements of economic growth with those of 
economic development. This seems an endorsement of the opinion rendered by Weiwel, 
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Tietz, and Giloth (1993) that sees the ability to define such a theory a long way off. 
Blakely and Bradshaw ( 2002) defend their definition of economic development as a 
movement by claiming that all of the prevailing theoretical models that describe regional 
or local economic development rely on the following, general equation:  
Local and Regional Development = c X r, 
where ‘c’ equals the economic, social, technological and political capacity of a region, 
and ‘r’ equals its resources: natural resource availability, location, labor, capital 
investment, entrepreneurial climate, transportation, communication, industrial 
composition, technology, size, export market, international economic situation, and 
national and state government spending. Comparing this definition against that put forth 
by proponents of the neoclassic theory highlights how much the definition of economic 
growth expands when it includes aspects that some suggest represent economic 
development. As we will see later, many of the institutions publishing an index of a 
state’s business climate have used this expanded definition as a way to justify 
incorporating more variables into their measures. 
Throughout the literature one comes away with the sense that underlying all these 
attempts to define the term economic development, is an acute awareness of the need to 
have a measure that captures the dynamics of an economy. Principally these measures,  
like those proposed by Vaughn and Bearse (1981),  seek to define the impact from 
changes that result from the loss of some industries and the changes that societies must  
undergo as they create space for emerging markets. Today this transformation is being 
played out as a decline in traditional manufacturing and a social system struggling with 
how to absorb and participate in the new, knowledge-based economy (KBE).  The impact 
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of this socio-economic transition has rekindled our interest in developing a better 
understanding of the contribution that human capital and technology makes towards 
achieving economic progress that can be judged sustainable.  
In attempts to address the question of how to capture the dynamic nature of 
markets, several of the institutions measuring business climate have added indicators to 
capture levels of innovative capacity. So while the publishers of business climate indices 
capture these measures as a way to gauge changes in the level of economic growth, their 
adoption of these measures is more apt to align with measures of economic development. 
This opinion is consistent with that of Vaughn and Bearse (1981). They expect the 
measure of economic development to be defined as a structural change within the basic 
composition and mix of an economy. The real issue is that most indices do not distribute 
or otherwise differentiate their measures across these two states of nature, growth and 
development. This surfaces the concern over whether they are measuring growth, 
development, or both. This matter is explored in a later section. 
The need to prepare society to adapt to these shifting economic conditions has not 
escaped Daly (1994).  Once again he leverages the market failure argument to highlight 
how the effort to formulate policies that adjust GDP, and by inference the GSP, masks 
our ability to assess whether members of a society posses the capacity to adapt and 
confront the changes underway in an economy. In deference to suggesting that economic 
progress continue to be defined from measures used to track changes in the quantifiable 
measures of output, Daly seeks to alter our definition of progress.  He believes the best 
way to judge progress is to determine whether a society is improving its capacity to 
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support the constructs of intergenerational equity. This important subject is discussed in 
more detail later in this review.  
Malizia and Feser’s (1999) summary of the major theories of development serve 
as a testimony to Blakely’s (2002) claim that all the economic development theories can 
be explained by the short form:  
Local and Regional Development = c X r.  
An overview of the theories that Malizia and Feser (1999) reviewed appear in 
Appendix A.  A quick review of the works outlined in that table highlights how the 
lexicon has contributed to the proliferation of conflicting definitions. However, a closer 
examination reveals that all of these theories have focused on a single goal: capturing the 
more dynamic state of economic development.  
While each of the theories of economic development discussed by Malizia and 
Feser (1999) demonstrate an ability to respond to shifts in the economy, each adopts a 
slightly different set of dynamics to explain the forces driving economic development. 
Malizia and Fraser (1999) point out that if one accepts the notion that the goal of 
development is structural reform then the following theories of economic development 
would be relevant: the Growth-Pole Theory which views the nurturing of  fast moving , 
gazelle type industries as its primary source of structural change; the Entrepreneurship 
Theory which supports restructuring the economy around innovative processes, which in 
turn sponsors different modes of inter-sectional connectivity; the Product Cycle Theory, 
which is closely aligned with strategies to create knowledge and spawn its diffusion; and 
finally the Flexible Specification Theory, which highlights Porter’s (1998) notion of 
attaching economic value to creating and supporting highly agile industrial clusters.  
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Alternatively, evolving a strategy of economic development from within the 
constructs of the Economic Base Theory, the Staple Theory, the Regional Concentration 
and Diffusion Theory, or the Interregional Trade Theory will increase government’s 
intervention in an economy. But even those theories that endorse increasing the levels of 
intervention fail to explain how following the politically expedient strategy of supporting 
traditional industries and traditional forms of employment encumbers the development of  
human capital in ways that would support a new era of economic progress.  
Once again, we find Daly (1996) offering to solve this conundrum: society needs 
to shift to his definition of progress. His proposal is to replace the current vision of 
progress, measured by quantitative expansion, something we adopt as our operational 
definition of economic growth, with measures that define the attainment of goals that 
center on improving the quality of life, our choice for operationally defining economic 
development. He submits that the most efficient method for realizing these goals is to 
replace the extreme individualism of the Homo economicus, currently seated at the center 
of neoclassic economic theory, with an individual focused on both a real and abstract 
group of others that reside within their community. His support of a communitarian ethic 
as the vehicle for achieving sustainability melds quite nicely with his rationale for 
equating sustainability with measures of intergenerational equity. Likewise, the moral 
claims attached to intergenerational equity provide him with sufficient justification for 
measuring progress along a vector that is normally used to gauge the quality of life 
(QOL). In Daly’s (1996) case, he wants to insure that the QOL measures taken in the 
present reflect a set of conditions that individuals can be expected to experience in the 
future.  
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By defining sustainability from qualitative, QOL measures, Daly (1996) and 
others from the school of development (Milbrath, 1989), can argue that policies focused 
on achieving economic growth will always have a negative impact on society’s obligation 
to future generations. Of course, the willingness to frame a social system around Daly’s 
definition of economic development is totally dependent upon society’s worldview of 
how individuals should relate to the physical environment.  
Those possessing the world view of an environmentalist retain an anthropocentric 
construct and thus limit their considerations of intergenerational equity to the impact that 
decisions might have on the quality of life for a future generation of humans. This 
contrasts with the views held by social and deep ecologists, both of which posit that 
intergenerational equity is a right to be bestowed upon all sentient beings. Social 
ecologists expect humans to use their labyrinth of social systems to create a safety net 
able to protect the ecosystem. Those possessing the worldview of deep ecologists lean on 
the tenets of the precautionary principle and abstain from interfering with nature; do 
nothing lest it create an unknown harm, now or in the future (Laverty, 2003).  
Compared with Daly, Milbrath (1989) is seen to take a more moderate approach 
to governments’ role in markets. He suggests that markets are effective and efficient 
methods for allocating goods and services and that they produce conditions that stimulate 
social learning. The following summary stipulates the limited role he sees markets 
playing in support of economic development (p 27): 
• Markets are unable to anticipate and plan for the future; 
• Markets while not inherently unjust cannot correct injustice; 
• Markets fail to protect us from dangerous externalities; 
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• Markets undervalue nature; 
• Markets fail to provide for public goods, and; 
• Markets cannot restrain our growth or provide quality of life in a society 
that is overcrowded and experiencing shortages.  
Milbrath contends that society needs to depend on governments to correct the 
problems and supplement the deficiencies inherent in market-based economies.  His 
rationale for government intervention is quite simple: he believes that as individuals, our 
normal reaction to the negative externalities generated by policies to increase levels of 
growth is to ignore them. This behavioral-based hypothesis leads Milbrath to conclude 
that governments have a legitimate purpose to intervene in ways that will temper the 
impact of market failures. While others have hinted at the presence of an appropriate 
condition for intervention, Milbrath appears to consider the dimension of time, early 
intervention, approaching preemption, as the only viable method for slowing down a 
cycle of growth. While his suggestion for preemption stems from a desire to give the 
political and economic systems time to reflect and redefine the equilibrium point between 
increasing rates of growth and achieving a predefined quality of life, the neoclassic 
economist would certainly argue in favor of other methods.  What is intriguing here is 
Milbrath’s suggestion that there is a time interval or some trigger point when 
governments need to intervene in markets. The argument both for and against 
government intervention in markets finds consensus around the idea that government 
intervention is legitimate if it is focused on persevering or restoring the quality of life for 
members of its society. So there is little disagreement with the suggestion that this point 
of intervention should be triggered by the need to preserve an individual’s quality of life.  
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The contention arises in how to determine the level of deterioration that warrants 
intervention. Similarly there is need to define the type of intervention needed to restore 
equilibrium. The measures used to infer the level of government intervention in state-
based economies is captured in this study by the measure of a state’s political ideology. 
The selection and treatment of the variables used to create this measure are explored in 
the methods section of this review.   
It is also interesting to note that many of Milbrath’s observations mirror those 
identified by Schumpeter (1934). In his treatise, Schumpeter states that the 
interrelationship between growth and development is cyclical, framed by the often-
quoted phase “creative destruction”. Contrasting Schumpeter’s analysis of business and 
economic cycles against the proliferation of economic development theories presented in 
the earlier section showcases our assumption that government’s role in shaping the 
temporal character of these cycles is poorly understood.  
The one bright spot in all this is found in the research that followed Schumpeter. 
Those investigations have explored the myriad of factors that help guide an economy 
along the path of creative destruction. In the process several of these investigators have 
elected to define economic development as economic growth plus some number of 
measures that indicate changes in the quality of life. Schumpeter’s (1934) own 
observations highlighted how an individual’s search for an improved QOL can be a major 
force in shaping the prosperity of a firm. This serves as yet another data point in support 
of an interrelationship between what we have come to define as economic growth and 
those of economic development. 
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Another way to view government’s intervention in markets can be extrapolated 
from the work by Lentz and Mortensen ( 2005). These authors focused on understanding 
the factors that motivate an individual to improve their economic well being. In their 
scenario, it is easy to understand how the discontent arising from loss of employment 
could spark an individual’s desire to improve their lot in life.  If this cascades into an 
exodus where employees are departing an industry where the level of economic 
uncertainty is high to move to an industry where the prospects are brighter, then this shift 
has created a drain of skilled labor in one sector and an infusion of skills into another 
market. To the extent that this natural migration of labor ignites a structural realignment 
within an economy, it is easy to see how a government’s intervention, denoted as a non-
market force engaged to help stabilize the ailing sector of this hypothetical economy, 
could establish an artificial and protracted period of stasis between the Schumpeterian 
oscillations that describe periods of economic growth and those of economic 
development. This behavior is witnessed whenever governments enact policies that 
attempt to preserve traditional jobs. The literature makes it abundantly clear that political 
pressure to sustain employment is a key reason governments are willing to intervene in 
markets (Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002). Under these conditions governments’ actions are 
motivated by trying to preserve the power base that resides within the economic 
structures of the recent past. Of course, throughout this process governments are 
allocating resources that might have otherwise been used to improve the capacity of the 
human capital demanded by a future economy. Apart from the short-lived value that the 
policies to preserve a status-quo in employment may offer to  politicians, investigators 
have implicated these policies as the primary reason the individuals in a state have been 
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locked out of enjoying the benefits of more growth (Maine Economic Research Institute, 
2005). This was the same conclusion reached by North and Thomas (1973). Their work 
aligns with the more contemporary studies conducted by Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2002). Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson make a structural connection 
between levels of intervention and the quality of a government institution. They conclude 
that the quality of the institution accounted for some of the differences in levels of 
economic prosperity observed across nation-states. From those investigations we can 
hypothesize that the lack of convergence of prosperity across the American states, a 
region where on most measures the demographics and economic differences would be 
considered minor, might be attributed to variations in their political ideology and their 
capacity to manage the affairs of government.  
The literature reveals that during prolonged periods of economic growth the 
human condition improves and eventually evolves to achieve a new, more enlightened 
stage of social development. If this is the case then we would expect to find states with 
high levels of economic growth exhibiting high levels of economic development. The 
discovery that a lack of economic convergence might be due to variations in the 
institutional settings across the states is an important finding and one that has proven 
pivotal to the way the methods for this investigation have been structured.  
Numerous studies and books offer policy solutions that address the triad of 
challenges facing those that must choose between producing more economic growth or 
more economic development: redirecting the economy, improving the human condition, 
and protecting the resources of the planet. Most of these recommendations attempt to 
isolate policies that constitute economic growth from those that foster economic 
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development. In their seminal piece, For The Common Good, Daly and Cobb (1994) 
offer their own solutions for reconciling the inconsistencies that exist when designing 
policies of economic growth vs. those of economic development. They discuss each in 
the context of how contemporary policies on trade, population control, land use 
regulations, agricultural practices, industry, labor, income policies, taxation, and national 
security, demonstrate their support of growth over development. Naturally their 
recommendations seek to alter policy in ways that will help move economic development 
closer to their goals for achieving sustainability: recommendations for changing patterns 
of land use reflect an ethic of bio-centric egalitarianism; the policy prescription for 
addressing population growth focuses on achieving something called “optimal scale”. 
The authors provide insights into the context and meaning of the term scale:  “economics 
for persons in the community must face the question of scale; how many persons 
simultaneously living at what level of per capita resource use, is best for community, 
where community includes concern for the future and non-human species as well as those 
presently living humans? The next question: What are the best means of controlling the 
scale of population and per capita resource use?” The authors define the optimal 
population as one that can sustain itself for a “very long time at levels of per capita use 
that permit ‘a good life’ for all” (1994, p. 241). This leaves us with the obvious questions 
of what defines a ‘‘good life”, and who defines how these conditions are obtained?   
Attempts to define the precepts leading to a “good life for all” can be traced to the 
writings of Aristotle. In his work Nicomachean Ethics, he suggests that living well, i.e. 
leading a virtuous life, allows us to develop what the Greeks call ‘eudaimonia’, a good 
guardian spirit. In those writings Aristotle suggests that while living a virtuous life is 
33 
 
necessary, virtue alone cannot fulfill some of the other criteria required to acquire 
happiness. His other prerequisites include good fortune, (to bring one the material goods 
necessary for a happy life), and physical and spiritual health (Aristotle, trans.www. 2006). 
It is from within these ancient constructs that classical liberalism develops its most 
stinging critique of economic development. By endorsing the pursuit of individual rights, 
liberties and happiness, classical liberals consider policies that emphasize economic 
growth and smaller government as the primary sources for improving the quality of life. 
These beliefs are reflected in Hobbe’s (1651/2000) critique on the dangers of large 
government, Locke’s (1689/2000) examination of the relationship between labor and 
property rights, Friedman’s (1962/2000) views on the link between economic and 
political freedoms, and Hayek’s (1944) treatise on the threat that collectivism holds for 
democracy (also see Blaug, 2000). The common theme running through all of these 
writings is a strong belief in the individual’s right of self determination. The fact that 
such rights are articulated as ‘inalienable’ in the U.S. Constitution continues to influence 
elements of economic policy. More recently, growth economists have adopted the term 
economic freedoms as a way to describe their measurement of these rights (Wang, 2005). 
Not surprisingly, several of the factors thought to contribute to the good life are 
captured in the indices that define a state’s business climate. As noted earlier, these 
indices do not differentiate between measures of growth and those of development. As a 
result their determinates for QOL tend to meld with some of the other variables that 
economists routinely use to measure material well-being: health, safety, political stability, 
family life, community life, climate and geography, job security, educational attainment, 
access to goods and services, political and/or economic freedom, and gender equality 
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(The Economist, 2006). The literature fully endorses efforts that aggregate these variables 
into indexes that indicate a region’s QOL (UN, 2006). International agencies such as the 
UN have a long history of using selected measures of well-being to help them define the 
QOL in a region. Towards that end the UN has continued to refine its measures of QOL. 
Today this institution reports results from an HDI, or human development index. This 
index measures poverty, literacy, education, life expectancy, and birth rates. A subset of 
this measure, the HPI, the human poverty index, is used to measure a country’s standard 
of living (UN, 2006).  
The importance of capturing levels of economic development should not be 
understated. The literature provides a wealth of information to support the positive 
relationship between measures of economic growth and changes in the quality of life 
(Economist, 2006). Each example points to a strong positive correlation between 
increased GSP, increased per capita incomes, and improvements in the quality of life. A 
study by Banerjee and Newman (1993) highlighted this relationship when they examined 
the problem of trying to sustain a degree of intergenerational equity when the capacity of 
society is one of low wages and low wealth, as these societies are clearly unable to make 
even the most basic of bequests to future generations. Any student of freshman 
psychology will be quick to link those findings to Maslow’s (1970, p. 151) hierarchical 
order of human needs.  
A study by Powell (2003) supports the tact taken by the classical liberals and 
suggests that improving the conditions for economic growth will logically spawn 
improvements in the QOL. Whether that relationship holds in reverse is unclear. 
Certainly if Schumpeter’s cycles of creative destruction were found to have a closed loop 
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or feedback mechanism then this inverse relationship might be inferred. Given the 
apparent synergy between the type of growth that Daly might judge sustainable, 
(measured from improvements in the QOL, and the traditional measures used to define 
levels of economic growth, changes GSP or per capita incomes) it is a bit of a surprise to 
find Daly willing to replace such easily quantifiable measures of growth with less 
rigorous measures of progress. 
The one item to be gleaned from Daly’s assertion that society can achieve a level 
of social progress while ignoring the policies that promote improvements to the GDP, 
GSP or per capita income, is that he believes that all developed economies are comprised 
of citizens that already have the capacity to bestow wealth on their progeny...today. Since 
this degree of prosperity is not enjoyed by all citizens in all states it is with some 
trepidation that we would entertain a recommendation to replace the objective 
determinants of economic growth, measured as GSP and per capita income, with a more 
subjective measure of progress.  Of course this investigation does embrace Daly’s notion 
that defines economic development from measures of QOL.    
Finally, it is important to note that much of the neoclassicist’s critique 
surrounding Daly’s work on sustainable growth is based on its incompatibility to operate 
within the political structure of a capitalist, free market system.  For example: it is well 
accepted that in free societies intergenerational equity is addressed by policies of 
redistribution.  Bowles (1998) offers an insightful critique into the use of 
intergenerational equity as a measure of economic development. He makes it clear that 
measuring the behavior and openness of markets is an effective way to define how wealth 
is acquired and passed across generations. When markets are not open and individuals are 
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not free to pursue their own self interests, the totality of wealth is diminished. It is 
interesting to note that in connection with the consequential loss of intergenerational 
wealth, Bowles reveals a diminution in the utility of the other, non-monetary components 
that are frequently attached to the value chain of intergenerational equity. Many of those 
measures are used to define the quality of life today and are connected to the strand of 
QOL that goes on into the future.  
These past two sections of the literature review identified the two major and 
competing views of the economy: economic growth and economic development. 
However, there are few studies at the state level that examine how these views compete 
or what drives their respective behaviors. For the reasons stated at the beginning of this 
section, much of the work cited in this review tends be the work of economists.  Many of 
these works were theoretical in nature or discussed the application of theory to a large 
national economy. Works by Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) as well as those of Rodrik (2004) 
support our basic argument that policy analysts need a holistic framework suited to 
measuring how economic and non-economic factors interact and contribute to conditions 
of economic growth separate from the way they interact to effect levels of economic 
development. 
Business Climate 
As noted in the earlier section, the politics within a state define its policy 
environment. The nature of these policies affects the behaviors of businesses and 
individuals alike. As businesses begin to grow they are confronted with a myriad of 
challenges. Do they invest and expand in local facilities? Do they build a new facility? 
Do they relocate to another, more attractive jurisdiction? So it is imperative that planners 
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and politicians have a tool that can interpret how these policies shape the business 
communities perception of the state and can anticipate how these businesses will respond 
to government actions.  
While the terms used to define a state’s business climate vary widely, the majority 
of the operational definitions focus on gauging how a state’s tax or regulatory 
environment affects its prospects for attracting or retaining business. Fisher (2005) 
collected a variety of business climate indices from across the states. His work reveals 
how all the institutions publishing an index of business climate believe they have 
captured the mix of conditions that improves the capacity or potential for economic 
growth. While this list of potential indicators is endless, the indicators selected seem to 
ebb and flow between measures that the literature considers to be a indicators of 
economic growth: changes in per capita income, changes in the GSP; and those that may 
result from growth, higher levels of educational attainment, lower crime rates. These 
inconsistencies support Fisher’s (2005) indictment that the publishers of these indices 
base their claim of value by employing “circular reasoning” (p. 2). His findings that the 
only thing these indices have in common is their claim that locations with “lower taxes 
and fewer government regulations are better” support his critique of a strong ideological 
biases running though all these reports (p. 2).  
While Fisher (2005) naturally questions the utility of using these indices to 
modify policies of growth, he fails to offer any explicit comparisons of how each index 
performs relative to its ability to predict or explain changes in the levels of economic 
growth or development seen across the American states.  
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In spite of Fisher’s (2005) warnings concerning the utility that should be attached 
to an index of business climate, the popular press and state web sites are riddled with  
support for using these indexes as benchmarks for improving a state’s prospect for 
economic growth ( MDF, 2003). In large part this results from the way states currently 
compete to attract and retain businesses.  It turns out that reporting performance along the 
dimensions of one or more of these indices is a good way to communicate the value that 
an independent body attaches to living and working in a state. Based on the advertising 
space that states purchase to tout their performance in one of more of these rankings one 
gets the impression that these indices of business climate must be capturing the attention 
of some businesses. Unfortunately the headline-like exposure awarded this term has 
caused it to find its way into the lexicon of economic policy. A scan of the Department of 
Economic and Community Development web sites from several states reveals just how 
many states are using their standing in one or more of these indexes to communicate their 
competitive position and to attract new business prospects (MDF, 2003). 
So it is not surprising to discover that states like Washington have begun to use 
their standing in these rankings to justify changes in their tax policies and to adjust their 
approach to the use of tax incentives to attract and retain businesses 
(www.cfed.org/go/scorecard). The fact that states have adjusted their  polices to shift 
their position in these rankings has spurred criticism from groups like the American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). The AFSCME’s 
suggestion that the revenues lost from the tax incentives directed at improving a state’s 
business climate simply shifts the tax burden from businesses and onto working families 
is echoed by other critics of these practices. The basis for their argument is that over time 
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the perpetuation of government incentives makes it more difficult for local governments 
to sustain public spending. The AFSCME warns that incentives to improve economic 
growth in the short run do so at the expense of the quality of life (AFSCME, 1988). 
While the AFSCME does not quantify these impacts, their warning underscores the 
danger of adopting a benchmark from a business climate index that focuses on directing a 
policy agenda of less government and lower taxes.  This is simply another example 
demonstrating the importance of quantifying the relationship between a government’s 
actions to intervene in markets and the level of economic growth or development within 
the state.  
The remainder of this section examines the body of research that suggests 
improving the measure of business climate will improve a state’s prospects for economic 
growth. This is accomplished by assessing the relationship between measures of business 
climate and the two silos that have long dominated economic growth theories: place-
based theories and people-based theories.  
Business climate and placed-based theories of economic growth. 
Location-based theories center on assessing how a firm makes the all important 
decision on where to locate facilities, where to expand existing operations or whether to 
withdraw operations from geography. Blair and Premus (1987) studied how the location-
based theories of economic growth have evolved. Much of their work focused on the 
nature of economic clusters located around the Silicon Valley area of California and 
along the high technology strip of businesses located along Route 128 in Boston, 
Massachusetts. At their inception these theories were simple transportation-based, cost- 
minimization strategies. Today, they have evolved into a series of hybrid theories 
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directed at capturing the role that technology plays in driving growth in the new economy. 
Included in these newer theories are factors that measure the technical competence of the 
local work force, the cost of state and local taxes, the attractiveness of a state, and factors 
that contribute to the quality of life. These authors conclude that whenever a firm is 
operating in the mode of the traditional economy its production costs remain strongly 
influenced by the physical location of the business. This supports the notion that in 
certain markets the decision of where to locate has an influence over the firm’s ability to 
position a competitive offer. Included in these author’s list of factors contributing to a 
firm’s decision on where to locate are the expansiveness of a state’s infrastructure, the 
composition and cost of its labor pool, the structure of local and state taxes, the quality of 
life, and the stability of governmental policies.  
As noted in the earlier sections of this literature review, Blakely and Bradshaw 
(2002) posit that the economic development theories of the past have focused on 
monitoring and measuring factors that influence the ‘r’ or resource component of this 
equation. Of course, this is consistent with expectations. The variables associated with ‘r’ 
are generally defined as those that influence the firm’s production costs. While the actual 
values associated with each component of ‘r’ will be specific to an individual firm, many 
of these values will reflect costs that are ubiquitous across all firms operating within an 
industrial sector. The inference to be drawn from the literature supports the suggestion 
that for those firms operating in the traditional economy these costs are driven by the 
firm’s physical location.  
The factors influencing both the capacity and the resource component of this 
equation are frequently embedded into the index that defines a state’s business climate: 
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the expansiveness of a state’s infrastructure, the composition and cost of its labor pool, 
the structure of local and state taxes, the quality of life, and the stability of governmental 
policies.  Despite being confronted by nearly two decades of literature touting the 
dominance that one or more of those factors play in defining levels of growth, Blair 
(1991) insists that many of the more subjective, less quantifiable variables such as those 
discussed in the next section, and thought to define the structure of a state’s political 
climate, while poorly documented, may in fact be equally important. 
Porter (1998) reveals that the formation, depth, and support that the governments 
provide to key economic clusters have a significant influence over the level of economic 
growth within a state. He defines a cluster as, “a geographical concentration of 
interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related 
industries, and associated institutions, specifically universities, trade associations” (p. 
197).  His efforts to link the treatment of clusters to conditions of economic growth has 
led investigations to decipher the role that physical location might play in predicting 
growth in the new, knowledge-based economy. Porter (1998) also takes stock of the 
diminished capacity that governments possess as they try and render support to domestic 
firms that are confronted by the challenge of participating in global markets. One 
proposal for addressing this challenge is to have governments intervene in markets in 
ways that increase their control over the local economy. This can be accomplished by 
shifting the state’s policy agenda towards micro-economic policies that conform to 
meeting the needs that are unique to a core group of economic entities, or in his terms, 
industrial clusters. Examples of this would include efforts by local municipalities to link 
the creation of tax increment financing districts to efforts that attract specific types of 
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businesses to the location. Such efforts might include the development of business parks 
where the incubators within that park are designed to meet the needs of a particular class 
of manufacturers: biotechnology, advanced materials production, information technology 
and the like.  
The literature is generally supportive of the idea of governments intervening in 
support of industrial clusters. This strategy has been tried in several states and has been 
shown to preserve jobs and stabilize the local economy (Porter, 2000). As noted earlier, 
the factors that motivate businesses operating within the same economic sector to relocate 
are defined by a broad range of variables. While many of these variables represent a set 
of cost drivers that are shared by all participants in that vertical market, other costs are 
unique to the firm. They may reflect the conditions associated with servicing a local 
market or staying within proximity of a political jurisdiction. So before a state can 
embrace Porter’s recommendations and establish a suite of micro-economic policies, the 
government needs to possess the capacity to evaluate how the policies in place today 
encumber or enhance the ability of a firm to achieve its business goals. Regardless of the 
industry segment these goals continue to be defined as operating profitability and 
attracting capital. 
Porter (1998, 2000) did more than consider the importance of clusters: he 
examined what motivated their behaviors. After examining the decision trees these 
companies used to formulate a business location decision, he discovered several instances 
where firms within the same industrial segment were basing their location decisions in 
response to competitive threats. His analysis exposed these threats as economic in nature 
and found them to be shared by all producers in that market. He concluded that because 
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the driving force behind decisions on where to locate originated from the dynamics 
influencing the industry in which the firm operated, these types of decisions were not 
amenable to being set into a universal law or theory.  
A slightly different conclusion was reached by Evans-Klock (2005). After 
exploring the process that Japanese automakers used to formulate decisions on where to 
locate plants in North America, the investigator discovered the location decision was 
driven by a desire to design greater flexibility into the labor pool. By selecting a location 
where the labor force was able to operate outside the control of unionized auto workers 
the company was able to redefine the organizational structures of the plant and create the 
same high performance, flexible work systems used in Japan. During this same time 
frame several other automakers, including General Motors, continued to locate or expand 
in proximity to existing resources and within range of the infrastructure centered in the 
Midwest. To a large extent these findings counter Porter’s assertions on what motivates 
firms to locate. Here investigators found firms operating in the same industry giving 
somewhat different reasons for their preference for a location. In the Japanese example 
the preference is for locations that offer a differential advantage over the competition, in 
this case in wages and in more efficient modes of organizing labor. They also base their 
preference on a desire to stay aligned to the core business model and operating 
philosophy of the parent organization.  
Porter’s (1990, 2000) statements that there are always other factors motivating a 
firm to exploit a specific, internally-defined strategic advantage allows him to escape the 
criticism arising out of these more recent findings. He indicates there will always be 
cases when these types of strategic factors will trump the central tenets of traditional 
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location theory.  In those instances, the dynamics within the firm will dominate a location 
decision.  
By elevating the requirement that governments must understand the forces that 
motivate these types of business decisions, Porter (1998) is supporting our hypothesis 
that a government’s capacity to manage these conditions influences the level of economic 
growth that can be enjoyed within the jurisdiction of a state. Porter’s (1998,2000) work 
investigating the benefits of economic cluster leaves little doubt that to the extent that the 
sources of these stimuli are better understood, policy makers will be able to customize 
programs that enhance the level of growth and development in their locale. Since the 
amount of interaction between the public and private sector has a direct bearing on how 
well policy cycles and business cycles are integrated, some method for inferring this level 
of interaction should improve our ability to predict or explain the conditions leading to 
economic growth.  
The belief that location decisions are motivated by the profit maximizing 
constructs of neo-classic economic theory led Witt (2002) to re-examine the behaviors 
leading to growth as it is defined by the Schumpeterian cycle of growth: growth through 
endogenous change. His work reveals that the driving force behind the Schumpeterian 
cycles of creative destruction, growth followed by decline and rejuvenation, is best 
represented by a measure of the firm’s capacity to survive the natural evolution of market 
forces. Like Porter (1998), Witt observed that the key to anticipating how a firm will 
respond to changes in market conditions is through a more thorough understanding of the 
forces that motive it to succeed: capture more market share, vertical expansion of product 
lines and the like. In reaching the conclusion that the decision processes associated with 
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business location, expansion or contraction, are composed of a very deep mix of 
psychographics, Witt (2002) provides a justification for those that believe the proper role 
of government is one of facilitation not intervention: the system is simply too complex to 
be centrally managed.  
In their theoretical investigation to gauge the influence that measures of industrial 
productivity play in defining economic growth, Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen 
(2003) developed a cross country and cross industry analysis that found measures of 
innovation and research and development useful in identifying productivity changes 
occurring within an economy.  They linked variations in productivity to changes in the 
rate of technology transfer and to the institution’s ability to protect intellectual property. 
They connected performance in each of those categories to differences in the structure of 
government policies and the organization of their institutions. Since their work also 
attributed these differences in productivity to variations in the physical location of the 
industries we continue to categorize these under the heading of placed-based theories. As 
a side note, these authors considered the social rate of return from investments in research 
and development (R & D) to be understated. If this were proven true, then a case can be 
made that a legitimate role of government is to accelerate economic growth by increasing 
the level of investments in certain innovative processes. Whether this behavior is 
representative of intervention or facilitation is exposed in the findings and is discussed 
later in this manuscript.   
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Business climate and human capital theories of economic growth. 
While the strategies associated with cost minimization are seen as the common 
thread that runs through the fabric of every business strategy, and labor is often seen as a 
cost to be managed, there is a growing appreciation of the value that a skilled and 
dedicated workforce plays in mitigating cost. Certainly there is an understanding of the 
relationship between poor labor relations and lower productivity. The desire to increase 
the value of the employee is reflected in the way they are expected to participate in the 
life of the business: employee involvement, consensus building and six sigma quality 
initiatives are all ways that employees are being asked to contribute to the economic 
performance of a business. This desire to establish a more engaged workforce is being 
reflected in some of the theories that relate the perceived value of human capital to 
decisions businesses make when they decide to relocate. 
Evans-Klock (2005) found that the Japanese automobile manufacturers sought 
locations where the labor market was conducive to establishing high performance work 
systems over those geographies that offered incentives, expertise, or where the 
infrastructure was already centered on supporting the manufacturing of automobiles. In 
this instance the managing directors of this Japanese firm rated the benefit of moving to a 
region of higher labor efficiencies (lower cost, and more flexible work rules) , above the 
benefits of locating to a region proximal to suppliers, vendors, a legacy infrastructure, 
and a trained labor force. As stated earlier, their decision was based on the desire to 
redefine a labor environment and secure a long term competitive advantage within their 
industry. They sought out locations that would allow them to emulate the business 
practices mandated by the parent company. Clearly the factors that weighed most heavily 
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in this recent decision ran contrary to those that have long dominated traditional location 
theory. Evans-Klock’s (2005) found this decision to be in stark contrast to a series of 
decisions in which General Motors continued to locate and expand in the mid-west. The 
decision process used by the Japanese automakers highlights the way that the traditional 
elements of the location theory have been eclipsed by newer concepts that elevate the 
value of human capital. In a very real sense, the findings by Evans-Klock cast a thin 
shadow over Porter’s (2000) conclusions that clusters play an important role in defining 
and possibly predicting future economic growth. However, the study by Evans-Klock 
serves to reaffirm the Schumpeterian notion that the evolutionary component of 
economic growth is driven from changes within the firm or markets. It appears that this 
evolutionary and somewhat ephemeral character of growth originating endogenously has 
stymied efforts to create a unified theory capable of encapsulating explanations for cycles 
of economic growth and economic development. In his assessment of Schumpeter’s 
theory of economic development, Witt (2002) expresses his concern: “ …the debate on 
the Schumpeterian hypothesis concerning the relationships between innovativeness and 
market structure, has made great progress, [yet] the proper place of  innovations and the 
motivation to pursue them within an evolutionary theory of the economic process still 
needs clarification” (p. 21).  
In a study based on the behavioral dimensions of human capital in Danish firms, 
Lentz and Mortensen (2005) discovered that changes in job types, changes in economic 
security, and changes in prospects for employment stability motivated workers to relocate 
from firms with low productivity to those of higher productivity. They found the rate of 
mobility to be an important contributor to rate of economic growth. The finding that 
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economic growth can be achieved by encouraging the migration of knowledge workers to 
move across firms updates the Schumpeterian notion that expects to find growth spawned 
from within the cycle of creative destruction occurring within the firms operating in an 
industry or an economy (1934). 
The literature supports what most economists have been saying for a long time, 
that the epoch of economic turmoil is created by entrepreneurs seeking to define new 
ways of meeting the demands of rapidly changing global markets. Like the mythical 
Phoenix, the innovative and productive capacity of this new worker will give rise to a 
new economic structure, replete with innovative modes of development and new methods 
of production. By and large this new economy links the fortunes of economic growth and 
productivity to advances in the fields of information technology, energy, biotechnology, 
and advanced manufacturing. The recent advances in both the production and use of 
information technology have led to the development of what some now call the new, 
knowledge-based-economy (KBE). The momentum within this new market has increased 
the demand for human capital. This shift in the demand for resources, from physical to 
human capital, is largely responsible for the disequilibrium observed within both our 
social and economic systems. In seeking to capture the importance that Blakely and 
Bradshaw (2002) and others ascribe to the influence human capital plays in the future of 
economic growth, many of the institutions publishing a business climate index have 
adopted measures that indicate the level of educational attainment within a state. This 
seems reasonable as most of the literature attaches a high significance to the relationship 
between education and measures of economic prosperity. So it is with interest that we 
find Galor’s (2005) research running a bit contrary to the popular notion that levels of 
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educational attainment are an indicator of future economic activity. While he agrees that 
policymakers’ efforts to increase access to better education will improve the comparative 
advantage of an individual, he finds the lack of structure associated with the 
implementation of these policies counterproductive to achieving that goal. To the extent 
that this lack of structure fails to elevate human capital across the entire social strata he 
considers such policies a failure. He places the responsibility for alienating individuals 
from participating in the new economy squarely onto the backs of institutions. One can 
logically assume that there is a spectrum of inclusiveness and that somehow this is linked 
to the demographics of a state.  Factors such as age distribution and income, its legacy 
economic structures, levels of educational attainment, its political climate, and ultimately, 
its capacity to innovate, would all be expected to influence the rate at which a society can 
absorb and take advantage of these educational opportunities.  
Alternatively, the research conducted by Lentz and Mortensen (2005) and Klettle 
(2002) highlights how the investments in education and in research and development 
have created a series of innovative structures the likes of which have been shown to 
improve the quality and quantity of intellectual capital. So while Galor’s (2005) work 
might provide one with reason to pause and begin to question the amount of spillover 
benefits coming from investments in education, the consensus within the literature 
continues to suggest that such investments, whether sourced from within the  private 
sector or the public sector, enhance the state’s prospect for improving its economic 
condition.  Since the call to spark more innovation from within a society usually evokes 
policies to expand investments in education, Galor’s (2005) work should serve as a 
reminder that investments in education, or for that matter any number of other 
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government-funded remedies, must be accompanied by a cohesive strategy of 
implementation. In the end this is not about finding solutions, it is about understanding 
trade-offs. Gauging the effects of the trade-offs that occur in this complex arena of 
economics policy carries some weighty consequences.  The ability to manage 
implementations, analyze trade-offs, and unravel cause from effect can all be tied to the 
quality and the capacity of the body politic. 
The conclusion to be drawn from a distillation of the literature is clear: to the 
extent that the business climate benchmark selected by a state continues to be linked to 
the older, location-based theories of economic growth, the longer their policies will 
isolate firms from enjoying the kind of organic growth generated by cycles that drive 
markets to purge inefficiencies and reward innovators. Oddly enough, the current practice 
to use these indices selectively may explain why business climate indices have not 
established the normative claim of spawning policies that improve business attraction and 
retention within a state.  
Summary business climate.  
Fisher (2005) does not test the interrelationships between improvements in 
economic growth and the adoption of any of the major indexes of business climate. In 
more recent work Kreft (2003) examined the impact that very specific indicators of 
innovation, entrepreneurial activity and venture capital had on conditions of economic 
growth. He found that there is a one-way causal relationship between state 
entrepreneurial activity and venture capital: entrepreneurial activity causes the inflow of 
venture funding, not the reverse.  
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Based on this review, a clear way to test the effect of a state’s business climate on 
levels of economic growth or development is to define the interaction between a specific 
set of indices and the changes in levels of growth, measured both as changes in gross 
state product and per capita income occurring across a suite of states. Determining 
whether a business climate index can predict changes in the levels of economic growth or 
development will aid in an assessment of its utility as a benchmark for altering policy. 
Political Climate 
Political theory supports the premise that the composition and make-up of a 
government affects its economic policy. The actions governments take are a reflection of 
its political climate. Thus the measure of political climate affects the shape, form and 
character of a state’s economic policy. There have been numerous attempts to frame a 
definition of political climate. Those deemed suitable to achieving the goals of this study 
led to an examination of how the literature defines and measures political ideology and 
how it defines and measures the capacity of a state to manage its affairs.  
This section explores the various pathways that political scientists and politicians 
have traveled to define the political climate of a region. The literature review revealed the 
rationale behind the measures most commonly used to define political climate: those of 
political ideology and political culture.  A review of the studies in each of these areas 
provides the waypoints for designing a methodology that assesses whether a state 
possesses the political will to change its economic fortunes.   
The second dimension of a region’s political climate is defined by measuring its 
capacity to manage. In recent years the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, under 
funding from the Pew Foundation, has measured the management capacity of state 
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governments.  According to Maxwell, a state’s capacity to manage its affairs is closely 
linked to its ability to adjust policy and respond to the broad base of socio-economic 
needs that are expressed by constituents and local businesses. 
The perspectives on what constitutes a suitable definition of political climate vary. 
In their treatise on the role that location and space theories play in economic development, 
Blair and Premus (1993) suggest that while political climate is a major factor in a firm’s 
decision on where to locate, their investigations only consider it applicable when the 
location decisions are being made on an international scale. By focusing their definition 
of political climate on levels of government stability, these authors presuppose that 
whenever a location decision is constrained to selecting a state or region within the 
developed economies of the west, political climate plays a minor role. It is worth noting 
that this assumption runs counter to their own statements claiming that whenever a 
region’s political climate contains elements known to support a business’ ability to make 
sound investments it becomes a major factor in that firm’s decision on where to locate. 
Since it is well within the purview of individual states to enact policies that directly 
impact a business’ returns on such investments, it seems only reasonable to test this 
aspect of Blair’s criteria and assess whether the variations in the political climates across 
the states have had an influence on the variations in economic prosperity. 
To a large extent the difficulty associated with obtaining objective measures of a 
state’s political climate stem from the fact that while the definition of this term is 
generally understood by political scientists, it is a relative newcomer to the lexicon of 
economic policy. Elazar’s (1984) investigations to define and categorize the political 
culture of states have redefined the boundaries traditionally used to segregate political 
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ideologies. His work defines and characterizes three political sub-cultures: individualistic, 
moralistic and traditionalist. He then hypothesizes that identifying the presence or 
absence of these sub-cultures enables one to explain the political views of constituents 
concerning the role that government should play within that society. 
In general parlance, whenever the term political climate is bantered about by 
politicians and members of the press, it can be considered an attempt to define the 
ideological shift occurring within or across one of Elazar’s subcultures. Certainly when 
the term is employed by the mainstream media it rarely describes anything more than a 
small ideological shift somewhere in a subset of a much larger social setting. From an 
academic perspective this constrained perspective fails to define the role that a broad 
array of political factors plays in motivating the actions within a state. To help close this 
gap, this investigation searched the literature for a method suited to translating a state’s 
political culture into one of political climate. This effort required extracting measures 
from the broad ecosystem of political factors that Gray et.al. (2004), Hanson (1993), Dye 
(2002) and others consider influential to determining a state’s policy-making 
environment…“Its long standing historical and cultural patterns, contemporary public 
opinion and ideology, and the influence of national trends” (Gray, p. 22).  
While it is well accepted that public opinion influences the shape and definition of 
some types of policy, it is unclear how public opinion in a state influences such broad 
reaching policy areas as economic growth and development. Part of the reason for this 
uncertainty stems from the fact that everyone tends to view their economic growth issues 
differently. This makes translating the problems that are voiced by a vocal few into a 
solution that satisfies the needs of many much more difficult. Saiz and Clark (2004) link 
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this problem of perception to the way policy makers view and interpret economic theory. 
As pointed out earlier, there are situations in the life of a state when the government may 
need to step in and provide incentives to insure that a legacy industry invests in ways that 
help secure the economic future of their employees. However, if public opinion considers 
it more important that government focus on attracting new businesses then the 
government is going to be confronted with a different set of challenges. In the former 
condition the policy maker analyzes and then addresses the challenge from within the 
realm of the variables that define the location theory of economic development (Blair and 
Premus, 1993). For example, the policy options available are shaped by some of the more 
traditional choices that states have used to help mitigate the cost associated with some of 
the firm’s basic production factors: tax breaks on capital investment, support for labor 
training, or simply alter the regulatory environment for the firm in that location.  In the 
case where the government’s strategy is to focus on business attraction there is a need for 
the body politic to understand the role that infrastructure and quality of life play in 
attracting new business.  
Since economic policy is made through a political process we have focused this 
part of the literature review on exploring what we know about the forces that motivate 
political change. From there we can decipher the role that a state’s political climate plays 
in spawning economic growth and economic development.  
The literature is clear that regulatory environment within a state is a reflection of 
its political climate. In certain cases the regulatory environment is seen as an impediment 
to increasing levels of economic growth. David Truman (1981) has argued that while 
regulatory policies of the type enacted by the EPA and OSHA are affected by a relatively 
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stable group of actors, other policies, such as those associated with redistribution, for 
example, tax incentives offered to a business, are more defined, and tend to be formulated 
in an arena of public awareness.  The way different forces act to influence different types 
of policy is best understood from the vantage point of how policy is created.  
One perspective on how government policies are created suggests the importance 
that government actors, public opinion, bureaucracy, lobbyists and interest groups play in 
shaping the policy process. Kingdon’s (1984) work in this area describes how shifts in 
policy streams and policy windows motivate changes in a policy agenda. He asserts that 
three sets of variables (the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream), 
while operating autonomously will converge when either a problem window or a political 
window is opened. The opening of a problem window usually follows the incidence of a 
major economic or social problem. Most openings occur when the issue at hand can only 
be addressed by elevating it to those responsible for governance. Kingdon reveals that a 
political stream opens in response to changes of the administration, changes in the 
ideological underpinnings of the representatives, or when there is a shift in the mood of 
the citizens. Since the most dramatic change occurs when each policy stream is active 
and when the actions under consideration are in response to political stimuli, it is 
important to understand which factors motivate change within each of the streams. A 
simple extrapolation of Kingdon’s theory allows us to posit the following: when citizens 
continue to experience suboptimal economic performance, it is quite likely there will be a 
convergence of the problem, policy and political streams. This convergence is followed 
by the opening of a problem window. Through this opening citizens become exposed to 
the issues and have an opportunity to engage in the political process. At that point they 
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can elect to open the policy window and pressure their lawmakers to make a shift towards 
policies known to shape economic growth, economic development, or both; or they can 
leave the window closed. Understanding when it is prudent to open a window and when it 
is best left closed is explored in this study by measures of a state’s capacity to manage its 
affairs.  
Political ideology: propensity to regulate. 
Another way that political scientists have measured political climate is from 
within the realm of its ideological bias. Based on the literature, political ideology can be 
defined by measuring a state’s propensity towards regulation and by default the growth of 
state government. Gray and Hanson (2004), Lester (1990), and Elazar (1984) all endorse 
the basic tenet that suggests the extent to which the ideology of a state can be defined as 
liberal indicates its political culture being prone to endorse increasing levels of 
government regulation. Likewise, the extent to which a state’s ideology is defined as 
conservative seems indicative of a political culture somewhat less supportive of 
increasing regulations.  
In a review of the literature to examine the relationship between economic growth 
and the size of the public sector, Gordon and Wang (2004) found numerous 
contradictions and conflicts in the results presented. While Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2002) and others demonstrate a positive relationship between economic 
growth and the quality of the government institution, those works appear a bit contrary to  
Barro’s (1997) findings that provide evidence of a negative relationship between 
economic growth and an increase in public expenditures.  The influence that increased 
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expenditures has over levels of economic growth and whether those increases lead to 
improvements in the quality of government or its size are explored a bit later. 
Lester’s (1990) discovery that a state’s political ideology explained differences in 
the regulatory activity across the states led this investigation to collect data as a time-
series and adopt regression models using lagged exogenous variables. This method 
attempts to capture the non-instantaneous effect that measures of political climate have 
over the regulatory environment. This approach is used to frame the way each variable 
influences the levels of economic growth and development. A detailed description of how 
these models are structured is provided in the methods section of this study.  
Political ideology: government growth.  
One of the more traditional methods for measuring ideology involves establishing 
the extent to which the state legislature is either Democratic or Republican. In states with 
a liberal ideology citizens see a legitimate role for government and thus one would expect 
to witness an expansion of the public sector. The opposite is, of course, true for 
conservative states.  
Work by Gray and Hanson (2004) affirms Lester’s findings that a state’s political 
ideology can be measured by its predisposition towards regulation. Gray and Hanson 
(2004) identified three proxies for measuring the tendency towards regulation: patterns 
and priorities of expenditures, patterns and priorities assigned to revenue sources, and 
government employment as a percentage of total state employment.  
Another approach to gauge the ideology of a state is to examine the size of its 
government. Studies by both Garand (1993) and Kapeluck (2001) demonstrate the link 
between the size of a government and these polar measurements of ideology. In their 
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investigation to uncover the relationships between economic development (what we call 
growth), the nature of political institutions, and the scope or size of the public sector, 
Gordon and Wang (2004) discovered a tie between the regulatory factors they used to 
judge the qualities of political institutions and the improvements in economic growth. 
Their research failed to uncover any empirical evidence to suggest that the size of 
government affected economic growth or that the size of government influenced the 
regulatory behaviors of public institutions.  
The literature supports our approach to explaining the political ideology of a state 
from dimensions that compare its level of employment in the state and local government 
against those of its cohorts.  
Political ideology: responsive government vs. excessive government. 
Some of the earliest works to explain the reason for government growth were 
conducted by Wagner (1877/2004). His investigations considered government growth to 
be a function of the economic and social changes that were accompanying our shift 
towards industrialization and urbanization. Consistent with the axioms of what has come 
to be known as Wagner’s Law, we would expect to find both the form and structure of a 
state’s political climate evolving in parallel with the changes in its economic structure. If 
this relationship holds then there must be a link between measures of economic growth, 
measures indicative of a government’s responsiveness, and its movement along a 
spectrum that gauges its capacity to address such change. 
In investigations to explain the differences in government growth across states 
over time, Lowery and Berry (1983) examined a series of works that isolates and 
characterizes the two theoretical pillars that define strategies of government growth: 
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measures that indicate a responsive government and measures that suggest excessive 
government. They contend that the measure of a responsive government can be 
determined by judging the way the scale of government ebbs and flows with the 
expectations and demands expressed by its citizens. Alternatively, they characterize as 
excessive those state governments in which the government supersedes the role that 
constituents would like to see them occupy. The importance that these findings attach to 
the size of government justifies our approach to gauging political ideology by 
normalizing the width and breadth of employment in a state’s public sector.   
Lowery and Berry (1983) emphasize an important indicator that must be 
appended to the ecosystem used to describe a state’s political climate: the responsiveness 
of government to the interests expressed by its constituency. Here we focus on what the 
literature says about how constituencies will respond to conditions that improve 
economic growth and economic development.  Lowery and Berry’s (1983) survey of the 
literature indicated that the most common methods for gauging the responsiveness of 
government are defined by measures of party control and ideological leanings, the 
presence or absence of inter-party competition, and the prevailing political culture. While 
there is the notion that a responsive government is associated with the political culture 
defined as liberal, one normally thought of as endorsing the continued growth and 
expansion of government, it is actually found that whenever that expansion is the result 
of policies known to favor economic growth, such as might be seen from increased 
expenditures and staffing to support expanding the math and science programs in public 
education, then these acts can also be considered part of a conservative ideology. 
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Kapeluck’s (2001) search for a linkage between party control and government 
responsiveness tested the long-held notion that a protracted period of liberal control, or 
what we might generally term as leadership under control of Democratic parties, 
increases the size of government, while control under conservative or Republican parties 
leads to governments that are relatively smaller and more stable.   
Of course many investigations have linked the idea of a responsive or excessive 
government to a conservative or liberal regime. While Kapeluck (2001) expanded his 
investigation and explored the relationship between the responsiveness of governments in 
situations of both high and low levels of party competition, he was unable to associate 
changes in either the scale of government spending or its relative rate of growth to the 
absence or presence of a political monopoly. Finally, an examination of the seminal 
works on state politics by Dye (1980, 2002), and Gray and Hanson (2004) also failed to 
support the claim that a measure of inter-party competition can be used to gauge 
responsive government. This has left many in the academic community wondering if 
there is any relationship between the amount of inter-party competition and the 
responsiveness of governments.  
Kapeluck (2001) and Garand (1993) also tested the assumption that whenever the 
political cultures of a state are judged liberal the growth of its government can be 
explained as the outcome of a citizenry willing to accept an expanded role for 
government. Likewise, in the political cultures of the more conservative states one 
expects to find its citizens endorsing policies that minimize government regulation.  Their 
findings presented a bit of a conundrum. Providing that an allocation of public resources 
could be shown to produce incentives for economic growth, they found conservative 
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states were apt to allocate more resources. These included incentives to expand 
infrastructure and support policies that lead to a more liberal distribution of tax incentives. 
In these and other cases, the justification for increased government intervention by these 
conservative states was predicated on the assumption that such actions would act to 
correct policies of over-regulation and thus accelerate free market practices. The 
expectation that these actions would generate more growth at a faster pace was 
inconclusive. 
Much of what we think about when we consider Elazar’s works tends to focus on 
the definition and influence that a political culture has in a society. However, we can 
easily extrapolate Elazar’s (1984) description of how various cultural modes influence 
the state’s political systems into an examination of how these cultures would influence 
the size of the public sector. States exhibiting the characteristics he attributes to an 
individualist subculture would endorse the operation of free and open markets and 
express a desire for smaller government. In those instances the legislative representatives 
from these states would embrace benchmarks from business climate indices supporting 
lower levels of taxation and smaller governments. States with moralist cultures would 
embrace government’s intervention to curb policies of economic growth as the 
constituencies would view such policies as complicit with a proliferation of market 
failures.  Often within these moralistic cultures the activity to spawn intervention is 
carried out by interest groups. As such the call to action may result in no call being 
placed, as moralist’s are likely to invoke the precautionary principle which simply states 
that if we are unable to accurately assess the policy’s impacts then do nothing. While 
such recommendations are made under the pretense of protecting the public’s interest, 
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this approach remains the subject of intense criticism both from neoclassic economists 
and those that follow classical liberalism. 
The final subculture examined in Elazar’s study is that of the traditionalist. He 
finds the states typifying a traditional culture to be indifferent to the role of government.  
Elazar’s (1984) classification of the way political subcultures influence state’s 
political systems reinforces one of the key assumptions of this study: assessing a state’s 
capacity for embracing policies of economic development and economic growth 
mandates a set of measures that can profile the political landscape of a state, something 
we have elected to define as its political climate.  
Antithetically, studies by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) confirm the role 
that a dominant political culture has on the behavior of the individuals residing within 
that political boundary. They tie the basic elements that dominate liberal or conservative 
viewpoints to the endorsement of liberal or conservative policy choices. As was the case 
with the investigations into the role of party control and inter-party competition, 
Erikson’s investigations to decipher whether changes in government size are a reflection 
of the prevailing political culture appear inconclusive.   
The question of whether a government’s responsiveness is related to its capacity 
to install the appropriate fiscal controls was investigated by Matsusaka (1995).  He finds 
that states with citizen referenda have lower levels of state spending.  This suggests that 
governments, in and of themselves, lack the capacity to install the type of controls that 
their constituency deems necessary to remain fiscally prudent. At first these findings 
appear to infer that states with high levels of referenda activity will have lower levels of 
taxation and then, almost by default, will exhibit a more favorable business climate. Such 
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a conclusion would be consistent with the literature’s suggestion that businesses prefer to 
locate and expand in areas that exhibit lower levels of taxation. Yet not all referenda 
states have low taxation and not all occupy a top tier ranking in terms that define their 
business climate. This brings us to the heart of this investigation: it matters why, where, 
and how a government spends its resources. For example, a state with an aging 
population might elect to under-fund local and secondary education while increasing 
support for health care and prescription drugs for the elderly. While the net result might 
be lower total expenditures, if other lawmakers determine that the revenues are not being 
equitably dispended for the purpose of expanding an agenda of economic growth, say by 
increasing the capacity of human capital by expanding investments in education, the state 
leaves itself open to being criticized for misallocation of resources. The literature also 
makes it clear that each of these types of allocation decisions are guided by a state’s 
political climate. Garnering a better understanding of the tenets that define the political 
climate of a state is crucial to determining the influence that such measures have over the 
state’s potential for increasing its level of economic activity. 
In a study to examine the influence that high demand groups have over levels of 
governmental response, Kapeluck (1991) noted that a positive relationship between the 
size of high demand groups within the general population and the level of government 
responsiveness was not unique to the demographic being served. There does not appear to 
be anything in the literature to suggest that the benefits emanating from these responsive 
styles of governments would be limited to citizens or that they would not apply equally to 
businesses and other groups with political influence.  
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Political ideology: excessive government and its effect on economic growth.  
The tenets of economic growth theory are useful for testing whether government 
has a positive or negative effect on growth. Today the most popular means of gauging its 
negative impact involves assessing those categorical values that define whether the 
actions taken by governments can be judged excessive.  The most common measures of 
excess are those that define the  methods and means of collecting revenues, the state’s use 
of debt (debt to GSP and non-interest spending), the influence of intergovernmental 
grants, (percentage of revenue vs. GSP)  and constituency size and its standard of living 
(per capita GSP).  Fisher (2005) highlights how the consensus among those publishing a 
business climate index is that the lower the collective revenues, the more positive the 
climate for economic growth.  
Singleton and Griswold (1999) take a slightly different tact and connect 
government size to functions deemed critical to expanding and growing in the new 
economy.  They suggest that the presence of multiple layers of jurisdiction impacts the 
policies of taxation, affects copyright protection, defines the nature of mergers and 
acquisitions, and establishes the level of consumer protection. However since the authors 
considers each of these functions a mandate placed on government by the new economy, 
they caution against focusing solely on the size of government. They submit that 
measures of excess within a bureaucracy and not its size are better indicators of judging 
whether the policy environment fosters or stymies innovation and growth. From their 
work one might infer that the easiest way to mediate the competition for jobs and 
business development amongst the states is with smaller government and fewer 
regulations. This recommendation would certainly be consistent with the neoclassic 
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approach of positioning markets, and not governments, as the clearing house for insuring 
efficient distributions.  This investigation will test the validity of such recommendations. 
The political and management capacity of governments.  
According to Honsdale (1981) political capacity is the measure of a government’s 
“… ability to anticipate and influence change; make informed and intelligent decisions 
about policy; attract and absorb resources…and evaluate current activities to guide future 
actions” (in Gray and Hansen, 2004, p. 395). As noted earlier, Lester’s (1990) approach 
is to define political capacity in terms used to measure political culture. He suggests 
creating this measure as a composite of variables that delineate the number and type of 
political parties, interest group relations, and the source of electoral support. The latter is 
generally defined by the level and source of campaign contributions.   
Due to the strong emphasis placed on predicting the influence that a political 
culture will have on a government’s performance (usually measured as policy outcomes), 
scant attention has been paid to examining how this same measure might influence the 
capacity of governments to manage. In the past, investigators have operated on the 
assumption that management capacity is closely associated with the relative size of a 
state’s government.  As a result, efforts to measure capacity have been limited to linking 
the state’s political culture with its fiscal policies. The Government Performance Project 
produced by Maxwell School at Syracuse University (GPP) offers insights into how a 
broad suite of variables typically tied to managing and monitoring business performance 
might be used to indicate whether a government possesses the management capacity to 
change and adapt (Syracuse, 2001). The variables they selected assessed management 
capacity  along a variety of fairly traditional dimensions, including financial management, 
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human resource management, information technology management, capital management 
and a catch-all category they call managing for results (Syracuse, 2001). In the GPP’s 
efforts to measures high and low capacity governments the researchers were careful to 
define management capacity as potential for performance and not as performance itself 
(Syracuse, 2001). They discovered that high-capacity governments focus on creating 
positive change and remain vigilant to the conditions that might impede management’s 
ability to innovate. High-performing institutions were also found to be learning 
organizations. They actively sought out and incorporated the experiences of others into a 
suite of best-practice benchmarks. This type of benchmarking was instrumental in 
helping those states create a shared vision of their future. This allowed those high-
performing states to build consensus around a set of actions that would improve their 
capacity to adapt and address change.  
The results from the GPP study offers insights into which governments have 
achieved high levels of management capacity, which were not trying, and which ones 
were either improving or regressing.  However, the Maxwell report is quick to point out 
that they are not providing a benchmark against which specific remedies are given; rather 
their goal is to articulate the conditions against which potential performance or 
management capacity can be gauged (Syracuse, 2001, Chapter 2).  
In a study along the same lines as the GPP, Malhotra (2002) examined the actions 
that states need to take to prepare members of society to transition to a new, knowledge-
based economy.  In that investigation he cites a government’s capacity to adapt and 
change as a critical factor for achieving economic growth.  In both instances the authors 
agree that future markets will operate at a rate-of-flux that will challenge the capacity of 
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governments to react in ways needed to support economic growth. The common themes 
running through the GPP and Malhotra’s (2002) report is one of readiness and 
preparation. Governments need to improve their capacity to adapt and change.  
This investigation embraces Maltotra’s observation that determining the source of 
variations in a government’s capacity and its responsiveness will become an increasingly 
important predictor of its level of economic growth and economic development.  
Summary of political climate. 
One of the leading controversies in the contemporary literature concerns the 
interrelationship between the size and direction of government growth and the measures 
adopted to gauge economic growth and, to a lesser degree, economic development.   
This portion of the literature review highlighted how several investigations that 
delve into the forces that shape the size of government or its rate of growth have tied 
these changes to measures of its political culture or its political ideology. Today,  
researchers in these fields are continuing to rely on some of the more subjective yet 
traditional measures of ideology: liberal or conservative; legislative structures that are 
dominated by democrats or republicans; and the influence of national trends towards 
more government or less government. While some of these studies touched on the 
influence that each measure plays in improving levels of economic growth, few have 
examined their influence on levels of economic development.  
In an effort to install some objectivity into the measure that defines a 
government’s capacity to manage, the Maxwell report offers an important new dimension 
to defining the political ideology of a state. Certainly the traditional measures that define 
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a state’s willingness to change have been missing a companion measure that gauges its 
capacity to actually implement and manage that change.  
The literature endorses the approach taken by this investigation that compares the 
political ideology across states by measuring their relative level of employment in state 
and local government and as a measure of state and local tax burdens. Combining each of 
those measures of ideology with an indicator that gauges a state’s capacity to manage its 
affairs provides this investigation with a holistic picture of the political climate within a 
state.  This collection of variables enhances the validity of our claim to have tested the 
influence that political climate has over levels of economic growth and economic 
development.   
This review highlights the importance of discerning what a government is willing 
to do from what it is capable of doing. Measuring and testing the effect that each of these 
variables has over levels of economic growth and development is considered a precursor 
to examining the interrelationships between a state’s political climate, its business climate 
and the conditions that will enhance levels of growth and development. Finally, the effort 
to segregate the actions a government is willing to take from those it is capable of taking 
fills a gap in the literature and offers a realistic and objective basis for comparing the 
influence that these non-economic variables have over the economic conditions across 
states.   
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CHAPTER 3: DATA SOURCES AND METHODS TO OPERATIONALIZE 
VARIABLES 
Introduction, Gaps in the Literature 
Theoretical basis for this analysis. 
The theoretical basis that Schumpeter (1934) develops to define economic growth 
as the outcome of creative destruction, a cycle driven by the competitive behaviors of 
actors operating in free and open markets, is based on the following precepts: (1) growth 
that is deemed sustainable is delivered in stages; (2) each stage is characterized by the 
way many actors, operating across many markets, respond to competitive pressures that 
are unique to their market niche; (3) the diversity of response helps to stabilize an 
economy as only rarely will the conditions that shape the response from one set of actors 
in one market coalesce into a common response from all actors in all markets; (4) while 
government plays a legitimate role in helping grow markets, its influence is optimal when 
its intervention is limited to correcting those market failures that degrade the quality of 
life for large segments of its population.  
Today there continues to be serious debate surrounding what, if any role 
governments should play in influencing both the duration and characteristic of these 
cycles. The goal of this investigation is to explore how a state’s political climate, defined 
by measures of its political ideology and measures used to gauge the government’s 
capacity to manage, has contributed to the variations in the level of economic growth and 
economic development observed across the American States.  
It is at this juncture that we expose a major gap in the literature. None of the prior 
studies on this topic have dissected a state’s political climate into elements that define its 
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political ideology separate from its capacity to manage. Likewise, none of the prior 
investigations have examined how factors commonly used to define a state’s political 
ideology, often considered a measure of its willingness to change, interact with factors 
that define the most basic element of any response: the capacity to do so. By electing to  
operationally define each factor from within a set of objective determinants,  this 
investigation provides an alternative framework for assessing how the political climate of 
a state, its willingness to change in response to prevailing economic conditions, and its 
capacity to shape a response that is appropriate, have influenced levels of economic 
growth and those of development.  
The methodologies selected for this investigation were designed to address the 
research questions posed by this investigation. The operational definitions for all the 
variables used in this investigation are presented in the following sections.  
Application of Theory 
Political theory supports the premise that the make-up of a government, 
conservative or liberal, Republican or Democratic, will influence how it frames and 
implements policy. However, establishing a set of non-partisan metrics capable of 
operationally defining make-up, or what some within academic circles refer to as political 
culture or political ideology, have proven illusive. As noted in the review of the literature,   
Gordon and Wang (2004) highlight the conflicts, contradictions, and inconsistencies 
associated with creating simple, direct, and objective determinations of how a state’s 
political ideology influences its policy choices.  
This investigation embraces the works of Lowery and Berry (1983), Garand 
(1993) and Kapeluck (2001), all of which suggest that a valid representation of a state’s 
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political climate can be gleaned from the measures of political ideology that dominates 
the jurisdiction. These investigators quantify ideology by measuring the relative size of 
the public sector, in this case the larger the size of government the more liberal the 
ideology. Towards that end we adopt as one indicator of political ideology measures that 
compare the relative size of employment in the public sector within each state. Lowery 
and Berry’s (1983) investigations explored the various ways this measure was used to 
assess whether the prevailing political ideology is excessive or responsive to meeting the 
needs of their constituents. Each of these studies has been instrumental in moving the 
determinants of political ideology out of the shadows of subjectivity and into the light of 
an objectively quantifiable variable.  This facilitates the adoption of measures well suited 
to the rigor of the statistical testing undertaken by this investigation. 
Finally, a close review of the works by Gordon and Wang (2004) and those of 
Malhotra (2002) reveals how the underlining quality of political institutions has 
influenced levels of economic growth.  By testing the influence the capacity to manage 
has on levels of economic growth and economic development this investigation creates a 
loose connection between the measures used to gauge the capacity of a government to 
manage and the overall quality of that institution. No direct test is made on the influence 
that the quality of the institution has over levels of growth or development.  
Considered collectively, these studies support our contention that crafting a 
holistic picture of a state’s political climate mandates an operational definition comprised 
of two distinct dimensions: (1) measures that define its political ideology or its 
willingness to change; and (2) measures that define its capacity to manage and by default 
its ability to manage change. This study posits that both measures are indicative of how 
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policy choices are formulated and implemented, and as such each is likely to exert its 
own influence on the variation in economic growth and development across the states.  
Finally, the efforts undertaken to define a state’s political climate from a set of 
objectively determined measures side steps any partisan critique of these results. 
Certainly, the ability to make non-partisan assessments of how political forces interact 
with economic forces to drive economic growth makes these results more palatable. In 
their review of the literature, Rodrik (2004) and Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) found the lack 
of objectivity a major impediment to the adoption of such findings.  
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The Operational Definition of Economic Growth 
Definition.  
For the most part, the measures of economic growth continue to rely upon the 
theoretical framework of the neoclassical economists. Freidman (1962) and his 
contemporaries support the notion that a measure of economic growth must capture the 
impact that competitive pressures operating in free markets create when they force 
producers to reorganize their factors of production. The assertion that increases in 
operational or management efficiency drive economic expansion allows the neoclassical 
economist to select quantifiable measures of economic output as their indicator of 
changes in the level of economic growth. However, within complex economic structures 
the ability to accurately measure growth requires that those assessments be made at both 
a macro level, within a state economy, and at the level of the individual. Consistent with 
those objectives, this investigation defines economic growth as a change in two of the 
most commonly used measures of economic output: changes in levels of gross state 
product (GSP) capture the breadth of change occurring at a macro level of a state’s 
economy, and changes in the levels of per capita income measure changes in the 
economic condition of individuals.  
 Justification. 
Investigations by Vaughn and Bearse (1981) examined the use of neoclassic 
metrics and considered them reliable indicators of changes occurring within an economy. 
Likewise, Schumpeter (1934) considers the ability to measure economic output to be a 
reliable indicator of how well the private sector is reorganizing its factors of production. 
This measure infers the level of economic growth and overall expansion. Dye’s (1980) 
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work examining the influence that levels of taxation had over levels of economic growth 
also relied on the neoclassic determinants of growth.  
It was not until the environmental movement of the late 1960’s and 70’s that 
arguments began to surface to counter the neoclassic view that more growth equates with 
a better quality of life. During that timeframe several of the suggestions put forth as 
alternative measures of growth were reviewed by North and Thomas (1973), and again, 
later, by Hoff (2001). For the most part their findings are consistent with those of Fisher 
(2005) and suggest that several of the alternatives proposed, such as measuring changes 
in the level of educational attainment, or changes in the accumulation of capital, are not 
measures of growth but are measuring the results of growth. The controversy over which 
measures cause growth and which measures are indicative of growth’s effect have led 
most investigators to return to the neoclassic view of measuring economic growth from 
quantitative measures of output such as GDP, GSP, and per capita income.  
Data source and type. 
The most widely accepted measure for determining changes in a state’s level of 
productive output, (GSP), and measures representing changes in the economic well-being 
of the individual, (per capita income), are used by this study to operationally define 
changes in the level of economic growth occurring within a state and changes in the 
economic growth experienced by the individuals residing in that state.  
The Bureau of Economic Analysis’ measure of the GSP in each of the 50 states 
was collected from across all economic sectors operating within that jurisdiction. These 
data were collected from 1980 to 2006. The absolute GSP value for each state in each 
year was recorded as reported. Each original value was then converted to represent the 
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percentage change over the prior year.  That value, the percent changes year to year, was 
tallied for each state in each year and was carried forward in this analysis.  
Measures of per capita income in each of the 50 states were tallied from the 
Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data were collected from 1987 
through 2005. The values were retained and carried forward in this analysis as absolute 
dollars. 
Limitations. 
 The limitations of adopting traditional neoclassical measures as our indicator of 
economic growth are cited by Rodrik (2004). The author’s critique focuses on how these 
measures fail to inspire the development of a culture of growth that can be judged 
sustainable. At the same time his assertion that policies for sustaining growth need to 
combine measures of government reforms with other non-economic measures resonates 
as an endorsement for assessing how a state’s political climate influences the conditions 
of economic growth as something separate and distinct from determining the influence it 
has over conditions of economic development. 
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 The Operational Definition of Economic Development  
Definition.  
The operational definition of economic development is based on Daly’s (1996) 
argument that in order to survive as a species mankind must shift its definition of social 
progress from measures of quantitative expansion in the economy, measures which we 
have come to call economic growth, to measures that can gauge a qualitative 
improvement in the quality of an individual’s life. His call for such a dramatic change 
reflects his desire to expose the shortfall of capitalist settings in which the social costs 
associated with achieving more growth occasionally supersedes the benefits that 
individuals or communities receive. Clearly an undaunted reliance on neoclassic 
measures ignores the unintended consequences that more growth may be creating in the 
lives of individuals.  The paradox of how capitalism’s choice for measuring social 
progress has impacted society at large, both for the better and for the worse, remains the 
subject of studies by economists and sociologists alike. Most of the qualitative 
determinants that Daly wants to see used to as a measure of progress are echoed in the 
QOL measures that political and social scientists use to quantify changes in the human 
condition. Consistent with Daly’s worldview, this study segregates the conditions of 
economic development from those of economic growth, and adopts as its proxy for 
economic development a set of QOL measures. This proxy is used to quantify and 
operationally define the levels of economic development within each state. 
The selection of QOL as a proxy for quantifying economic development also 
finds support in the work of Holmes (2002) and in the United Nations reports (2006). 
Both suggest the fallacy of measuring social progress from within the single dimension of 
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outputs that are the result of more growth. Finally, the use of QOL as a proxy for 
measuring changes in the level of economic development establishes a measure that 
bridges Schumpeter’s periods of growth and destruction. While it is beyond the scope of 
this work to analyze and dissect these iterations into two distinct periods, this 
investigation is interested in establishing a framework that can be used to profile how the 
residence time on each side of this cycle influences levels of economic growth or 
development. At this point we are only able to infer that cycles of economic growth are 
spurred by the competitive forces that create more efficient behaviors from within the 
private sector. Certainly the observations that most markets respond to competitive 
threats or substitute goods by making incremental improvements in efficiency confirms 
the assertion that within a complex economic structure any social cost attributed to the 
ebb and flow within a single market is muted by the oscillations taking place from the 
growth occurring across all sectors of that economy. Absent a force large enough to 
influence a diverse set of markets, one rarely finds markets responding in harmony to a 
set of competitive threats. So it is no surprise to find that the factor best suited to 
tempering government’s intervention in markets is the dynamism inherent in a market-
based economy.  At the other extreme is the tumult created when forces internal to 
markets and external to local economics collide to create wholesale destruction of 
markets. When that destruction disrupts the quality of life for a broad base of the 
population, governments must intervene and restore the level of economic development. 
While Schumpeter’s theories were not directed at the economic behavior of states, they 
allow one to assert that when a state languishes on one side of a cycle or the other it 
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displays a lack of the dynamism needed to increase its level of economic development 
and economic growth.  
A closer review of Schumpeterian theory suggests that the more rapid an 
economy accelerates through each period and the more pronounced the oscillation within 
each period; the more likely it is that the levels of both economic growth and economic 
development will increase. This step-wise function leads to more growth and yields a 
higher level of economic development. When this is properly choreographed it 
establishes a style of growth that even the most ardent critics of neoclassic economics 
would find socially acceptable.  
While Schumpeter (1934) stopped short of making any explicit references as to 
which measures he considered best suited to judging changes in the human condition, he 
was quick to suggest that whenever market failures lead to a wholesale deterioration in 
those conditions, then governments need to intervene to curtail any escalation in social 
costs. However, since he never states how to measure these conditions, his arguments for 
intervention never explicitly mention trigger points indicative of the ideal point in the 
cycle when government’s intervention is needed or considered optimal. As a result we 
can only infer that Schumpeter is relying on the capacity of government to respond to the 
events as they evolve. Such an expectation would seem reasonable as governments would 
be assumed to possess the capacity to react in ways that stem the impact that negative 
externalities have over a population.  So while Schumpeter (1934) suggests a more 
mechanical description of how this intervention might occur and Daly (1994) makes 
several references as to how such unintended costs are best defined by qualitative 
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measures, in the end both authors seem willing to abdicate this question of timing to the 
political process.  
Holmes’ (2002) efforts to create a QOL index from a framework of economic, 
social and demographic variables provided a template for selecting the indicators used in 
this investigation.  His investigation offers some precise guidelines for defining and 
quantifying the variables critical to constructing a valid quality of life index. 
While the operational definition of economic development developed for this 
investigation is consistent with Daly’s (1994) desire to measure social progress as a 
change in a series of measures that define quality of life, we necessarily limit these 
indicators to those that can be tied to the experiences of individuals, and not a community. 
A good solution to dealing with the paradox of measuring QOL for individuals separate 
from that of a community can be seen in the way the United Nations (UN, 2006) selects 
the indicators used to measure the Human Development Index. The measures for the HDI 
are specifically designed to capture changes in the quality of life of individuals. The 
approach taken by the UN to specify QOL at the level of the individual and not the 
community is used as a guideline to help define the elements needed to create the 
composite QOL index used in this study.  
The composite QOL index created for each state is represented by measures of 
educational attainment, poverty rates, crime rates, income, and health. Values for each of 
these indicators were collected over the time span from 1980 through 2005. 
 Justification. 
Spurred by the finding of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (Brundtland, 1987), Milbrath (1989), Daly and Cobb (1994) and others 
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raced to pick up the baton and begin replacing the neoclassical construct of  economic 
growth with measures that capture the unintended social cost associated with increasing 
levels of outputs. These individuals were anxious to define the impact that unbridled 
economic growth had on the sustainability of the natural environment and on the quality 
of life for members of a society.  
Despite three decades of work to differentiate the conditions of development from 
those of growth many of the citations continue to use the terms economic growth and 
economic development interchangeably. In their effort to delineate these conditions, 
Vaughn and Bearse (1981) suggest that while the measures of economic growth continue 
to be based on the quantitative changes in an economy, the conditions that define 
economic development are best depicted by measuring structural changes within an 
economy. By their definition these qualitative changes would include changes in the 
behavior and innovative capacity of institutions. The step taken by this study to define 
economic development as a variable separate and distinct from the measures used to 
define economic growth acknowledge the importance of partitioning how each condition 
is assessed.  
It is also important to point out that one of  Daly’s (1994, 1996) suggestions on 
how to shift a society’s measure of progress is the recommendation to adopt a set of 
qualitative metrics that capture how changes in a social system affect its capacity to 
support the constructs of intergenerational equity. This struggle to unravel the effects that 
free and open markets play in creating the type of wealth required to sustain gift-giving 
across generations was the subject of investigations by Bowles (1998), and by Banerjee 
and Newman (1993). As noted in the literature review, each of these investigators 
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highlights how a system void of wealth and beset by a low wage structure diminishes the 
capacity of a society to affect a transfer of intergenerational equity. So while Daly’s work 
provided this study with its justification for a proxy that defines changes in the level of 
economic development, his desire to measure a society’s capacity to support 
intergenerational equity relies on a set of theoretical constructs that defy measurement. 
Creating and testing the utility of this measure is both unnecessary and outside the scope 
of this investigation.   
But Daly is not alone in trying to quantify the impact that a policy of unbridled 
growth has on a society. As noted earlier, in their attempt to define economic 
development as something separate and apart from economic growth, Blakely and 
Bradshaw (2002) side-stepped the issue of quantification and chose to define economic 
development within the context of a social movement. Like Schumpeter (1934), Milbrath 
(1989) is quick to acknowledge the presence of a cyclical relationship between these two 
opposing states of nature, growth vs. development. He even goes so far as to suggest that 
this dependency may be amendable to more structured analysis. By defining economic 
development as something distinct and separate from economic growth this study opens a 
portal for conducting an analysis into how the non-economic forces of a state’s political 
climate influence the behavior of each variable.  
Data source and type. 
The indicators used to measure changes in the levels of economic development in 
each state in each year include levels of educational attainment, poverty rates, crime rates, 
income levels, and health. Data from each state on each indicator were collected from 
1980 through 2005. The average and standard deviations were calculated for each 
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indicator in each year. Boolean algorithms were designed to compare and then recode the 
original score from each state in each year against the average and standard deviation of 
all states in that same year. The general form of the filter, less the specification of its 
conditional formatting, is shown below: 
If X > (Ῡ + 1.0σ) = 1. 
If X > (Ῡ + 0.5σ) = 2. 
If X > (Ῡ - 0.5σ) = 3. 
If X<  (Ῡ - 0.5σ) = 4. 
The goal is to create an index capable of comparing performance across a 
spectrum of the states.  
As noted above, the filtered output was coded as a 1, 2, 3 or 4. In those states 
where a higher original value portrayed an attribute favorable to improving the quality of 
life, for example educational attainment, then the states with values exceeding their 
cohorts by the annual average value plus one standard deviation was coded as a 1. This 
represents approximately 15.8% of the observations. Original values exceeding the 
average plus a half a standard deviation were coded a 2. This represents 15.0% of the 
observations. Original values greater than the average minus one-half of a standard 
deviation were coded a 3 and represent 38.3% of the observations. Finally, if an original 
value was more than one half a standard deviation unit below the average, it was coded a 
4, and represented 30.85% of the observations. In instances where a higher original value 
conveys a negative influence on the quality of life, such as higher mortality rates, the 
Boolean logic was inverted and with that the numbering sequence used to code the 
variable was reversed. The procedure for coding insured the percentages assigned to top 
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and bottom performing states remained intact. Considered collectively states coded 1 and 
2 represent the top 30% of the states. States coded a 4 represent the bottom 30%. The 
approach to coding from a mathematically objective method allows this investigation to 
compare the relative level of performance of each state for each indicator in each year 
measured. 
The final determinate for the level of economic development exhibited by each 
state in each year is based upon a composite QOL index. The composite index is created 
by averaging the coded values for each of the indicators observed in that state in that year. 
For example, if in 1995 a state’s crime rate was coded a 4.0, its level of educational 
attainment coded a 2.0, its index of comparative health coded a 2.0, and the poverty level 
coded to a 3.0  then the 1995 composite QOL index for that state would be coded as 2.75. 
The average and standard deviation of this index over the years 2001-2005 is shown in 
Appendix B. No weightings were assigned to any of the indicators.  The following 
sections highlight the source and type of measurements used to define performance in 
each of the sub-categories used to create the composite QOL index for each state. 
Educational attainment. 
The indicator used to define the level of educational attainment is depicted by the 
percent of the state’s population under 25 possessing a high school education. These data 
were sourced from the Census Bureau. The original values were coded in the manner 
noted earlier. In a typical year, 2005, the original values ranged from a low of 78.9% 
attainment (KY) to a high of 92.5% (UT). Across the data set the levels of educational 
attainment ranged from an annual average of 67.5% to as high as 86.8%. 
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Poverty rate.  
A state’s poverty rate is defined by the percent of the population below the 
poverty rate defined in that year. These data are sourced from the annual social and 
economic supplement of the U. S. Census Bureau, the Poverty and Health Statistics 
Branch of HHES, and the Department of Commerce. The original values were coded in 
the manner noted earlier. In a contemporary year, 2005, raw values for the percent of a 
population below the poverty line ranged from 5.6% (NH) to a high of 20.1% (MS). 
Across the data set, the percent of the population in poverty ranged from an annual 
average of 10.87% to a high of 15.38%.  
Crime. 
The crime level within each state is defined by the incidence rate of violent crimes 
per 100,000 of the population.  These data were compiled from the statistics collected 
from the U.S. Justice Department. The original values were coded in the manner noted 
earlier. 
In a typical year, 2005, original values for the incidents of violent crime per 
100,000 ranged from 98 (ND) to 761(SC) per 100,000 of the population. Across the data 
set, incidents of violent crime ranged from an annual average low of 397 to a high of 568 
per 100,000. 
Income. 
The definition of income is based on the actual per capita earnings in each state for the 
years 1980 thought 2005. These data were collected from the Regional Economic 
Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the U.S. Department of 
Commerce. The original values were coded in the manner noted earlier. 
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In a typical year, 2005, original values for per capita income across all the states 
ranged from $24,664 (LA) to $47,388 (CT). Across the data set, per capita income levels 
ranged from an annual average of $9775 to a high of $33,671. 
Health. 
The definition of overall health within a state relied on statistics comparing the 
death rates in each state. These data were collected from all state from 1981 through 2004 
and represented the aggregate rate of death from all causes and from both sexes. These 
data were obtained from the Population Division of the U.S. Census Bureau. The original 
values were coded in the manner noted earlier.  
 In a typical year, 2004, the original values for death per 100,000 across all the 
states ranged from 3588 (HA) to 5608 (AL). Across the data set, death rates per 100,000 
populations ranged from an annual average of 4757.3 to 5670.0.  
Summary of sub-indices. 
Creating a quality of life index for each state in each year provides this study with 
a proxy for measuring changes in its level of economic development. The selections of 
indicators to create the sub-indices as well as the method to create the composite index 
were consistent with the approaches reported throughout the literature. Since the 
literature failed to offer any justification for assigning weights to any of the individual 
indicators used to create the composite QOL index, it is created without consideration of 
a weighting scheme. Adopting Boolean conditioning statements to code the original 
values provided an objective mathematical method for creating the rankings. Rankings 
were assigned in relation to cohort states and were determined within each year that the 
values were collected. The values used to code each indicator ranged from 1.0 (best) to 
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4.0 (worse).  The composite QOL index created for each state in each year establishes an 
objective method for profiling changes in the level of economic development occurring 
across all states in all years. This approach facilitates a comparative analysis of the 
performance across states within years. 
Limitations. 
While the indicators used to measure the quality of life suggest the depth and 
effectiveness of a state’s social programs, the indicators used in this study were also 
limited to those that were (1) endorsed by the literature and (2) available from secondary 
sources. Finally, while studies from within the field of development economics are 
starting to equate shifts in social capital and changes in the capacity of human capital to 
changes in the quality of life, no attempt was made to define or otherwise incorporate 
these more subjective indicators into our proxy for defining the level of economic 
development within a state.  
The Operational Definition of Political Climate 
Definition. 
Political will and support for policies of growth  
As noted in the review of the literature, there are a variety of meanings attached to 
the term political climate. Within the academic literature the term political climate is 
most often used in reference to measures that define differences or a change in the 
political ideology of the state. 
Our review of the literature reveals two schools of thought on how to best define 
and measure political ideology.  Lester (1990) suggests the best method for building an 
ideological continuum ranging from liberal to conservative is to use measures associated 
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with the propensity to increase or decrease government regulations. Elazar (1984) 
preferred to define political ideology as something emanating from the cultural 
differences that define variations in social structures. In a search for a more pragmatic 
viewpoint this study turned to the work of Garand (1993) and Kapelunk (2001). These 
investigators define political ideology from measures that compare the relative size and 
the relative rate of growth of government. Lowery and Berry (1983) examined the 
dimensions of political climate from measures that define the way that the quantity of 
funds collected, specifically the burden from state and local taxes were viewed.  
By comparing the citations and noting the varying approaches used to define the 
influence that a state’s political ideology has on its economic performance, one finds an 
array of conflicting images of how politics might be driving economic performance. The 
source of this conflict appears to stem from the fact that some of the key measures of 
political performance are missing from their definition of political ideology. The 
measures that are missing are those that lie outside the paradigm commonly used to frame 
the political ideology of a state. Any student of behavioral psychology will be quick to 
point out the weakness in trying to characterize the nature of a response based solely on 
intent. In cases where a comparison of organizational response is needed, the 
methodology must quantify facets of the subject’s willingness to respond and tie this to 
their capacity to do so. Towards that end this study captures measures that define a state’s 
willingness to change and its capacity to do so. Both measures are hypothesized to 
influence a state’s approach to attract and retain business and each defines the states’ 
ability to respond to changes in the fast paced world of economic growth.   
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This study uses a state’s willingness to change as it conceptual definition of 
political ideology. The operational definition is created from the two independent 
measures highlighted by Garand (1993), Kapelunk (2001) and Lowery & Berry (1983). 
The first gauges the relative size of employment in state and local government. The 
second is defined by the absolute levels of taxation borne by its constituents. The later is 
considered more typical of how political scientists have measured the political ideology 
of a state (Dye, 1980). Creating two measures of political ideology allows this 
investigation to test how each variable influences levels of economic growth and those of 
economic development across the 50 states. This approach also provides an opportunity 
to examine the impact that the additive effect of political ideology, measured in two ways, 
and the capacity to manage, has on each dependent variable: economic growth and 
economic development. 
The operational definition of a state’s capacity to manage is derived from the 
grading system that the Pew Foundation’s Government Performance Project assigns to 
each state and is discussed in the next section.  
Justification. 
As noted in the review of the literature, Blair and Premus (1993) emphasize the 
importance that a region’s political climate plays in a firm’s decision on where to locate, 
whether to invest and expand, or whether to terminate operations and relocate. They see 
the characterization of these local conditions as an extension of the location theory of 
economic development. They considered the operational measure of political climate to 
be comprised of elements that are both economic and non-economic in nature. Again 
referring to the literature review, the variables these authors select for their operational 
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definition exist at the macro level and appear limited to assessing the investment 
decisions firms encounter when the decision to locate has a global scope. In making this 
distinction the authors also make it clear they do not expect that the minor variations in 
the political climate across the U.S. states to exert much of an influence over the 
investment decisions guiding domestic firms. Yet those claims run counter to their own 
findings that suggest that whenever a region’s political climate is able to influence the 
factors that businesses rely upon to make investment decisions, such as the incidents of 
incentives, the level of individual and corporate taxation, the quality of the infrastructure 
and the array of factors that influence the quality and quantity of the labor force, then the 
measure of the political climate within a region are important elements in the decision to 
locate or expand.  
While political theory has long held that the political make-up of government 
institutions influence the form and shape of the policies it creates, the literature does not 
provide a holistic definition of how the measures used to define the political climate 
within the jurisdiction of a state might influence its level of economic growth or 
economic development. By defining the political climate of a state with measures that 
frame both its willingness to change and its capacity to manage, this study can categorize 
and analyze the influence that political climate has on clusters of states that exhibit 
favorable or unfavorable levels of economic growth and those of development. While this 
bifurcated approach to assessing the impact of political climate is a bit unique, it is an 
approach that is easily teased from within the interstices of the literature.   
For example, the literature provides insights into the relationships between factors 
that improve or impede our measures of economic growth and those that enhance or 
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diminish the conditions that affect our measures of economic development. Both Daly 
(1996) and Milbrath (1989) contend that policies thought to accelerate levels of economic 
growth, for example tax incentives, are done at the expense of economic development.  
While on the surface this observation appears consistent with the Schumpeterian 
notion of two rather distinct cycles, nowhere does Schumpeter infer that the policies 
suspected of inducing growth do so at the expense of development. Quite the contrary, he 
asserts that the holy grail of sustainable growth depends upon perpetuating a cycle where 
one phase offers to push until the other is needed to pull.  
So while the citations in the literature reveal several studies that initially set out to 
unravel the interrelationships between a state’s political culture and its propensity to 
support economic growth, none have included the non-economic, political variables 
associated with a government’s capacity to manage and none have isolated the effects 
that a state’s political climate has on economic development separate from those of 
economic growth.  
The works by Garand (1993) and Kapeluck (2001) provide a conduit between 
measures used to indicate the size of government and the characterization of its political 
ideology. While the relative size of a state’s government suggests its bias towards 
behaviors that might also cause it to be judged as liberal or conservative, our definition of 
ideology is framed by measures that define a willingness to regulate and have no 
connection to party affiliations. As an example, our selection of variables remains 
bounded by the literature and is supported by the desire to obtain a set of objective 
measures amendable to statistical analysis. Capturing these measures in the form of an 
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index is an easy way to compare levels of employment in the public sector against all 
forms of employment within the state.  
The literature also suggests a preference to gauge ideology from measures of 
revenue sourcing and from patterns and priorities of expenditure. Because the latter 
measure is more susceptible to variations in state demographics, the likes of which might 
mask the underlying ideological construct, we default to the use of levels of taxation as 
our second measure of political ideology. Investigations by Gray and Hanson (2004) and 
those of Lowery and Berry (1983) suggest changes in the propensity to grow government 
can be gleaned from changes in the levels of taxation and from patterns and priorities 
attached to those revenue sources. The operational definition used to frame our second 
measure of political ideology compares the per capita level of state and local taxation 
across states. A comparative analysis along this dimension serves as a viable test for 
judging whether government is excessive or responsive.  
Political capacity to manage  
The second element of a state’s political climate is shaped by its capacity to 
manage its affairs. The importance of this measure is not to be overshadowed by the large 
body of literature dedicated to describing the influence that political ideology has on the 
economic conditions within a jurisdiction. From what we can glean from the literature it 
is reasonable to assume that the trajectory of economic growth in a state is driven by an 
interaction between a government’s capacity to manage its affairs and its ideological 
willingness to change. At the extremes this is seen as an ideology that endorses the use of 
incentives to increase the levels of economic growth or it is an ideology that uses 
increased taxation and expanded regulatory authority to temper levels of expansion. In 
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either case the capability to enact the type of changes needed to produce a desired 
outcome must be factored into an explanation of how political climate influences 
economic growth. 
 The concept of political capacity and its role in shaping the regulatory 
environment has been extensively investigated by political scientists. In fact, the selection 
of the measures used by this study to define this variable was triggered by Honsdale’s 
(1981, p. 578) description of why it was important to measure the management capacity 
of a government: it influences... “....the ability to anticipate and influence change, make 
informed and intelligent decisions about policy; attract and absorb resources...and 
evaluate current activities to guide future actions”. In describing the criteria used to judge 
an institution’s capacity to move society into the new economy, Malhotra (2001) 
reiterates many of these same points.  
The need to make a clear distinction between the measures of political ideology 
and the measures of a body politics’ capacity to manage is validated throughout the 
literature.  Most of these writings focus on how the interaction between these two 
variables can be used to explain some of the difference in the regulatory environment 
across the states (Gray, 2004). While the literature explores the way regulation is 
tempered by ideology, there are no investigations that explicitly link these measures to 
variations in economic growth or development across the U.S. states.  
Embellishing the definition of a state’s political climate with a measure of the 
government’s capacity to manage is consistent with trying to better understand the role 
that this measure plays in the regulatory environment known to have an influences over 
levels of business attraction and retention. The inclusion of a government’s capacity to 
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manage is also supported by findings that suggest measuring a state’s political ideology 
provides a necessary but incomplete picture of how a state’s government might be 
influencing levels of economic growth or development.  
The operational definitions adopted for this part of the investigation help quantify 
how the political climate of a state, measured as ideology (willingness to change) and its 
management capacity (capacity to change), interact to influence levels of economic 
growth and economic development.  
Data sources and types. 
 Size of Employment in the Public Sector  
An index of employment in the public sector was established as the percent of the 
working population employed in state or local government in each state. Employment 
data were collected from the Statistical Abstract of the Census Bureau and tallied over the 
years from 1990 through 2006. The average and standard deviations for public 
employment were calculated from all states in each year. Boolean algorithms of the type 
and form described earlier were used to recode the values. Each original value captured 
the percent employed in the public sector for each state. This value was compared 
relative to the average and standard deviation of public sector employment in all states in 
that same year. This allowed each original score to be filtered and coded as a 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
The lower values reflect conditions that the literature considers favorable to enhancing 
levels of economic growth. In this example a smaller government serves as a proxy for a 
lower propensity to regulate and thus yields conditions favorable to more growth. In 
those cases where the values exceeded those of its cohorts by the average plus one 
standard deviation, these were coded as a 4. Original values that exceeded the average 
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plus a half a standard deviation were coded a 3. Original values less than the average 
minus one-half of a standard deviation were coded a 2, and if an original value was 
greater than one-half a standard deviation unit below the average, it was coded a 1.These 
coded values provided an objective method for partitioning states into categories that can 
be roughly defined as the top and bottom third. This allowed each state’s government to 
be positioned along a continuum that represents excessive or responsive governments.  
Tax Burden 
The U. S. Census Bureau provided the data required to define the level of 
personal income consumed by the taxes levied within each state. Data relating the percent 
of a state’s tax burden borne by its citizens were collected for the years 1987 through 
2007. The values, defined as the percentage of the local tax burden, were carried 
throughout the analysis in their original or raw form. The ranges of these values varied 
from year to year. For example, in 2007 the tax burden was highest in VT at 14.1% (ME 
was second at 14.0%) to a low of 6.6 % in AK.  
Capacity to Manage the Affairs of Government 
The capacity for a state government to manage effectively is operationally defined 
from the measures generated in the Government Performance Project (GPP). The 
Maxwell School at Syracuse University collected the majority of the data used in the GPP. 
The GPP judges a state’s performance in five distinct areas: (1) financial management, 
(2) human resource management, (3) information technology management, (4) capital 
management, and a generic category, (5) managing for results. A letter grade is assigned 
to each state in each category and provides a sense of how well each state is able to 
manage its affairs and adapt to change.  
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The letter grades that the GPP assigned for the state’s performance in each area 
were coded into a numeric score and then averaged across all areas to yield a single 
numerical value for the state in each year. The GPP data used in this study was collected 
from the study years 1999, 2001, and 2005. The range of data varied year to year. An 
example can be seen in the data collected in 2005. In that year the variation in grades 
across the states ranged from 72.0 for Iowa and Alaska to 92.0 for Oregon and South 
Carolina. The higher scores are indicative of a greater capacity to manage the affairs of 
government. 
Limitations of political climate.  
The goal of this study is to create a framework that is judged operationally valid 
and is capable of being periodically updated. This creates a mandate that these data reside 
within the public domain, that the measurements remain void of subjectivity or political 
bias, and that models remain simple to use, update and maintain. 
Great care has been taken to insure that the definition, selection, and manipulation 
of the measures used to define the political ideology of a state comply with that goal. The 
approach to defining and selecting these data followed the direction set by the literature. 
The data collection methods conform to the requirement that the measures selected are 
suited to judging whether a state’s government is responsive to meeting the economic 
needs of its constituency or is excessively engaged in the affairs of the individual.  
The major weaknesses associated with this approach are those that differentiate an 
analysis based on the use of quantitative data accessible from unbiased secondary sources, 
from an analysis that relies on measures that must, by their very nature, incorporate a 
degree of subjectivity.  
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The Operational Definition of Business Climate 
Definition. 
A review of the academic literature failed to produce an operational definition of 
business climate that met the goals of this study: objectively derived and openly available 
for future analysis. Fortunately, several agencies, universities, and nonprofit institutes 
regularly publish indices define whether the business climate in a state is favorable or 
unfavorable to increasing the level of economic growth. Included in these indices are 
measures that their authors claim can explain the variations in the levels of economic 
growth experienced across the U.S. states.  
At a conceptual level the definition of business climate has achieved broad 
recognition. However, its operational definitions remain quite fragmented. In this study 
the operational definition of a state’s business climate is taken from each of five indices 
published by three separate sources: 
• The Development Report Card for the States (DRC) published by the 
Center for Enterprise Development contains three distinct indices: 
o The Index of Performance assesses the general health of a state’s 
economy. 
o The Index of Business Vitality evaluates the robustness of the 
businesses operating within a state. 
o The Index of Development Capacity examines the quantity and 
quality of the resources utilized today, with an eye towards the 
demands that will be placed on these in the future.   
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• State Business Climate Tax Index: Published by the Tax Foundation, this 
index assesses how variations in state and local taxes influence the level of 
economic growth within the state. 
• Beacon Hill Index of Competitiveness, BHI: Published by Suffolk 
University, this index measures the microeconomic factors that influence 
growth and prosperity within a state. 
Details associated with the objectives, measures, and methods used to develop 
each index are provided in a later section entitled data source and type. 
While each of the business climate indices claims to measure the capacity or 
potential for economic growth, they exhibit a fair amount of diversity in how they 
operationally define business climate. Since a goal of this investigation is to test whether 
an index of business climate can help explain the variations in levels of economic growth 
or economic development, it is hoped that this diversity will provide some insights into 
the utility surrounding each index. Is it a useful predictor of changes in economic 
development, economic growth, or both?  
Justification.  
Over the past decade a plethora of indices have been published that claim to have 
discovered the cause behind the variations in the economic performance across the U.S. 
states. Today it is not uncommon to find a reference to a state’s business climate ranking 
appearing in the popular press, in trade journals for economic development, or on the 
state’s web site. For example, the web site for the state of Minnesota showcases a report 
entitled “Positively Minnesota- A Great Place to Live, Work and do Business”, this 
report along with other items on their web site highlight the state’s ranking from no less 
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than a dozen published sources. They range from Suffolk University’s Beacon Hill Index, 
to reports generated in Forbes and reproduced in Site Selection magazine. 
(www.PositvelyMinnesota.com). A review of the web sites of Georgia and Massachusetts 
demonstrates how each is leveraging its rankings to attract businesses and encourage 
existing operations to expand (memcclanahan@georgia.com , www.mass.gov/).  
The media highlight how several states have begun to rely on their standing in one 
or more of these indices to justify changes to their tax policy, or to alter their stance on 
tax incentives. To gain an appreciation of the influence and reach that these rankings 
carry one need only read the following quote from Rep. Jeannie Darneille, Washington 
State House of Representatives: “The SCORECARD is just the tool to launch the 
discussions and spur the policy changes needed to make a real difference.”  
(www.cfed.org/go/scorecard). The scorecard she refers to is part of a new CFED report, 
the Asset and Opportunity Scorecard which measures a state’s business climate (formerly 
called the State Asset Development Report Card (DRC)). 
Recall from the earlier section that this study defines a state’s political climate by 
its level of state and local tax burden, the relative size of employment in state and local 
government, and its capacity to manage its affairs. Segregating levels of taxation and 
government size from intervening variables greatly simplifies the assessment of how non-
economic variable influences the levels of economic growth or development occurring 
within a state.  
The approach to this investigation is simplification through the segregation of 
dissimilar measures.  This tact serves to shelter this study from the criticisms that 
investigators commonly cite over the outcomes produced when regression models are 
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created from an excessive list of unrelated independent variables. While the endeavors to 
establish a logical connection across a multiplicity of variables often improve the 
robustness of the inferences, frequently these outputs are no more robust than those 
constructed from single-variable or bi-variate models. The real concern is that these 
complex models convey a sense of uneasiness over how the manipulation of a few key 
variables might influence levels of growth or development. To avoid such criticisms this 
investigation creates a framework for testing the impact that a limited number of 
variables might have on a larger number of observations.  
Data source and type. 
The indicators selected for defining a state’s business climate are those that were 
available in the public domain, were generated in years relevant to this investigation, had 
a history of being quoted in both the media and in the popular press, and exhibited 
diversity in the philosophical approach taken to craft the index. The five indices of 
business climate selected for analysis in this study include: 
• The Center for Enterprise Development: Development Report Card for the States 
(DRC)  
o The DRC includes three separate indices. Each is examined as a separate 
and distinct variable;  
? An index of Performance,  
? An index of Business Vitality and  
? An index of Development Capacity.  
• The Tax Foundation: The State Business Climate Index  
• Suffolk University: The Beacon Hill Institute of State Competitiveness  
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The following section highlights the basic methods each organization used to 
develop their index. The issues associated with the development and use of each index is 
provided in the section entitled limitations.  
The Center for Enterprise Development. 
According to its web site (www.cfed.org),  
“The Center publishes indices of a state’s economic performance, its 
economic vitality, and its economic capacity. The DRC grades all states in 
three indexes-Performance, Business Vitality, and Development Capacity 
that measure different aspects of economic health. Each index is 
composed of two or more sub-indices, also graded, that provide a more 
detailed understanding of a state's economy. Sub-indexes are made up of 
anywhere from two to 10 measures for a total of 67 measures.  The report 
card tries to assess whether the opportunities to obtain a better life are 
expanding and how those opportunities are distributed across and within 
states. It does so by presenting a portrait of each state, its structure, 
operation, and potential. The report card is divided into three indexes: 
Performance, Business Vitality, and Development Capacity”. 
Each of the indices of Performance, Vitality and Capacity grades states from A 
through F. Each index is comprised of a series of sub-indices which are also graded. Each 
sub-index is defined by measures numbering from as few as two to as many as ten. 
Considered collectively this yields a total of 68 measures used to create three indices. 
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  The general methodology used to create each index involves ranking every 
measure from 1-50. The process described below is quoted from its web site 
( www.cfed.org) 
• Raw data are collected for the 68 measures.   
• Each state is individually ranked in every measure based upon the raw data 
obtained. The best score is "1", the worst score is "50."   
• To calculate sub-index scores, the relevant measure rankings for each state are 
added together. Sub-index scores are ranked from "1" to "50"-best to worst.   
• To calculate index scores, the relevant sub-index rankings for each state are 
added together. Index scores are ranked from "1" to "50"-best to worst.   
• States that rank from 1-10 earn As. States that rank from 11-20 earn Bs. States 
that rank from 21-35 earn Cs. States that rank from 36-45 earn Ds. And states 
that rank from 46-50 earn Fs.   
• When a tie occurs, each state receives the same rank and the next best 
performing state is ranked as if the tie had not occurred. For example, if two 
states have the best score, each receives a "1" ranking and the next state is 
ranked "3."  
The Index of Performance  
The CFED creates its index of Performance to assess the return that various 
investments in both the private and public sector have yielded for its citizens. These 
include sub-indices of employment, earnings and job quality, equity, quality of life and 
resource efficiency. For example, within the employment sub-index are measures of 
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employment growth and unemployment rates. Within the equity sub-index are measures 
of income distribution, average annual pay, and poverty rate. The resource efficiency 
sub-index includes measures on per capita energy consumption, the use of alternative 
energy, vehicle miles travelled, and a handful of other variables the likes of which the 
CFED considers representative of how to manage natural resources in a sustainable 
manner.  
The Index of Business Vitality 
The CFED developed its index of business vitality as a way to gauge the agility 
and dynamism of the private sector. This index is comprised of two sub-indices; 
entrepreneurial energy and the competitiveness of existing businesses. Entrepreneurial 
energy is composed of variables that measure new company start-ups, employment in the 
technology sectors, and the level of IPO’s. The competiveness sub-index looks at 
measures of business closings, investment by manufacturing, and measures that gauge the 
diversity within the industrial base. For more information visit www.cfed.org/go/drc . 
The Index of Development Capacity 
The CFED uses its index of development Capacity to measure how well the state 
is managing both its physical and human resources and whether those policies indicate 
trends that will prepare the state to participate in a global economy. To gauge this 
performance the CFED builds its development Capacity index from measures used to 
create 5 sub-indices. The sub-indices include human resources, financial resources, 
infrastructure resources, amenity resources and natural capital, and a category called 
innovation assets. The sub-index entitled Financial Assets is comprised of 4 variables. 
These include measurements of the level of income derived from dividend, interest and 
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rent, the level of investments being made by venture capitalists, the level of financing 
offered by the SBIC, and the loans being made to small business. The sub-index for 
infrastructure resources includes such measures as access to affordable housing, energy 
costs, and bridge deficiency. The sub-index of human resources includes expenditure 
levels for education K-12 expenditures, the level of high school completion and 
attainment, and a measure of college attainment.  
To facilitate our analysis of the CFED data set, its letter grades were converted to 
a numeric value. The method for translating a letter grade to a numeric value adheres to 
the grading guidelines established by the University of Maine. The conversions were 
generated for each of the 50 states in each year and for each of the three indices included 
in this study. The study incorporated data for all years in which all three indices were 
available: 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006. Across the states the numeric scores 
ranged from low values of 50 (WY) to highs of 97 (MA).  
The uniqueness associated with how each of these indices were constructed 
provides this investigation an opportunity to test how a series of indices, each comprised 
of different measures, vary in their ability to predict levels of economic growth and 
economic development.  
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The Tax Foundation. 
 Like the CFED, the Tax Foundation relies on a simple system that ranks the states 
from 1 (best) to 50 (worst). According to the Tax Foundation, its index is designed to 
measure how state and local tax laws may have created distortions in the economic 
performance across the U.S. States. By suggesting that many of the non-tax factors 
known to influence local economies are in fact outside the purview of lawmakers, the 
Tax Foundation justifies limiting its analysis to assessing the influence that taxation plays 
on growth. They also justify their selection of variables by referencing the literature: 
“Papke and Papke (1986) found that tax differentials between locations may be an 
important business location factor, finding that consistently high business taxes can 
represent a hindrance to the location of industry...Bartik (1989) provides strong evidence 
that taxes negatively impact business start-ups.” (www.taxfoundation.org). At first blush 
these authors would appear to contradict Dye’s (1980) findings indicating no strong 
relationship between levels of taxation and those of economic growth. On closer 
examination it appears that what Papke and Papke (1986) and Bartik (1989) are looking 
at are the impacts that taxation has on a certain level, class or category of business 
decisions. Dye (1980) on the other hand looked more holistically at how levels of 
taxation influenced the measures of economic activity occurring within a state. Neither 
conclusion is wrong; it is simply a matter of analytical perspective. Since the intent of 
this investigation is to determine how measures of business climate and political climate 
influence measures of economic growth and development in a state, the results of this 
investigation will provide a more reliable basis for validating or repudiating Dye’s work 
in this area.  
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  The Tax Foundation’s State Business Climate is a composite from five sub-
indices.  
• Business Tax Index: This sub-index measures the economic impact of 
state corporate tax law. It is comprised of two sub-indices. One measures 
the rate structure and the other measures the composition of the tax base. 
Both are weighted equally.  
• Individual Income Tax Index: This sub-index measures the economic 
impact of state and county laws on individual incomes. As was the case 
with the development of the sub-index of the business tax index, this sub-
index is made up from measures that determine rate structure and tax base. 
The base is affected by such things as the presence or absence of a 
marriage penalty and the state’s approach to taxing capital income.  
• Sales and Gross Receipts Tax Index: This measures the economic impact 
that state and county laws have on the purchase of goods and services. As 
in the previous indices, measures of both rate and base are used to 
determine the final ranking. A determination of the impact that taxes 
levied on products essential to the operation of a business have on its 
profitability are included in the determination of the impact of the tax base.  
• Unemployment Insurance Tax Index: This measures the impact of state 
unemployment insurance tax laws on business. This index includes two 
sub-indices. One measures the adherence to a simple formula for 
determining the rate structure, something the tax foundation refers to as 
‘neutrality of the structure’, while the other measures the tax base.  
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• Wealth Tax Index/ Fiscal Balance Index/ Property Tax Index: While the 
names of these measures have changed over the reporting years the goal 
has remained the same: to capture the economic impact of asset-based 
taxation. 
As is the case for all its measures, the Tax Foundation relies on measures of tax 
rate and tax base as their determinate for crafting each sub-index. Example of items 
determined to have a negative impact on businesses include taxes on items that impede 
the transfer of wealth and punitive taxes on intangible personal property, such as 
trademarks, and taxes on inventory. 
A description of the general method used to create each index and sub-index used 
by the Tax Foundation is described below. For more information on the variables used to 
create each sub-index or the source of data the reader is encouraged to refer to the 
following web site: www.taxfoundation.org. 
For each variable measured by the Tax Foundation a ranking of 1 represents the 
lowest overall tax burden and a ranking of 50 represent the highest. According to its web 
site, the State Business Tax Climate Index (SBTCI) is designed as a relative index. Each 
variable collected is measured relative to the law in force within the other states.  The 
measures are not held against an ideal or arbitrary third party standard. The scale for 
scoring ranges from 0 to 10 with zero being the worst among the 50 states. For example, 
the rates vary from a low in the state of New Hampshire (0.85 percent) to rates that are 
considered on these relative terms to be very high; Oregon and Hawaii (11 percent). As 
the state with the lowest score, New Hampshire receives a 10. Since both Oregon and 
Hawaii exhibit the highest rate they each receive a zero. At 6 percent the state of Georgia 
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is close to the mid-point, so it receives a score of 5.10. Illinois has a rate of 3 percent and 
scores 7.96, Idaho with a top rate of 7.8 percent receives a score to 3.39. A higher total 
score equates with a more favorable, lower ranking.  
The Tax Foundation’s state’s rankings were published in 2000, 2004, 2006, 2007 
and 2008. The final score that each state receives is used to operationally define the 
business climate according to the Tax Foundation.  
Suffolk University 
The data from Suffolk University are captured and reported as the Beacon Hill 
Index of Competitiveness (BHI).  According to the BHI, a state is competitive “if it has in 
place the polices and conditions that ensure and sustain a high level of per capita income 
and continued growth” (BHI, 2008, p.5). As with the analysis by the CFED, the BHI’s 
business climate measures are constructed from sub-indices. The BHI selects its sub-
indices from within the basic economic model that says any given level of output is 
influenced by the admixture of capital, labor and technology. Its goal is to translate the 
four components that Porter’s (2000) work uses to define competitiveness in the private 
sector to one able to describe the nature of competition across the U.S. States. As seen in 
the excerpt below, the BHI breaks these four areas of competitiveness into 8 distinct 
groupings. A partial list of the measures in each sub-index is as follows. Each major 
group has its own set of indicators and each is ranked as a factor deemed to have a 
positive (+) or negative (-) influence on growth (Suffolk, 2008); 
• Government and fiscal policy: indicators that capture measures of fiscal 
constraint and the market’s view of performance. Examples include:  
o state and local taxes per capita/income per capita (-) 
108 
 
o workers compensation premium rates (-) 
o bond Rating, S & P and Moody’s (+) 
• Security: indicators of public trust and personal safety. Examples include: 
o crime index per 100,000 inhabitants (-) 
o murder index per 100,000 inhabitants (-) 
• Infrastructure: indicators include the affordability of housing, access to 
internet, ease of commuting, energy costs. Examples include:   
o median housing costs (-) 
o air passenger miles per capita (+) 
o electricity price per million Btu (-) 
• Human resources: indicators of the skills, knowledge, capacity of human 
capital as well as the commitment to improve in each area, coupled with 
access to health care. Examples include: 
o % of population with health insurance (+) 
o % of population aged 25+ graduated from High School(+) 
o  infant mortality rate in deaths per 1000 live births (-) 
• Technology: indicators of R and D funding, patents assigned, proportion 
of scientists and engineers in the work force and the relative importance of 
high tech companies to the local economy.   
o academic R and D per $1000 GSP (+) 
o patents per 100,000 inhabitants (+) 
o science and engineering graduate students per 100,000 inhabitants 
(+) 
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• Business incubations: indicators of the birth rate of new businesses. 
Examples include: 
o venture capital available per capita (+) 
o employer firm births per 100,000 inhabitants ( +)  
o % of labor force represented by unions (-) 
• Openness: indicators of how well the businesses are connected with those 
outside the local markets, includes levels of exports and the percent of the 
population born abroad. Examples include:  
o exports per capita, $ (+) 
o incoming foreign investment per capita (+) 
o % of population born abroad (+) 
• Environmental policy: indicators that gauge how well states adhere to a 
moderate level of activity associated with enacting environmental 
regulations. Examples include: 
o toxic release inventory in pounds per 1000 sq miles (-) 
o carbon emissions per 1000 sq miles (-) 
o air quality (% good average days) (+) 
As noted in the sample list above each index is comprised of one or more sub-
index. The values for each index range from 0.00 to 10.00. They have a mean of 5.00 and 
a standard deviation of 1.00. The score from the index is used to rank each state in each 
category. States with the lowest overall rank have the highest performance. In the lexicon 
of the BHI study, variables are the elements used to make up each sub-index. Variables 
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that rank between 1 and 20 are considered favorable to the state. Those ranking between 
30 and 50 are deemed unfavorable. 
In its 2008 report the publishers of the BHI claim that improving one point on 
their competitive index translates into an increase of $1,546 in real per capita income. 
To obtain a complete listing of the variables included in each sub-index or view the 
report in its entirety refer to www.beaconhill.org 
The values from the BHI for each state in each of the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 
were included in this analysis. Typical values of the BHI range from a high of 7.00 (MA), 
to a low of 3.00 (MS). In each case the higher the number the more competitive the state.  
Limitations. 
The limitations to operationally defining business climate from within the 
framework of published measures is found in the exposure this brings to the variety of 
methods used to construct each index. A brief critique of each appears below.  
• The CFED and its Development Report Card (DRC)  
While the methods used to score, weight, and collate the data for each of its three 
indices into a single grade are transparent, the data source and the selection of the 
variables are not. 
The CFED weighs all measures equally. The variables it selects and their 
applicability to the category assigned is quite subjective. For example, within its 
Performance Index is the sub-index called QOL. Yet the QOL sub-index does not 
incorporate variables associated with the level of poverty. Instead, the measure of poverty 
is reserved as a variable used to create a sub-index that defines a different measure of 
performance. In this instance the measure is referred to as equity. In another example we 
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discover variables used to measure or rank average annual pay are rolled into a sub- 
index labeled Earning and Jobs. If we refer back to the literature one discovers unanimity 
with how to best categorize each of these variables: poverty should be included in a 
measure of QOL, while annual pay levels, of the type used here to craft the annual 
payroll, is more appropriately used to define a change in the level of economic growth.  
Finally, the algorithms adopted by CFED lack statistical rigor. Much of this stems 
from its desire to simplify both the interpretation of its findings and any outsider’s 
analysis of their data sets. Unfortunately, through the process of moving interval data to 
ordinal data the CFED has lost some of its underlying fidelity.  For example, in its 2007 
report, data used to construct the sub-index of Resource Efficiency gives the state of 
Vermont a score of 13.17. This is derived from a simple average of the state’s ranking 
across all the measures used to create the sub-index. That score, 13.17, is then forced 
back into an algorithm that creates its final ranking within this sub-index. In this example 
Vermont receives a ranking of 9th out of a possible 50. By virtue of this ranking the state 
of VT appears in the top 11 of the 50 states and thus qualifies to receive a letter grade of 
A. This letter grade is carried forward in their analysis and used to create the state’s index 
in the major category called Performance. Yet within the same sub-index of resource 
efficiency the state of Rhode Island receives a score of 15.5, ranks 10th and thus also 
earns a letter grade of A. However, New Jersey, with a score just 0.38 higher than Rhode 
Island ranks 11th and receives a B as its letter grade. So while the DRC weights all 
measures equally, the absence of statistical methods to filter values and define 
performance based on an objective measure of variation creates spurious results and 
brings into question the value one can attach to their assignment of a state’s final grade. 
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• The Tax Foundation  
The Tax Foundation’s index is created from five separate sub-indices. However, 
they all fall into the same monolith of measuring the influence of state and local taxation 
on business and individuals. While the methods used to create this index appear to be the 
most objective of those selected, its weakness lies in the absence of non-tax variables 
known to influence levels economic growth or development. Unfortunately there is no 
consensus on exactly how the range of tax rates or structures used by the Tax Foundation 
might influence the level of economic growth occurring within a state. Despite its 
inherent limitations, this index is the only measure of business climate to offer a set of 
economic variables that fall under auspices of state government. Yet the literature makes 
it clear that taxation is not the only variable useful in helping to define the shape or scope 
of the economic growth occurring within a region. In fact, as pointed out in the literature, 
many contemporary studies have suggested that non-tax variables, such as those that 
define quality of place or quality of life, might overshadow the impact of higher taxes. To 
date, the academic literature has been unable to reconcile how a tax that impedes the 
expansion and attraction of new business impacts the level of economic growth 
experienced by a state. One can only speculate as to why this remains an open issue. For 
example, it is reasonable to assume that the proponents of less tax and smaller 
government are unwilling to expose the unintended consequences associated with an 
uneven use of incentives. Certainly the abatement of taxes for a sector of the economy 
considered part of a cluster could disenfranchise those businesses that operate outside that 
cluster. This may reduce the willingness of non-cluster businesses to invest and expand 
within that geography. Whether the economic stability that results from supporting 
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industrial clusters offsets the losses resulting from a lower level of investment by a broad 
range of non-cluster industries is unclear. Finally the literature is virtually silent on how 
non-tax variables such as QOL might dilute or potentially offset the influence of higher 
taxes.  
• The BHI 
The BHI has a very elaborate method for collecting variables and for weighting 
their impact. The nature of its investigation centers on Porter’s definition of 
competitiveness. As noted earlier, the measures they adopt are those used to compare the 
competitiveness of firms operating in free market economies. So while the BHI embraces 
Porter’s general theme, it is important to note that Porter originally developed his micro-
economic theory in favor of clusters as a way to improve the competitive landscape 
amongst players in the private sector. While the BHI’s 2010 Report claims that a 1 point 
increase in the performance is associated with $1,546 increase in real per capita income, 
the confidence they attach to using measures that frame the competitiveness amongst 
private sector firms as shaping the competition occurring amongst the states would seem 
to warrant closer scrutiny (Suffolk, 2010).  
Summary Statement on the Limitations of the Indices 
The major limitations to the information generated by these indices: 
• Several of the measures used to develop the indices or one of its major 
sub-indices are duplicates of what the literature suggests are measures of 
economic growth.  
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• Several of the measures used to develop the indices or sub-indices include 
measures used to construct the QOL index, our surrogate for measuring 
levels of economic development.   
• Several of the measures used to develop the indices or sub-indices include 
indicators this study adopts as a determinant of a state’s political climate, 
specifically levels of taxation and measures that reference the size of state 
and local government.  
Despite these limitations each of the five indices selected by this study are used 
by politicians and policy advisors to guide and formulate policy. Therefore, each needs to 
be tested in a formal model that examines their ability to predict or explain changes in the 
levels of economic growth and those of economic development within a state. Most of 
these indices do not consider the effect of their measures on economic development as 
defined in this study. 
Summary of Methods: Business Climate 
The measures used to craft these rather complex indices helps to explain why they 
offer such little value to policy makers.  The fact remains we do not know if these reports 
are measuring changes in the level of economic growth or economic development.  
Except for the report by the Tax Foundation, it is impossible to determine which factors 
are within control of governments. Yet even the Tax Foundation’s report contains a mix 
of rates and conditions. This makes it difficult to determine whether adjusting the tax rate 
in one category will have a positive or negative impact on the prevailing economic 
conditions. Finally, there seems to be a direct relationship between the complexity of the 
index and our ability to decipher whether the change made to improve upon a score or 
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ranking will result in changes to the levels of economic growth, economic development, 
or both.   
The confusion surrounding the utility of these reports stems from their inability to 
segregate and then describe, in an operational sense, how the non-economic forces that 
this study describes as a state’s political climate, influences the body politic’s response to 
shifts in local markets.  
This new appreciation of the architectural underpinnings used to create business 
climate indices justifies the decision not to test the combined influence that business 
climate and political climate have on conditions of economic growth or economic 
development. The equation required to test such a relationship would incorporate 
independent variables with a high degree of serial correlation. As a result this 
investigation tests the influence of business climate separate from those of political 
climate. An explanation of the analytics used to answer the research questions is provided 
in the following section. 
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 Analytical Methods  
Regardless of whether an investigation is being launched by a social scientist, or 
by a practitioner from within one of the pure and applied disciplines, the objective of 
their analytical methodology remains the same: provide the most efficient means for 
asking a fixed set of questions from a potentially large set of data. In the social sciences, 
data collection methodologies tend to be closely coupled to the formulation of the 
research question under investigation. A good example of this is the way survey 
instruments are designed and how the responses are analyzed. In the disciplines of 
chemistry, biology and physics, the nature of the question defines the design of the 
experiment(s) and establishes the methods used to capture and analyze the data they 
generate. What differentiates these investigations is the method they use to create or 
capture data.   
From the outset, a goal of this investigation has been to offer a simple, auditable 
framework capable of analyzing the influence that measures of political climate and 
business climate have over levels of economic growth and those of development. So by 
definition this investigation must rely on data originating from secondary sources. As a 
result, the vast majority of the 10,000 or so variables collected to help answer the 
questions posed by this investigation were not designed with these questions in mind.  
Given the origin of these data, the first step in this analysis is to assess how these data 
vary over time across states. The relationships that each state has to these data are 
exposed in descriptive statistics and supported by a variety of charting techniques. For 
example, frequency plots and scatter diagrams identify the presence or absence of 
symmetry in these data. Pareto charting of the average and standard deviation values of 
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each variable in each state proved to be a quick and efficient method for comparing 
changes in the levels of economic growth, economic development, political climate and 
business climate across states.  
Of course there is a certain temporal character attached to this analysis. Markets 
are slow to respond and adjust to changes in economic policies. As a result, the effects of 
a policy change cannot be judged instantaneously. To account for this delay, a lag period, 
defined in annual intervals, is established for each of the independent variables. The 
selection of these lags is defined by a series of OLS regression trials that establish that 
point in the past when the independent variable exhibited its greatest influence over the 
behavior of each dependent variable.  The lag periods yielding the highest correlation 
coefficients were applied to each exogenous variable. These annual lags are then 
incorporated into an array of regression models that test the explanatory power of the 
variables, both as individual contributors and in additive relationships. OLS regression 
with lagged exogenous variables (OLS-LEV) was adopted as the technique best suited to 
defining whether the long run movement of data amongst states can be used to predict 
changes in growth and development. The specification of a generalized, OLS–LEV 
model as well as examples of how the general model is modified to answer each of the 
research questions are highlighted later in this section.  
Justification. 
The criteria for selecting the analytic methods used by this investigation include: 
(1) an ability to describe patterns of change, (2) an ability to detect vectors of change, and 
(3) a capacity to define the strength of association. Following Menard’s (2002) guidelines 
for conducting longitudinal research, all the variables used in this analysis were collected 
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at regular intervals, in this case annually. This enables a comparison to be made of all 
states within the same year or groupings of years.  
Data collection for longitudinal research. 
These longitudinal research methods help interpret the differences in the levels of 
economic growth or development as differences across states in a specified time frame. 
The dependent variables measure the absolute change in the level of economic growth or 
economic development occurring within each state. These measures are not rate 
dependent. The justifications used to examine changes in levels rather than changes in 
rates are based on the suggestions within the literature and on the uniqueness of the  
variables used in this  study: (1) the measurement of a rate change tends to be influenced 
by factors external to the political system, specifically changes in demographics; (2) the 
measurement of a rate change can be artificially skewed by broad based federal policies 
that by their nature can be applied unevenly, especially in states with small population, 
for example the closure of military bases; (3) the values used to define a change in rate 
tends to be more difficult to insert into an analysis that seeks to avoid interpolating data; 
and finally, (4) measuring changes in levels minimizes the interaction amongst variables 
when the independent variables have to be lagged.  
Data characterization and analysis. 
A three step method is used to characterize the behavior of these data across the 
time series and answers the basic question of whether measures of a state’s political or 
business climate can predict or explain variation in the level of growth and/or 
development across the states.  
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1. Data Characterization: Pareto charts and frequency plots were used to 
examine the distribution of each value across all states in all years. The 
descriptive statistics used to characterize these distributions provided 
insights into the way the variable each shifted across the time series. 
Measures of dispersion, the annual mean and the annual standard 
deviation, were calculated for all data. The descriptive statistics for each 
variable defined as the five-year average from 2001 to 2005 is shown in 
Appendix B. Any data destined to be translated in to an index were filtered 
using the values of the sample mean and standard deviation. These values 
were used in Boolean conditioning statements that filtered and recoded the 
original values into an index suited to calibrating a state’s performance 
relative to its peers. The values assigned as the index were analyzed in this 
investigation.  
2. Test for Correlation: Correlation tests exposed the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables. These tests were also used to expose 
relationships between variables the literature indicates could share a 
common pedigree. An example would be the relationship of personal 
income as a determinant of economic growth and its use as a variable to 
define QOL, our surrogate for defining levels of economic development. 
These and other relationships were analyzed to identify variables 
considered highly correlated.  
3. Determination of lag periods and the specification of OLS regressions 
models to analyze time series data:  A series of trials were designed to 
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determine the regression technique best suited to describing how measures 
of a state’s business and political climate influenced levels of economic 
growth and development. OLS, 2-stage least square (2S-LS), exponential, 
logarithmic and polynomial models were developed and tested. The 
techniques associated with OLS regression were deemed the most suited 
to this investigation.  
 Lag periods were defined from a series of OLS regression trials. 
The models producing the highest correlation coefficient, R-squared value, 
defined that point in the past when each of the independent variables 
exhibited its highest influence on the dependent variable, either the level 
of economic growth and/or economic development. These results justified 
the specification of a 5-to-10 year lag on the measure of state and local tax 
burden (PC_I_RS), and 10-to-12 year lag on the index of employment in 
the public sector (PC_I_GEMP). The data used to measure a government’s 
capacity to manage its affairs (PC_C_GPP), did not benefit from the 
application of a lag.  
A review of the literature and a brief correspondence with an 
author of the Vega-Gordillo and Alvarez-Arce (2003) study helped refine 
and adapt the algorithms used by this investigation. This led to the 
specification of a generalized OLS regression model with lagged 
exogenous variables, OLS-LEV suited to estimating the influence that 
political climate and business climate have over measures of economic 
growth and development:   
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YT=α + β෍ܺT-i
q
k=1
+ β෍ܺԢT-i
q
k=1
 
 
…where  YT  represents the measures of the dependent variable defined 
from all cases in time T, where T is either the value for the five year 
average from 2001-2005 or the base year 2005; k and q represent the 
number of states (cases), included in each test;  ܺT-i and   ܺ′T-i  represent 
one or more of the independent variables whose lag interval i is defined as 
T-i.  
OLS-LEV models are adapted from this general equation and used 
to examine the time-series data collected for this investigation. The 
techniques for applying OLS-LEV models to the examination of time-
series data are supported by Ostrum (1990). While this type of analysis is 
frequently thought of as a time-series regression model (TRS), the focus of 
this investigation is to generalize around the influence that business and 
political climate have across many states and not across time periods 
within a state. So while we find the definition of OLS-LEV frequently 
mentioned in the context of a time-series regression technique, analyzing 
queries of how each state behaves across all time ranges is outside the 
scope of this study. An investigation to analyze and then compare state by 
state performance for the variables defined in this study will be part of a 
future investigation.  
122 
 
The database compiled for this investigation provided an array of options for 
designing a model that tests the questions posed by this investigation. To simplify this 
investigation, each endogenous variable was defined as the average annual value obtained 
from 2001 through 2005, and as the value in the base year, 2005. Values from these times 
were used to test the ability of the independent variables to predict economic growth and 
development.  2005 represents the most contemporary year for which all data required by 
these analyses are available. To dispel any notion that 2005 could be an outlier, the 
results from the OLS-LEV models used to test the explanatory power of changes 
occurring in 2005 were compared to the tests performed on data collected in 1990, 1995 
and 2000. The strength of the predictions, judged by comparing R-squared values, and 
their significance, defined from F-tests, (p<.05) indicates the data from 2005 is typical. In 
those instances where the endogenous variable was defined as an average, the lag periods 
for the corresponding exogenous variables were also averaged. For example, the test used 
to determine the ability of state and local tax burden, PC_I_RS, to explain changes in the 
level of economic growth averaged over 2001-2005 is based on tax burden averaged over 
the period 1996-2000.  
The generalized OLS-LEV model is modified to compare the impact that the 
annual lag on each exogenous variable has on the behavior of growth and development 
observed in each of the two time intervals. Except as noted, the tests are made against 
data collected in all states for each time interval.  
The findings from this investigation are presented in three distinct parts. The first 
assesses the impact that each measure of political climate has over the dependant 
variables of economic growth, and economic development.  The second assesses the 
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impact that each measure of a state’s business climate has over these same dependent 
variables. The third controls for high and low levels of economic development and tests 
how variations in that measure affects the ability of political climate or business climate 
to predict conditions of growth and development. High performing states rank in the top 
10 of all states for economic development. Similarly low performing states ranked in the 
bottom 10. These rankings were based on the average performance over the dataset, 
1985-2005.  
Specification of the Model to Test Political Climate 
To meet the requirements for assessing political climate’s influence over levels of 
growth and development the generalized OLS model was modified and recast into a 6 X 
5 matrix. The following example shows one of the 30 equations used to test the influence 
that political climate has over levels of economic growth and development. In this 
example, the additive model of political climate is specified against each of the dependent 
variables: levels of growth defined as per capita income (EG_PCI), growth defined as 
changes in GSP (EG_GSP), and changes levels of economic development (ED_QOL): 
ܧܩ_ܲܥܫ௡ୀହ଴
்ୀଶ଴଴ହ ן  ൅෍ ݌ܿ_݅_ݎݏሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻ
ହ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
൅ ෍ ݌ܿ_݅_݃݁݉݌ሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻ
ହ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
൅ ෍ ݌ܿ_ܿ_݃݌݌ሺܶ ൌ 0ሻ
ହ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
 
ܧܩீௌ௉௡ୀହ଴
்ୀଶ଴଴ହ ൌ ן  ൅෍ ݌ܿ_݅_ݎݏሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻ
ହ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
൅ ෍ ݌ܿ_݅_݃݁݉݌ሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻ
ହ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
൅ ෍ ݌ܿ_ܿ_݃݌݌ሺܶ ൌ 0ሻ
ହ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
 
   ܧܦ_ܱܳܮ௡ୀହ଴
்ୀଶ଴଴ହ ൌ ן  ൅෍ ݌ܿ_݅_ݎݏሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻ
ହ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
൅ ෍ ݌ܿ_݅_݃݁݉݌ሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻ
ହ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
൅ ෍ ݌ܿ_ܿ_݃݌݌ሺܶ ൌ 0ሻ
ହ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
 
To determine their ability to explain or predict changes in measures of economic 
growth and development, each indicator of political climate is tested individually and as 
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additive models. This includes the two measures of its ideology, PC_I_RS, and 
PC_I_GEMP and the measure of its capacity to manage, PC_C_GPP.  
The lag length, T, was designated from the selection process discussed earlier. 
Political climate is tested with lags at both 5 and 10 years, in the example above, where T 
= -5. Running tests against each of these lag period recognizes that while the lag 
relationships between each set of variables were not identical, they were always optimal 
in the range of 5 to 12 years. No lag was applied to the measure of capacity to manage, 
PC_C_GPP, T = 0.  Each dependent variable undergoes 2 sets of tests. In the first 
iteration the independent variable’s ability to predict changes in the average value over 
the years 2001-2005 is tested. A second iteration tests the ability to predict changes in the 
data collected in the base year, 2005.  
Specification of the Model to Test Business Climate  
To meet the requirements for assessing business climate’s influence over levels of 
growth and development, the generalized OLS model was defined in a 6 X 6 matrix. Here 
the 5 indices of a state’s business climate discussed earlier are tested to determine their 
capacity to explain or predict changes in the measures of economic growth, EG_GSP and 
EG_PCI, and those of economic development, ED_QOL. Each measure of business 
climate, the Beacon Hill Index, BC_BHI, the Tax Foundation, BC_TAXF and the 
development report card, BC_DRC_ is tested to determine its ability to predict or explain 
changes in the level of dependent variables defined both as the five year average and as 
data from 2005. The lag applied to all measures of business climate were identical, T = -2. 
The adoption of a 2 year lag reflects the nature of this variable: (1) measures of business 
climate have only recently become available from secondary sources, and (2) these data 
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are not always published on a regular, annual, basis. Other than the nested measures 
taken from the CFED development scorecard, where BC_DRC_P is combined with _V 
and _C, no additive models were specified. The reason for this is simple: those publishing 
a measure of business climate believe their solo variable explains changes in the 
conditions this study uses to define economic growth. 
The following example demonstrates how the general equation was modified to 
test the influence that each measure of business climate has over growth measured as per 
capita (EG_PCI) in 2005:  
ܧܩ_ܲܥܫ௡ୀହ଴
்ୀଶ଴଴ହ = ן  ൅ ∑ ܾܿ_ܾ݄݅ሺ ܶ െ 2ሻହ଴௡ୀଵ  
ܧܩ_ܲܥܫ௡ୀହ଴
்ୀଶ଴଴ହ = ן  ൅∑ ܾܿ_ݐܽݔ݂ሺܶ െ 2ሻହ଴௡ୀଵ  
ܧܩ_ܲܥܫ௡ୀହ଴
்ୀଶ଴଴ହ = ן  ൅∑ ܾܿ_݀ݎܿ_݌ሺܶ െ 2ሻହ଴௡ୀଵ  
ܧܩ_ܲܥܫ௡ୀହ଴
்ୀଶ଴଴ହ = ן  ൅∑ ܾܿ_݀ݎܿ_ݒሺܶ െ 2ሻହ଴௡ୀଵ  
ܧܩ_ܲܥܫ௡ୀହ଴
்ୀଶ଴଴ହ = ן  ൅∑ ܾܿ_݀ݎܿ_ܿሺܶ െ 2ሻହ଴௡ୀଵ  
ܧܩ_ܲܥܫ௡ୀହ଴
்ୀଶ଴଴ହ = ן  ൅∑ ܾܿ_݀ݎܿ_ܿ ൅ ݒ ൅ ݌ሺܶ െ 2ሻହ଴௡ୀଵ  
Specification of the Model Controlling for Economic Development 
The third application of the generalized model seeks to determine if the 
established level of economic development in a state influences the ability of political or 
business climate to predict changes in the level of growth and development. This iteration 
was limited to testing the explanatory power for the year 2005.  States ranking in the top 
deciles for levels of economic development are defined as the control group and labeled 
top performing states: Connecticut, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Colorado, Iowa, 
Nebraska, Wyoming, New Jersey and Washington were. The states ranked in the bottom 
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deciles, labeled as bottom performing states, include: Oklahoma, Kentucky, Arkansas, 
West Virginia, New Mexico, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina and 
Louisiana. Isolating these states into two separate groups allowed a comparison of how 
variations in the levels of economic development influence the ability of political or 
business climate to predict variations in the dependent variables. 
The following example highlights how the general equation is modified to assess 
the performance of the top performing states. The first set of equations depict how the 
formula was modified to assess the influence that all measures of political have over 
changes in growth in per capita income, EG-PCI, growth in gross state product, EG_GSP 
and economic development, ED_QOL. The last equation in this list provides an example 
of how the model was specified to test the influence that a measure of business climate, 
BC_BHI had over levels of growth across high performing states: 
ܧܩ_ܲܥܫ௡ୀଵିଵ଴்ୀଶ଴଴ହ ൌן  ൅෍ ݌ܿ_݅_ݎݏሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻ
ଵ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
൅ ෍ ݌ܿ_݅_݃݁݉݌ሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻ
ଵ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
൅ ෍ ݌ܿ_ܿ_݃݌݌ሺܶ ൌ 0ሻ
ଵ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
 
 
ܧܩ_ܩܵ ௡ܲୀଵିଵ଴்ୀଶ଴଴ହ ൌ ן  ൅෍ ݌ܿ_݅_ݎݏሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻ
ଵ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
൅ ෍ ݌ܿ_݅_݃݁݉݌ሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻ
ଵ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
൅ ෍ ݌ܿ_ܿ_݃݌݌ሺܶ ൌ 0ሻ
ଵ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
 
(1)  
ܧܦ_ܱܳܮ௡ୀଵିଵ଴்ୀଶ଴଴ହ ൌ ן  ൅෍ ݌ܿ_݅_ݎݏሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻ
ଵ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
൅ ෍ ݌ܿ_݅_݃݁݉݌ሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻ
ଵ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
൅ ෍ ݌ܿ_ܿ_݃݌݌ሺܶ ൌ 0ሻ
ଵ଴
௡ୀ ଵ
 
(2)  
(3) ܧܩ_ܲܥܫ௡ୀଵିଵ଴்ୀଶ଴଴ହ = ן ൅ ∑ ܾܿ_ܾ݄݅ሺ ܶ െ 2ሻଵ଴௡ୀଵ  
Assessing the performance in the bottom performing states is simply a matter of 
substituting n =1-10 with n = 41-50: 
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(1) ܧܩ_ܲܥܫ ௡ୀସଵିହ଴
்ୀଶ଴଴ହ ൌ  
(2)  ן ൅∑ ݌ܿ_݅_ݎݏሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻହ଴௡ୀ ସଵ ൅ ∑ ݌ܿ_݅_݃݁݉݌ሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻହ଴௡ୀ ସଵ ൅ ∑ ݌ܿ_ܿ_݃݌݌ሺܶ ൌ 0ሻହ଴௡ୀ ସଵ  
(3) ܧܩ_ܩܵܲ ௡ୀସଵିହ଴
்ୀଶ଴଴ହ ൌ  
(4)  ן ൅∑ ݌ܿ_݅_ݎݏሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻହ଴௡ୀ ସଵ ൅ ∑ ݌ܿ_݅_݃݁݉݌ሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻହ଴௡ୀ ସଵ ൅ ∑ ݌ܿ_ܿ_݃݌݌ሺܶ ൌ 0ሻହ଴௡ୀ ସଵ  
(5) ܧܦ_ܱܳܮ ௡ୀସଵିହ଴
்ୀଶ଴଴ହ ൌ  
(6)        ן  ൅∑ ݌ܿ_݅_ݎݏሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻହ଴௡ୀ ସଵ ൅ ∑ ݌ܿ_݅_݃݁݉݌ሺܶ ൌ െ5ሻହ଴௡ୀ ସଵ ൅ ∑ ݌ܿ_ܿ_݃݌݌ሺܶ ൌ 0ሻହ଴௡ୀ ସଵ  
In all instances where the general equation is modified:  T =lag period applied to the 
exogenous variable ; EG_ is the percentage change in the annual growth of _GSP  or the 
per capita income in absolute dollars, _PCI in the year(s) specified by the time T; when 
used as a rank  n=1 refers to the top ranked state, 50 refers to the lowest ranked state; 
ED_ is the measure of economic development ; BC_ is the preface used to describe the 
index defining the state’s business climate; T is the date of test year for the data set of the 
dependent variable, either a 5 year average from 2001-2005 or 2005. 
Limitations.  
The limitations associated with designing longitudinal research are highlighted by 
Menard, (2002, p. 3) and include: “(1) the ability to collect data for each variable over 
multiple time periods, (2) the alignment of cases to the periods under analysis, and (3) the 
selection of analytical tool suited to comparing data between or among periods.” To 
address these and the other limitations, data used in this study were collected at regular 
intervals and all were derived from secondary sources.  
Ostrom (1990, p.58) expresses several concerns over the presence of serial 
correlation in lagged models. Each is addressed by the methods adopted for use in this 
study. First, descriptive techniques identify patterns of convergence or anomalies that 
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might suggest correlation. Second, where needed, data or relationships were 
preconditioned using standard regression techniques. The succession of OLS regression 
trials described earlier helped limit the application of time lags to exogenous or 
independent variable(s). According to Ostrom, this avoids the unwanted encounter with 
serial correlation. With none of the lagged exogenous variables demonstrating any 
outward signs of serial correlation, the study was clear to specify the time interval to be 
used to test when a change in economic growth or development within the U.S. states 
responded to changes in its political climate. The specification of a precise time interval 
supports Ostrom’s requirement that the lagged models remain amendable to being 
analyzed for autocorrelation using traditional modes of intervention, in this case the 
Durbin-Watson statistic. Isolating the equations into specific time interval(s) has the 
added benefit of specifying an OLS model with lagged exogenous values that did not 
require further transformation or manipulation. As note in the literature review, the 
elimination of weighting schemes helps sidestep any criticism surrounding the bias used 
to assign weights.  
The strategy to restrict the application of time lags to exogenous variables and not 
apply partial effects to one or more of the explanatory variables (or hand working other 
variables into more elaborate distributed lag models) kept this study from encountering 
the pitfalls encountered when analyzing data from a time-series (Ostrom,1990). While 
these more restrictive methods may have fallen short of producing stronger correlations, 
they minimized exposing the findings from this study to the limitations cited in the 
literature.  
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Causation and Association 
Although the term causation is discussed, statistics alone cannot assign causality. 
The presence of association does not imply causation: but according to Chou (1969) the 
presence of causation always implies association. Chou (1969, p. 631) provides several 
explicit reasons why association cannot be used to assign causation: first there is the 
likelihood that the association between variables is the result of pure chance; second, 
association between two variables may be due to the influence of a third common 
variable or an intervening factor; finally, there are occasions when the relationship, while 
real, fails to delineate the relationship between the variables, in this instance failing to 
unravel which is the cause and which is the effect.  
Chou (1969) suggests that the case for causation must rely on logic and reasoning. 
He considers these to be the only reliable sources for uncovering errors inherent in any 
assessment of association. In an attempt to avoid reading causation into spurious 
associations, the findings presented in this study will be critiqued against research 
suggesting that economic growth is the logical outcome of discrete acts that seek to 
enhance the levels of innovation. Some of these acts are within control of markets while 
others fall under the influence of government regulators (Klette and Kortum, 2002).  
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Summary on Analytical Methods 
Considered collectively, the adoption of these analytical methods offered the 
following advantages: data could be collected in fixed-time intervals, no interpolations of 
data were required, the timeframes selected allowed a comparative analysis of all data 
from all states, and finally, they eliminated the need to create weighting schemes for 
variables. These factors coalesce into a methodology that addresses many of the shortfalls 
associated with the design of longitudinal research and the analysis of time series data.  
The methodology developed for this investigation is relatively flexible. The data 
collection methods evolved into a data set that is well suited to supporting the underlying 
goals of this study: objectivity of data collection, transparency of analytical methods, and 
simplicity in the interpretation of results.  
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Table 3.1 Summary: Sources and Uses of Data for each U.S. State, 2005( * except as noted) 
 
Variable  Name Source Description Range Average 
Business Climate 
 
 
 
The Center for Enterprise 
Development 
BC_DRC_P 
BC_DRC_V 
BC_DRC_C 
Tax Foundation 
BC-TAXF 
Suffolk University  
BC_BHI 
State Asset Development Report Card 
 
Index of Performance,  
Index of Vitality 
Index of Capacity 
State Business Climate Tax Index 
 
Beacon Hill Index 
 
 
50-100* 
50-100* 
50-100* 
 
1-50 
 
2.53-7.03 
 
 
76.9 
77.1 
76.9 
 
25.5 
 
5.00 
Political Climate 
 a.  Management 
Capacity 
 
 
 b. Political 
Ideology  
 
 
 
Maxwell School; Government 
Performance Project  
PC_W_GPP 
  
US Census Bureau; Statistical 
Abstract 
PC_I_RS 
 
PC_I_G_EMP  
Management Capacity in the areas of:  
-Financial Mgt   -HR Mgt 
-IT mgt              -Capital Management 
-Managing for Results  
 
Government Growth:  
Patterns of revenue sources, a percentage of 
personal income consumed by various forms of 
taxation  
Local government employment (Index as a percent 
of total state employment) 
 
 
 
72.0-92.0 
 
 
6.7%-14% 
 
 
1.0-4.0 
 
 
 
81.68 
 
 
10.6% 
 
 
2.10 
Economic Growth Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, HBS 
EG_GSP 
EG_PCI 
Quantitative Changes in Economy  
 
 
Changes in Gross State Product 
Absolute value of per capita income  
 
 
 
2.41%-14.11% 
$24.6-47.3K 
 
 
 
6.607% 
$33.3K 
Economic 
Development 
Census Bureau 
 
 
 
 
 
ED_QOL 
Qualitative changes in quality of life 
Income 
Educational attainment 
Poverty rates 
Crime Rates 
Health  
A composite index of each state’s performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.25-4.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.45 
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
Introduction  
This chapter addresses the essential question of whether the variables used to 
define the political and business climates across the American states are suited to 
predicting changes in economic growth or economic development. The findings are 
portrayed in graphs and the results are presented in a series of tables. The iteration of 
each model is labeled as a step. The outputs, described in the following sections, were 
derived from the series of OLS-LEV models specified in the methods section. The tables 
will highlight how well each variable explains changes in the average level of economic 
growth or development occurring across the period 2001to 2005 and in the base year, 
2005. While each table is accompanied by a general discussion of its findings, the 
conclusions to be drawn from this collective work are presented in the following chapter. 
Five regression steps will highlight how the combined and individual effects of 
political climate interact to predict levels of growth and development. As referred to in 
the methods section, the political climate variable measuring state and local tax burden is 
labeled (PC_I_RS), the value of the index used to define the ratio of employment in the 
states public sector is labeled (PC_I_GEMP), and a state’s capacity to manage its affairs 
is shown as (PC_C_GPP).  
Tables are also used to address the question of whether six of the more popular 
measures of business climate are reliable predictors of changes in the level of economic 
growth or development. The business climate variables are labeled as follows: the 
Beacon Hill Index (BC_BHI) , the Tax Foundations ranking (BC_TAXF) , and 
development report card ( BC_DRC_). Since the DRC produces individual measures for 
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development capacity (_C), performance (_P), and business vitality (_V), each of these 
indices are tested in a manner that defines their individual and additive effects.  
Figures 4.1 through 4.7 characterize the behavior of key variables across all states. 
These figures reveal a collection of states where the levels of economic development 
(ED_QOL), remained closely aligned to changes in the measures of political climate and 
levels of growth measured as per capita income (EG_PCI). Data from the top and bottom 
deciles of those states are selected as controls. Each is then tested to determine whether 
an established level of economic development influences the ability of political climate or 
business climate to predict changes in the levels of economic growth. The dependent 
variables used for this analysis were collected for 2005.  
The descriptive statistics for all variables measured as five year averages are 
summarized in Appendix B. Appendix C depicts the correlations of the variables.   
Profile of Economic Growth Across States 
Growth as per capita income 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates how the levels of per capita income vary across the U.S. 
States. These data are the average value collected from 1987 through 2005. The figure 
highlights a disparity in annual earnings of over ten thousand dollars.  
This chart gives an indication of how states might be grouped according to levels 
of income. In a third of the states the average levels of per capita income exceed $25,000. 
Approximately 40% fall between $20,000 and $25,000. The remainder of the states falls 
below $20,000.  
The observation that these states distributed themselves roughly in thirds helped 
guide the design of the Boolean filtering algorithms that were discussed earlier. It is also 
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worth noting the presence of an elite grouping of states. Clearly 10% of the states are 
enjoying much higher levels of growth measured by this variable. 
This observation, and its relationship to the other findings, is discussed later in the 
summary.  
Figure 4.1  Profile of U.S. States Average per Capita Income 1987-2005 
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Growth as gross state product 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 highlights how the year over year changes in gross state 
product varies across the states. The graph depicts the average year over year change in 
GSP from 1980 through 2005. As seen in this chart, approximately 20% of the states 
enjoy high levels of growth. Roughly 65% of the states have experienced an average 
level of change in their output. 15% of the states experience a level of growth that is 18% 
below the mean of 6.35%. 
Figure 4.2  Profile of U.S. States Average Gross State Product 1980-2005 
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Figure 4.3 highlights the nature of the standard deviations within each state over 
this same timeframe. The chart offers little to suggest an opportunity for convergence to 
either a higher or lower rate of growth. The standard deviation appears as the darker of 
the two bars. The lighter bar is the average for that state over the 15 years. 
 
  
Figure 4.3  Profile of U.S. States Average and Standard Deviation GSP 1980-2005 
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Profile of Economic Development Across the States  
Figure 4.4 portrays the average level of economic development in each state over 
the years 1980 to 2005. Recall from the methods section that the QOL is a composite 
index where a lower value defines a higher QOL. This chart displays a familiar picture: 
roughly a third of the states enjoy a high quality of life, defined as QOL values less than 
2.00. A second group exhibits a QOL that would be defined as average: QOL values 
between 2.00 and 3.00. A third group displays values exceeding 3.0. This final grouping 
clearly exhibits a particularly low QOL. Quality of Life ranges from 1.00 to 4.00. 
In comparing the rankings here to those that depict growth measured as per capita 
income (Figure 4.1), one finds several instances where states occupying the top tier in 
terms of economic growth exhibit top tier performance in the composite quality of life 
index. So while the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, 
Delaware, Minnesota and Illinois diverge in terms of industrial base, geography, and size, 
they converge around these measures of growth and those of development. Likewise, 
states such as Louisiana, West Virginia, Arkansas and New Mexico have low levels of 
income and are among those states ranked low in the quality of life index. 
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Profile of Political Climate Across the States 
As outlined in the section on method, the indicators of a state’s political climate 
incorporate two measures of its political ideology. Ideology is defined by measuring the 
size of state and local government and assessing the tax burden on individuals. Each 
measure is compared to the average from across all states in that year. That comparison 
serves as the benchmark for categorizing the government as excessively engaged in the 
affairs of the individual or responsive to meeting their needs.   
 Size of government. 
As noted in the methods, the measure used to gauge the size of state and local 
government was developed as an index. As was the case in all indices developed for this 
Figure 4.4  Profile of U.S. States Average Economic Development, QOL 1980-2005 
Average Economic Development: QOL Index
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investigation, the lower the number the more favorable the conditions for economic 
growth. Figure 4.5 depicts the variation in the average of this index across all states. The 
data were collected over the years 1987 through 2005.  Here the states distribute 
themselves into four distinct groups. Approximately 30% of the states exhibit a 
comparatively low level of employment in the public sector. This is defined by an index 
value of less than 1.50. States falling in this category outwardly display a political 
ideology deemed favorable to enhancing levels of economic growth. A second grouping, 
representing 35% of this sample, exhibits levels of public employment on par with the 
levels observed over all states and time ranges. This is defined by an index that hovers at 
or slightly above 2.00. Roughly 20% of the states have levels above the average. These 
states are categorized as high and therefore potentially unfavorable to growth. However, 
they are not immediately classified as excessive. This third group is defined by index 
values 2.50 to 3.00. Finally, there is a fourth group where the political ideology seems 
indicative of governments that could be judged excessive. About 15% of the states have 
values of over 3.00 and would fall into that category. The assignment of states to 
categories is based on the suggestion by the literature that as the size of a state’s 
government expands beyond some norm, (in this analysis statistically beyond or below 
the average) it starts to perform functions that other states have chosen to outsource. A 
quick comparison of the data presented in Figure 4.5 alongside that presented in Figure 
4.4 suggests some overlap between states that have low ratio of its citizens employed in 
government and those with high QOL. Examples include Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Colorado, and New Hampshire. 
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Figure 4.5  Profile of U.S. States Average Government Employment 1987-2005 
State and local tax burdens 
Figure 4.6 depicts the variations in the average level of state and local tax burden 
across all states over the years 1987 to 2005. A comparison of the distribution of states 
listed here against those appearing in the chart for the QOL (Figure 4.4) reveals a rather 
startling find: several of the states with the highest tax burdens enjoy a high quality of life 
and have the highest levels of economic growth.  For example, the states of Washington, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, and Connecticut exhibit tax burdens in the top 20-30% of those 
measured, yet each ranks in the top 20-30 % in the categories of economic development 
(QOL) and in economic growth (PCI). So while several of the business climate reports 
tout the relationship between lower taxes and higher levels of economic growth, their 
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claim is not borne out of these data. Take the case of the state of Alabama. The tax 
burden is low. Based on the reports from the business climate indices one would assume 
that its citizens would enjoy a higher quality of life and a higher overall level of 
economic growth. On the contrary, Alabama occupies the lowest tier in terms of 
economic growth (per capita income), and has the same position in the QOL index.  
Dye’s (1980) suggestion that tax burdens have no direct impact on economic growth 
seems to have merit. Only New Hampshire occupies a top 10 position in all categories 
that the literature would define as favorable to improving economic growth: it has a high 
level of growth, measured either as GSP or per capita income, it has a low tax rate, it has 
a low ratio of employees working in state and local government, and it enjoys a high 
quality of life.   
Figure 4.6  Profile of U.S. States Average Tax Burden 1987-2005 
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Figure 4.7 highlights how over the years a narrow variance in the measures associated 
with tax burdens suggests little convergence around an acceptable or lower level of 
taxation (standard deviation is the small solid bar). Over time state governments have 
gravitated to a burden that allows them to operate and serve the needs of their 
constituency. From the data presented in this section it appears there is some benefit to 
shifting this paradigm. Several states where taxes are high and growth, both in per capita 
income and GSP is low need to reconsider the role their governments are performing. As 
seen in the earlier Figure 4.6, history suggests that it would be a rare occasion for a state 
to stray from the rates already established.  Appendix B details the descriptive statistics 
for the variables used in this study.  
Figure 4.7  Profile of U.S. States Average, Standard Deviation Tax Burden 1987-2005 
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Economic Growth Measured as Per Capita Income  
This section highlights the results of the OLS-LEV tests used to define the ability 
of business climate and political climate to predict changes in the level of economic 
growth measured as the per capita income of individuals within a state. The measures of 
the dependent variable are depicted in actual dollars. See Table 3.1 for an explanation of 
the variables used in these tables. In all instances PC_ stands for political climate. The 
designation (_I) indicates a measure of ideology and the designation (_C) indicates a 
measure of political capacity to manage. For example the abbreviation for political 
climate, ideology defined by revenue source, tax burden, is shown as PC_I_ RS.   
Table 4.1  Five Year Average, Per Capita Income vs. Political Climate  
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.  
  
Step Variable 
Annual 
Lag 
R-square 
(adjusted) Coefficient SE (coeff) Constant 
1 PC_I_RS 10 0.035 72361.131 4397.830 23390.981 
2 PC_I_GEMP 10 0.231*** -2143.544*** 564.450 35324.978 
3 PC_C_GPP 0 0.003 47.431 127.155 27043.256 
4 
PC_ I_RS 
+ GEMP 
10 
10 
0.249*** 
(0.217) 
51474.440 
-2074.018*** 
49021.739 
567.772 29843.281 
5 
PC_ I_RS 
+ GEMP 
+ GPP 
10 
10 
0 
0.251** 
(0.202) 
53071.280 
-2111.569*** 
-42.521 
49665.685 
581.913 
114.985 33212.371 
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Economic growth: 5 year average per capita income vs. political climate. 
The only measure of political climate suited to predicting economic growth when 
growth is defined by the average level of per capita income over the years 2001 to 2005 
is the ratio of employment in state and local government (PC_I_ GEMP). Recall from the 
methods section, the value of (PC_I_GEMP) is that of an index. It was derived by 
comparing the ratio of each state’s level of employment in the public sector against total 
employment. The index was used to establish a relative level of employment in each state 
in each year. The values range from 1.00 (a statistically lower percentage of employment 
in the public sector) to 4.00 (a statistically higher percentage). The values were used to 
make comparisons of this measure across the states.  
A hypothetical example adopted from the values in step 2 helps to explain the 
influence that levels of government employment have over levels of economic growth: 
EG_PCI = 35324.98 – 2143.54 (PC_I_GEMP).  
Since a higher index represents a larger ratio of employment in the public sector, 
every 1.00 point of change in the index of (PC_I_GEMP) represents a loss of $2143 in 
personal income. This model explains 23% of the variation in economic growth measured 
as per capita income (p<.001).  
While the additive models combining measures of employment with the level of 
tax burden (PC_I_RS), or a state’s capacity to manage (PC_C_GPP), improve the 
explanatory power of the outputs in step 2, R-square of 0.231 ( p<.001) vs. R-square of 
0.249 ( p<.001), the adjusted R-square of 0.217 reduces the significance of these multi-
variable models. The size of the SE attached to the coefficient (PC_I_RS) and 
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(PC_C_GPP) indicates these multivariate models are exhibiting an unreliable level of 
interaction.  
The outputs in steps 2, 4 and 5 demonstrate how increasing levels of employment 
in the public sector have a negative impact on levels of personal income. The values 
assigned to the coefficients for (PC_I_GEMP) and the standard error of these estimates 
remains within 5% of one another. These finding from this table are supported by the 
works of Karabegovic and McMahon (2005) and that of Higgins, Levy, and Young 
(2003), all of whom revealed a negative correlation between increases in the 
representation of the public sector and the measures they used to define economic growth.   
The regression tests in steps 3 and 5 suggest that the measure used to gauge a 
states capacity to manage (PC_I_GPP), adds no value to the explanatory power of a 
model defined solely by levels of government employment.  
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Table 4.2  Per Capita Income in 2005 vs. Political Climate  
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE (Coeff) Constant 
1 PC_I_RS 5 0.000 NA NA NA 
2 PC_I_GEMP 10 0.201** -2135.705** 613.740 37687.733 
3 PC_C_GPP 0 0.026 166.870 145.995 19658.219 
4 
PC_ I_RS 
+ GEMP 
5 
10 
0.201** 
(0.167) 
-1363.870 
-2135.473*** 
54494.831 
620.300 
37828.366 
5 
PC_ I_RS 
+ GEMP 
+ GPP 
5 
10 
0 
0.210* 
(0.158) 
-3500.580 
-2063.532** 
95.625 
54876.443 
632.059 
136.345 
30090.551 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.  
Economic growth: per capita income 2005 vs. political climate.  
The results in Table 4.2 indicate that the only measure of political climate suited 
to predicting economic growth when growth is defined by the level of per capita income 
in 2005 is the ratio of employment in state and local government ( PC_I_ GEMP). These 
results confirm those seen in Table 4.1. In both examples, when political climate is 
defined as employment in the public sector (PC_I_GEMP), these OLS-LEV models are 
able to explain between 20% and 23% of the variation in levels of per capita income.  
Inserting actual data into these models reveals the utility of these estimates. In the 
base year 2005 the per capita income in Alabama was $29,623 and the index of 
employment was 3.0.  
EG_PCI (2005) = 37687.733 -2135.705(PC_I_GEMP) 
The model estimates the level of per capita income at $31,280 or within 5% of 
that observed. 
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Inserting these same determinants from the state of Connecticut, where the level 
of employment in the public sector (PC_I_GEMP), is relatively low, defined as a score of 
1.0 and the level of per capita income is relatively high at $47,388, yields an estimated 
income of $35,552. The error of this estimate is over 25% of that observed. This suggests 
the model is sensitive to variations in the initial level of income. 
Contrary to the popular notion that an increase in taxes hinders growth, this model 
discounts the notion that this measure of political ideology (PC_I_RS) can reliably 
predict a change in the level of per capita income. As noted in the review of the literature, 
these are the same conclusions reached by Dye (1980).  
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Table 4.3  Per Capita Income 2005 vs. Business Climate  
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 BC_ BHI 2 0.265*** 2494.944 599.954 20812.463 
2 BC_TAXF 2 0.000 NA NA NA 
3 BC_DRC-C 2 0.356*** 206.116*** 40.001 17392.780 
4 BC_DRC-P 2 0.374*** 206.331*** 38.495 17371.807 
5 BC_ DRC_V 2 0.130** 123.847** 46.157 23764.323 
6 
BC_DRC_C 
+DRC_P 
+DRC_V 
2 
0.488*** 
(0.455) 
91.090 
147.736** 
59.488 
51.097 
44.067 
42.122 
10294.209 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50. 
Economic growth: per capita income in 2005 vs. business climate.  
The results in Table 4.3 define whether measures of business climate can reliably 
predict economic growth measured as per capita income. A lag period of 2 years was 
applied to all measures of business climate. The rationale for this selection was presented 
in the methods section.  
With the exception of the data from the Tax Foundation, the findings in Table 4.3 
suggest that any measure of business climate can reliably predict between 13% and 37% 
of the variation in the level of per capita income ( p<0.01 or higher). While the additive 
effects of the development report card offers the greatest potential for predicting changes 
in per capita income, the variables in that additive model appear to be interacting as the 
variables have lost the significance (adjusted R-squared of 0.455, (p<.001)). 
In their 2006 report the BHI claims that every 1.0 point rise in its index translates 
to a $416.80 increase in per capita income (R-Square of 0.84, (p<.05)) (Suffolk 
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University, 2006). For the rankings published in 2008 they claim that same 1.0 point 
increase translates into a $1,546 increase in per capita income, yet the R-squared has 
dropped to 0.10. Finally, for that same year (2008), they claim that a 10 point increase in 
the overall ranking equates to a $1,130 increase in per capita income (Suffolk University, 
2010). The outputs from the models produced by this investigation indicate that the BHI 
index has the capacity to explain 26.5% of the variation in the level of per capita income: 
EG _PCI (2005) = 20812.463 + 2494.944 (BC_BHI(2003)). 
Since the BHI is quick to point out that their data represents a time lag of from 1 
to 3 years we will take the liberty of using the output in step 1, Table 4.3 to test their 
estimates. 
The BHI data indicates that in 2006 Maine was ranked 36th with an index of 4.33. 
In 2008 it climbed 10 points in the ranking to 26th and had a score of 4.70. By inserting 
the difference between these scores (0.370), into the model in Table 4.3 one anticipates 
an increase in real per capita income of $923. This value is slightly less than that 
predicted by the BHI. In fact, the most recent data suggests that over those years the 
income in ME increased $2,707. Across those same years a similar shift occurred in the 
ranking for the state of Alaska. In 2006 the BHI ranked Alaska 14th with a score of 5.75, 
and by 2008 it had slipped to 24th and had a score of 4.82. Inserting the difference in 
these scores into the equation developed here results in a loss in per capita income of 
$2,320. In point of fact, over that interval Alaska experienced an increase in per capita 
income of $5,141.  
Clearly none of the models discussed in these examples offers the reliability 
expected from a good forecasting tool. Yet the estimates calculated by the models 
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developed in this study and those of the BHI produce errors that were surprisingly close 
to one another. For the state of Maine the BHI estimates a gain of $1,130. This represents 
an error of $1,577. The error of the estimate produced from the models developed from 
this investigation was $1,784. The difference between these two estimates is 
approximately 14%.  In the example of Alaska the BHI error amounts to $6,271. The 
error produced from the models developed by this investigation is $7,461, a difference of 
19%.  
Once again, the explanatory power of the political climate variables developed for 
this investigation appears sensitive to the extremes in per capita income. The same 
appears to be true of the BHI index of competitiveness.  
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Economic Growth Measured as Gross State Product 
This section highlights the ability of business climate and political climate to 
predict changes in the level of economic growth measured as the annual change in gross 
state product. 
Table 4.4  Five Year Average, Gross State Product vs. Political Climate  
Step Variable Annual  Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 PC_I_RS 10 0.102* -38.300* 16.363 9.286 
2 PC_I_GEMP 10 0.139** 0.516** 0.186 4.248 
3 PC_C_GPP 0 0.018 -0.036 0.039 8.266 
4 
PC_ I_RS 
+ GEMP 
10 
10 
0.216** 
(0.183) 
 
-33.562* 
0.470** 
 
15.559 
0.180 
7.822 
5 
PC_ I_RS 
+ GEMP 
+ GPP 
10 
10 
0 
0.218** 
(0.167) 
-33.132* 
0.460 
-0.011 
 
15.770 
0.332 
0.037 
8.731 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.  
Economic growth: 5 year average gross state product vs. political climate. 
The results in Table 4.4 highlight how the measures of political ideology interact 
to produce a small, but nonetheless significant influence over changes in economic 
growth defined as gross state product. An increase in the levels of taxation decreases the 
level of a state’s GSP. Increasing the size of the public sector appears to have a positive 
influence on the value of the products produced by the state’s economy (EG_GSP).  
The interplay between these two variables is shown in a hypothetical example developed 
from the equations in step 4 of Table 4.4: 
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EG_GSP = 7.822 – 33.562 (PC_I_RS) + 0.470 (PC_I_GEMP) 
This model is directed at predicting economic growth measured as the value of 
economic output from a state. The model tests the scenario that over a 5 year time frame 
the state increases the tax burden by 1%. That move reduces the change in GSP by an 
average of 0.336%. This finding is consistent with those elements of the literature that 
associate a state’s failure to attract and retain business to levels of taxation. A closer look 
at the equation derived in step 4 suggests that the negative influence from increasing 
taxes can be offset by increasing employment in the public sector. For example, if the 
average value assigned to the index of employment in the public sector were to increase 
1.00, the loss of GSP, due to the hypothetical tax increase, could be offset by 0.470%. 
While the additive model appears significant (p<.01), it explains less than 20% of the 
variation in a state’s GSP. 
Finally, the outputs in Table 4.4 continue to demonstrate the value of using 
political ideology as a predictor of economic growth. The smaller correlation coefficients 
produced here (R-square = 0.139  (p<.01) suggest the measure of public sector 
employment is better suited to predicting changes in the level of economic growth 
measured as per capita income (EG_PCI), ( R-Squared =23.1%,  (p<.001)) than growth 
measured as gross state product. The fact that this variable surfaces as being significant in 
both models offers some hope that there is some utility to this variable. It should also be 
noted that in Table 4.1 the measure of growth is per capita income and the coefficient 
attached to the measure of government employment is negative. In Table 4.4 the measure 
of economic growth is defined as change in GSP and the coefficient attached to the 
measure of government employment is positive. This is to be expected. This finding 
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validates the value of the neoclassic economic models suggesting that economic growth 
be measured two ways. Clearly each is measuring something different. 
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Table 4.5  Gross State Product in 2005 vs. Political Climate  
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 PC_I_RS 5 0.112* -75.393* 30.665 14.407 
2 PC_I_GEMP 10 0.187** 1.111** 0.334 4.319 
3 PC_C_GPP 0 0.036 -0.104 0.078 15.117 
4 
PC_ I_RS 
+ GEMP 
5 
10 
0.304 *** 
(0.274) 
-76.867** 
1.124*** 
27.445 
0.312 
12.245 
5 
PC_ I_RS 
+ GEMP 
+ GPP 
5 
10 
0 
0.314*** 
(0.269) 
-75.594** 
1.081*** 
-0.057 
27.578 
0.318 
0.069 
16.851 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.  
Economic growth: gross state product in 2005 vs. political climate.  
While the results from the tests made against the data collected in 2005 are similar 
to those produced from the averaged data, there are a few noteworthy exceptions.  
 The outputs in step 4 highlight the combined influence of taxation ( PS_I_RS) 
and employment in the public sector (PC_I_GEMP). These two measures of ideology 
produce an additive model that improves the explanatory power produced from either of 
the individual measures. The additive model yields an adjusted R-square of 0.274 (p<.01).  
A hypothetical example using the equation shown in step 4: 
EG_GSP = 12.245 - 76.867 (PC_I_RS) + 1.1124 (PC_I_GEMP)  
In this example we see how increasing the state and local tax burden by 1% translates 
into 0.76% reduction in the level of economic growth measured as the GSP. As we 
observed in the models constructed from the 5-year average data, increasing the level of 
employment in the public sector by a 1.00 value of the index will offset the loss of 
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growth created by a 1% increase in tax burden 1.1124-0.7687 = 0.3427. Examining the 
ratio of the coefficients highlights the inflection point at which increasing the size of the 
public sector fails to absorb the negative effect of increased taxation. This occurs at the 
point where the level of taxation goes above 1.46%. These findings appear to contradict 
the claims that a government’s size is negatively correlated with levels of economic 
growth. Alternatively, this finding appear to confirm Singleton and Griswold’s (1999) 
suggestion that we need to shift away from relying on measures of a bureaucracy’s size to 
determine if the policy environment fosters or stymies innovation, and instead begin to 
adopt indicators that judge the quality of the institution. The nature of this contradiction 
and its relationship to the finding from this investigation are reexamined in the summary.  
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Table 4.6  Gross State Product in 2005 vs. Business Climate  
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 BC_ BHI 2 0.004 NA NA NA 
2 BC_TAXF 2 0.137** 1.087** 0.393 0.861 
3 BC_DRC-C 2 0.017 NA NA NA 
4 BC_DRC-P 2 0.084* -0.053* 0.025 10.678 
5 BC_ DRC_V 2 0.087* -0.054* 0.026 10.792 
6 
BC_DRC_C 
+DRC_P 
+ DRC_V 
2 
0.136* 
 
0.052 
-0.072* 
-0.069* 
0.035 
0.030 
0.029 
13.510 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50. 
Economic growth: gross state product in 2005 vs. business climate.  
In earlier findings measures of business climate seemed well-suited to predicting 
level of economic growth measured as per capita income. The outputs in Table 4.6 make 
it clear that none of the business climate measures are suited to predicting changes in 
economic growth when it is measured as a change in the level of gross state product.  
The goal of publishing an indicator of business climate is to suggest ways to 
change policy to attract and retain business. The prescriptions offered should be able to 
predict changes in the level growth measured as GSP. The measure of business climate 
best suited to predicting levels of growth in GSP is the one created by the Tax Foundation. 
It has an R-squared of 0.125 (p<.05). Yet that measure remains subordinate to the 
explanatory powers of a simple, objective determinant of a state’s political climate (see 
step 4 Table 4.5; adjusted R-square = 0.274, (p<01)).    
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Economic Development 
This section highlights the ability of a state’s business and political climate to 
predict changes in the level of economic development occurring within a state.  Recall 
from the methods section that economic development is defined by a proxy that indexes 
the quality of life enjoyed by individuals within a state. An index value of 1.00 indicates 
a high quality of life. By contrast, a value of 4.00 suggests the presence of conditions that 
hamper the prospects for achieving a high quality of life.   
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Table 4.7  Five Year Average Economic Development vs. Political Climate  
Step Variable Annual Lag 
R-square 
(adjusted) 
Coefficient SE( coeff) Constant 
1 PC_I_RS 10 0.142** -23.455 8..310 4.849 
2 PC_I_GEMP 10 0.091* 0.217* 0.099 1.968 
3 PC_C_GPP 0 0.001 NA NA NA 
4 
PC_ I_RS 
+ GEMP 
10 
10 
0.209** 
(0.176) 
-21.565** 
0.188* 
8.119 
0.094 
4.265 
5 
PC_ I_RS 
+ GEMP 
+ GPP 
10 
10 
0 
0.231** 
(0.181) 
-22.375** 
0.207* 
0.022* 
8.624 
0.100 
0.021 
2.556 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.  
Economic development: 5 year average vs. political climate.  
 Table 4.7 highlights how a state’s political climate influences its level of 
economic development.  
When compared to the measures of economic growth, the first change noted is the 
change in the precedence relationship assigned to the individual variables. However, the 
results in Table 4.7 reaffirm the utility that can be attached to combining the indicators of 
political ideology, employment in the public sector, and levels of tax burden. They 
predict changes in the levels of per capita income (Table 4.1, step 2, adjusted R-square of 
0.217, (p<0.001)), changes in gross state product (Table 4.4, step 4, adjusted R-square of 
0.183, (p<.05)), and changes in development (Table 4.7, step 4, adjusted R-square of 
0.176, (p<.05)), at or about the same level. Again, the consistency of these findings 
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strengthens the case for adopting measures of political ideology as an indicator suited to 
predicting changes in the levels of economic development and economic growth.  
The outputs in Table 4.7 highlight the presence of a positive relationship between 
measures of employment in the public sector (PC_I_GEMP), and levels of economic 
development within a state. When tested as a single variable this measure of political 
ideology only explains a modest amount of the variation in economic development 
(9.1% , ( p<.05)).  The additive models produce results that are roughly twice as strong: 
adjusted R-square of 0.176 (p<.01). 
A hypothetical example is based on the equation in step 2:  
ED_QOL = 1.968 + 0.217 (PC_I_GEMP) 
ED_QOL = 1.968 + 0.217 (2.07)  
ED_QOL = 2.41 
Inserting the average value of political ideology measured as level of employment 
in the public sector (PC_I_GEMP) lagged from the period 1990-1995 predicts a level of 
economic development consistent with the average observed over the period 2001 
through 2005. While the model can only explain 9.1% of variation in these relationships, 
the coefficients assigned to this variable are consistent throughout the table and reinforce 
the presence of an inverse relationship between levels of employment in the public sector 
and the conditions that improve levels of economic development. Recall that a higher 
value in the (ED_QOL) index is a lower quality of life! Since lawmakers have control 
over the social programs that improve an individual’s QOL, such as public safety, 
healthcare, and access to education, and since the call to improve these conditions is often 
used to justify increasing the size of government, these results appear antithetical. Yet the 
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literature makes it clear that more government does not necessarily equate with better 
government. To that point, these findings seem to suggest that more government does not 
by default create a system capable of providing its citizens with a higher quality of life. In 
terms of the 17.6% of the variation in levels of economic growth explained by the 
additive model shown in step 4, less government elevates the quality of life for 
individuals.  
As anticipated, the level of taxation also has an inverse relationship to levels of 
economic development. Again recall that the lower the index of economic development 
(measured as the composite index of quality of life), the higher the quality of life:  
EG_QOL = 4.840 – 23.455 (PS_I_RS) 
Every 1% increase in the state and local tax burden increases the quality of life by 
0.235 points. This equation only explains 14.2% of the variation in level of economic 
development, (p<.01).     
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Table 4.8  Economic Development 2005 vs. Political Climate  
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 PC_I_RS 5 0.028 -10.378 8.901 3.524 
2 PC_I_GEMP 10 0.041 0.175 0.100 2.089 
3 PC_C_GPP 0 0.001 NA NA NA 
4 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
5 
10 
0.089 
(0.051) 
-10.610 
0.177 
8.706 
0.099 
3.183 
5 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
+ GPP 
5 
10 
5 
0.095 
(0.036) 
-10.876 
0.186 
0.012 
8.785 
0.101 
0.022 
2.219 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.  
Economic development: 2005 vs. political climate. 
The results in Table 4.8 suggest an inability to attach significance to the 
explanatory power of these outputs. However, the signs on the coefficients presented both 
here and in the previous analysis indicate that the presence of more government or higher 
levels of taxation reduces the level of economic development within a state. 
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Table 4.9  Economic Development 2005 vs. Business Climate  
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 BC_ BHI 2 0.457*** -0.490*** 0.077 4.901 
2 BC_TAXF 2 0.000 NA NA NA 
3 BC_DRC-C 2 0.287*** -0.028*** 0.006 4.584 
4 BC_DRC-P 2 0.498*** -0.036*** 0.005 5.197 
5 BC- DRC_V 2 0.011 NA NA NA 
6 
BC-DRC_C 
+DRC_P 
+ DRC_V 
2 
0.532*** 
(0.502) 
-0.013 
-0.029*** 
0.005 
0.007 
0.006 
0.006 
2.519 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.  
Economic development: 2005 vs. business climate. 
The results in Table 4.9 highlight how measures of business climate vary in their 
ability to predict changes in the level of economic development. For example, the BHI 
index is a much better indication of changes in the levels of economic development (R-
squared of 0.457, (p<.001)) than it is an indicator of change in either growth measured as 
per capita income (R-squared of 0.265, p<.001, Table 4.3, step 1) or growth in gross state 
product (R-squared of 0.004, p=NA, Table 4.6, step 1). Similar variations are seen in the 
way the development report card’s measure of performance (BC_DRC_P), predicts 
change over these variables. A closer examination of these relationships reveals that the 
variables used to create the series of DRC indices have similarities to those used to create 
our QOL index. This may explain its strength to predict our measure of economic 
development: it is measuring the same thing.  
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The variability around what each of these business climate indices appears to be 
measuring was expected. Fisher, (2005) based his critique of these indices on the 
suggestion that they incorporate measures that are themselves indicators of growth or are 
measuring the results of growth.  
Recall earlier that we hypothesized that an accurate prediction of growth requires 
indicators that can measure the changes that occur on each side of the Schumpeterian 
cycle of growth. Any model designed to predict growth must capture the quantitative 
improvements in an economy and the qualitative improvements that define changes in the 
quality of life. To the extent that Fisher considers the treatment of these qualitative 
measures as outcomes of growth, he is correct. The inability of the published index to 
differentiate between these two measures is witnessed by the way they vary in their 
ability to predict the outcomes. The results in Table 4.9 confirm the assumption tendered 
at the outset of this study that some indices are better indicators of growth while others 
are better indicators of development. 
Controlling for Economic Development  
One of the most compelling arguments used to counter policies of growth are those that 
suggest the negative impact that such policies will have on the QOL enjoyed by the 
majority of citizens. This investigation develops a simple model that puts that argument 
to the test.  
Models are created to determine how the level of economic development in a state 
affects the ability of business and political climates to indicate changes in levels of 
growth and development. The real question is whether the initial conditions that define 
the presence or absence of economic development dilute or reinforce the ability of 
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political climate or business climate to predict changes in the levels of growth. Based on 
the literature the expectation is that states will respond differently.  
For this round of tests states are divided into two groups. Those states ranked in the top 
decile for levels of economic development include Connecticut, Minnesota, Washington, 
New Hampshire, Colorado, Iowa, New Jersey, Hawaii, Wyoming and Nebraska. States 
ranked in the bottom decile include Oklahoma, Kentucky, Arkansas, West Virginia, New 
Mexico, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina and Louisiana. The details 
associated with this exercise are provided in the section on methods. 
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Table 4.10  Top 10 States, Per Capita Income vs. Political Climate 
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 PC_I_RS 5 0.003 -20122.603 137520.862 39680.469 
2 PC_I_GEMP 5 0.077 -1520.391 1855.788 40454.043 
3 PC_C_GPP 0 0.075 -244.900 304.570 57337.675 
4 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
5 
10 
0.077 
(0.000) 
-2753.411 
-1514.174 
143264.151 
2010.062 
40731.652 
5 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
+ GPP 
5 
5 
0 
0.163 
(0.000). 
43236.848 
-1622.110 
-281.831 
158685.976 
2072.721 
360.125 
58902.640 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.  
Economic growth: per capita income vs. political climate, top 10 states.  
These findings indicate that where the level of economic development is already 
high the variables used to define a state’s political climate prove to be unreliable 
indicators of changes in per capita income.  
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Table 4.11  Bottom 10 States, Per Capita Income vs. Political Climate 
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 PC_I_RS 5 0.574** -191960.283** 58520.740 47169.925 
2 PC_I_GEMP 5 0.532* -1379.440* 457.499 31780.477 
3 PC_C_GPP 0 0.076 -121.115 149.477 37445.083 
4 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
5 
5 
0.644* 
(0.542) 
-122198.633 
-722.037 
82539.499 
615.908 
42217.238 
5 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
+ GPP 
5 
5 
0 
0.669 
(0.540) 
-92506.763 
-890.504 
-79.309 
96151.560 
686.110 
115.648 
46035.478 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.  
Economic growth: per capita income vs. political climate, bottom 10 states. 
Comparing the findings in Table 4.11 with those in Table 4.10 indicates the wide 
swings in the predictive power of each variable. These variations are in response to the 
level of economic development enjoyed by a state.  
Table 4.11 exposes some significant differences in the capacity of the models to predict 
growth in per capita income. Table 4.10 demonstrates how a high quality of life mutes 
the power of political climate to predict changes in the level of economic growth. In 
states where the level of QOL is low, these same variables play a significant role in 
predicting a change in economic growth. Increasing levels of taxation in low QOL states 
decreases per capita earnings in a far more dramatic way than in states where the QOL is 
high. In states with a low QOL every 1% change in the level of state or local tax 
decreases per capita earnings by approx $2,000 ( R-squared = 0.574. (p<.01)). 
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Based on this model, the 2005 per capita income in the state of Louisiana is 
predicted to be $27,013. The actual value was $24,664, an error of approximately 10%. 
EG_PCI = 47,169 – (191960 *0.105) = $27,013.   
Note, in 2000 the tax burden for this group of states ranged from 8.3% to 11.1% 
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Table 4.12  Top 10 States, Per Capita Income vs. Business Climate 
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 BC_ BHI 2 0.024 NA NA NA 
2 BC_TAXF 2 0.000 NA NA NA 
3 BC_DRC-C 2 0.139 117.533 103.458 27774.842 
4 BC_DRC-P 2 0.208 214.768 148.248 19181.197 
5 BC- DRC_V 2 0.278 136.399 77.761 27117.154 
6 
BC-DRC_C 
+DRC_P 
+DRC_V 
2 
0.312 
(0.000) 
-21.216 
111.200 
112.870 
156.232 
202.397 
132.785 
21168.002 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.  
Economic growth: per capita income vs. business climate, top 10 states. 
In states with a high level of QOL the measures of a state’s business climate are 
unable to reliably predict change in the level of economic growth measured as per capita 
income. 
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Table 4.13  Bottom 10 States, Per Capita Income vs. Business Climate 
Step Variable 
Annual 
Lag 
R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 BC_ BHI 2 0.433* 2287.033* 925.632 18901.839 
2 BC_TAXF 2 0.243 1637.756 1022.795 19540.224 
3 BC_DRC-C 2 0.056 NA NA NA 
4 BC_DRC-P 2 0.250 114.000 69.816 20940.100 
5 BC- DRC_V 2 0.036 NA NA NA 
6 
BC-DRC_C 
+DRC_P 
+ DRC_V 
2 
0.273 
(0.000) 
21.863 
101.773 
25.325 
95.651 
88.369 
60.495 
18558.103 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.  
           Economic growth: per capita income vs. business climate, bottom 10 states. 
           Clearly a pattern is beginning to emerge. There is reason to begin questioning the 
value of using business climate indices to predict economic outcomes. From the results 
presented thus far it appears that measures of business climate have the capacity to 
predict changes in levels of per capita earnings in states that exhibit low levels of 
economic development. A quick comparison of the results presented in Table 4.13 and 
those in Table 4.11 reveals how the measure of political ideology that gauges levels of 
taxation (PC_I_RS) is the best predictor of growth in states when the level of 
development is low (R-squared = 0.574, p<.01). From Table 4.13 one can see that from 
within the cadre of business climate measures the best predictor of growth when levels of 
development are low is the BHI (R-squared = 0.433. (p<.05)), but that is still subordinate 
to the measure of political ideology.  
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Table 4.14  Top 10 States, Gross State Product vs. Political Climate 
Step Variable AnnualLag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 PC_I_RS 5 0.010 -23.709 84.744 9.259 
2 PC_I_GEMP 10 0.529* 2.459* 0.820 2.095 
3 PC_C_GPP 0 0.190 -0.241 0.176 26.272 
4 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
5 
10 
0.577* 
(0.456) 
-53.294 
2.579* 
59.986 
0.842 
7.469 
5 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
+ GPP 
5 
10 
5 
0.721* 
(0.582) 
-16.348 
2.492* 
-0.226 
56.625 
0.740 
0.129 
22.066 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.  
Economic growth: gross state product vs. political climate, top 10 states.  
When the level of economic development in the state is high, its political ideology, 
defined as the level of employment in the public sector, is a reliable predictor of changes 
in its GSP. Overall, this measure of ideology is a better predictor of change in GSP when 
the quality of life is high (R-square = 0.529. (p<.05)) than it is of the states considered in 
aggregate (R-square of 0.18,(p<.01), Table 4.5)).  
The positive sign attached to the coefficients in both models indicates that a 
higher ratio of employment in the public sector yields higher GSP. Recall that the lower 
the index of employment the lower the relative percent of the work force employed in 
public sector. Note the results presented here are the opposite of those observed when 
growth measured as change in per capita income. There the relationship of increasing 
levels of employment is reversed. The influence of this variable is highest in low 
performing states (see Table 4.11 steps 2 and 4). 
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The equation from the results in Table 4.14:  
EG_GSP = 2.095 + 2.459 (PC_I_GEMP) 
While Table 4.14 suggests that the additive effects of political ideology coalesce 
to produce a model with higher R-squared values (adjusted R-square of 0.582, p<.05) the 
small sample size, (N=10), is a signal cautioning against assigning too much significance 
to the combined effect of these variables.  
Finally, while the output is not deemed statistically significant, it is worth noting 
that this is the first time that the R-squared associated with the capacity to manage 
(PC_C_GPP) has been elevated into the double digits. 
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Table 4.15  Bottom 10 States, Gross State Product vs. Political Climate 
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 PC_I_RS 5 0.100 82.614 87.447 -1.453 
2 PC_I_GEMP 10 0.205 0.920 0.640 4.133 
3 PC_C_GPP 0 0.059 -0.103 0.147 15.300 
4 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
5 
10 
0.205 
(0.000) 
-3.795 
0.941 
125.794 
0.980 
4.453 
5 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
+ GPP 
5 
10 
0 
0.212 
(0.000) 
-21.791 
1.055 
0.045 
155.107 
1.158 
0.188 
2.367 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.  
          Economic growth: gross state product vs. political climate, bottom 10 states.  
          The findings presented in the prior tables demonstrate how the measure of 
employment in the public sector has a far more dramatic impact on the prediction of GSP 
where the level of QOL is high. As noted from Table 4.14, the measure of employment in 
the public sector explains more than 50% of the variation in the growth of GSP in these 
high performing states. The significance of this finding is consistent with those in the 
literature. These models simply state that in states where the level of QOL is high, 
increasing the ratio of employment in the public sector increases GSP. The piece missing 
from this puzzle is an appreciation of the starting point for these determinations, or what 
some prefer to call the initial conditions. When compared to states with low levels of 
economic development, the states exhibiting high levels of economic development 
already have a lower ratio of employment in the public sector. This might suggest that an 
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incremental improvement in staffing yields a benefit in states where the levels of 
development are already high. This matter is the discussed in detail in the summary. 
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Table 4.16  Top 10 States, Gross State Product vs. Business Climate 
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 BC_ BHI 2 0.048 NA NA NA 
2 BC_TAXF 2 0.205 1.238 0.861 0.181 
3 BC_DRC-C 2 0.081 NA NA NA 
4 BC_DRC-P 2 0.046 NA NA NA 
5 BC- DRC_V 2 0.105 -0.047 0.049 10.498 
6 
BC-DRC_C 
+DRC_P 
+ DRC_V 
2 
0.462 
(0.193) 
0.071 
-0.029 
-0.133 
0.085 
0.111 
0.073 
13.539 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10. 
Economic growth: gross state product vs. business climate, top 10 states.  
The findings in Table 4.16 are consistent with the results in Table 4.6. There the 
business climate ranking produced by the Tax Foundation predicted 12.5%  of the change 
in the level of GSP. In this table the Tax Foundation’s measure of business climate is the 
only variable able to predict change in the gross state product when the conditions of 
economic development are high. However the output did not satisfy the criteria: (p<.05). 
It is not until one realizes that the states with the highest levels of development also 
exhibit high levels of economic growth, measured both as per capita income and as gross 
state product, and that these same states have some of the highest levels of taxation, that 
such findings might be mistaken as counter intuitive.  
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Table 4.17  Bottom 10 States, Gross State Product vs. Business Climate 
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 BC_ BHI 2 0.025 NA NA NA 
2 BC_TAXF 2 0.000 NA NA NA 
3 BC_DRC-C 2 0.085 0.073 0.085 2.391 
4 BC_DRC-P 2 0.015 NA NA NA 
5 BC- DRC_V 2 0.035 NA NA NA 
6 
BC-DRC_C 
+DRC_P 
+ DRC_V 
2 
0.158 
(0.000) 
0.095 
-0.061 
-0.015 
0.106 
0.098 
0.067 
5.746 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.  
Economic growth: gross state product vs. business climate, bottom 10 states.  
In contrast to the conclusions drawn from the results presented in Table 4.13, 
which established a viable role for using measures of business climate to predict changes 
in the level of per capita income in the low-performing states, no such claim can be made 
as to their utility for predicting changes in the GSP within those same states. A 
comparison of the results between these tables highlights the difficulty in defining the 
utility of these measures: are they to be used to predict changes in the level of per capita 
income, or change the GSP? Are they to be used to shape policy in a state with a high 
level of economic development, or one in which the level of QOL is hampering chances 
of growth? 
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Table 4.18 Top 10 States Economic Development vs. Political Climate 
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 PC_I_RS 5 0.077 7.657 9.358 0.820 
2 PC_I_GEMP 10 0.026 NA NA NA 
3 PC_C_GPP 0 0.160 -0.027 0.022 3.867 
4 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
5 
10 
0.112 
(0.000) 
8.500 
-0.074 
9.941 
0.139 
0.871 
5 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
+ GPP 
5 
10 
5 
0.115 
(0.000) 
7.923 
-0.072 
0.004 
11.542 
0.151 
0.026 
0.643 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.  
Economic development 2005 vs. political climate, top 10 states.  
The analysis in Table 4.18 defines whether the measures of political climate can 
exhibit a synergistic influence over the level of economic development in states where 
the level of development is inherently high. Indications are that the models developed for 
this investigation have failed to capture the forces responsible for enhancing the 
conditions of development when the levels are already high. One explanation worthy of 
exploration (and one that is touched upon in the literature) is whether high-performing 
states already possess the political capacity to foster economic development. If this were 
found to be the case then it would be logical to expect to find that these state have already 
created ways to monitor and manage the Schumpeterian cycles of creative destruction. 
Finally, if the theoretical literature is correct, these same states would also have devised 
sophisticated checks and balances that mute the influence that a change in the political 
climate might have over the prevailing level of development.  
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Table 4.19 Bottom 10 States Economic Development vs. Political Climate 
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 PC_I_RS 5 0.002 NA NA NA 
2 PC_I_GEMP 10 0.085 NA NA NA 
3 PC_C_GPP 0 0.002 NA NA NA 
4 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
5 
10 
0.140 
(0.000) 
-14.888 
0.183 
22.132 
0.172 
4.430 
5 
PC_I_ RS 
+ GEMP 
+ GPP 
5 
10 
5 
0.183 
(0.000) 
-22.225 
0.229 
0.018 
26.726 
0.199 
0.032 
3.579 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.  
Economic development 2005 vs. political climate, bottom 10 states.  
As was seen in Table 4.8, political ideology is a poor predictor of changes in 
economic development. This condition is reflected again in Table 4.19, where the ability 
to predict changes in the level of economic development in states when the QOL is low is 
nonexistent. The explanation, as to why these models failed to show how changes in the 
political ideology of a state might influence levels of economic development when the 
level of development is already low, is complex. However, the answer is revealed, at least 
in part, by the finding that the majority of states exhibiting low levels of economic 
development have state governments that are, by comparison, larger in size. One gets the 
sense from the literature that, as the level of employment in the public sector increases, 
citizens begin to view the function of government as excessive. It is quite plausible that 
as this size of government continues to expand it reaches a tipping point and causes an 
opening in one of Kingdon’s (1984) policy windows. If this is what is taking place then it 
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is also reasonable to postulate that when citizens become aware that the ratio of 
employment in the public sector is above a benchmark, say the national average, they 
may judge themselves possessing governments deemed excessive, and begin to seek 
remedies that temper any further expansion.  
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Table 4.20 Top 10 States Economic Development vs. Business Climate 
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 BC_ BHI 2 0.233 -0.206 0.107 2.770 
2 BC_TAXF 2 0.036 NA NA NA 
3 BC_DRC-C 2 0.046 NA NA NA 
4 BC_DRC-P 2 0.517* 0.024* 0.008 3.676 
5 BC- DRC_V 2 0.058 NA NA NA 
6 
BC-DRC_C 
+DRC_P 
+ DRC_V 
2 
0.615 
(0.422) 
 
0.001 
-0.032* 
0.006 
0.008 
0.011 
0.007 
3.752 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.  
Economic development 2005 vs. business climate, top 10 states. 
  The index of performance, DRC_P, published by CFED is the only variable 
expressing an ability to predict changes in the level of economic development in top-
performing states. While this appears encouraging, a probe into the components that 
CFED uses to construct this index reveals that it shares several of the measures this 
investigation adopts to define conditions of economic development. Somewhere nested in 
this index is the problem of intervening variables. The index is comprised of over 60 
variables so we are unable to selectively sort and delete measures. While the utility of this 
measure remains in question, for purposes of consistency, the remainder of this 
investigation will continue to analyze the value of using (BC_DRC_P) to predict changes 
in the level of economic development.  
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Table 4.21 Bottom 10 States Economic Development vs. Business Climate 
Step Variable Annual Lag R-square (Adjusted) Coefficient SE( Coeff) Constant 
1 BC_ BHI 2 0.089 0.181 0.204 2.774 
2 BC_TAXF 2 0.104 0.187 0.194 2.536 
3 BC_DRC-C 2 0.140 0.016 0.014 2.497 
4 BC_DRC-P 2 0.028 NA NA NA 
5 BC- DRC_V 2 0.001 NA NA NA 
6 
BC-DRC_C 
+DRC_P 
+ DRC_V 
2 
0.141 
(0.000) 
0.016 
0.001 
0.001 
0.018 
0.017 
0.011 
2.385 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10. 
Economic development 2005 vs. business climate, bottom 10 states. 
In states where the level of economic development is already low, the measures of 
business climate failed to produce a variable that could reliably predict changes in the 
level of economic development. The deterioration in ability of (BC_DRC_P) to predict 
change in states with low levels of development helps legitimize the earlier decision to 
disregard further consideration of this measure.  
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Summary: The Role of Business and Political Climate in Predicting Economic 
Growth and Development 
This discussion summarizes the findings and places them into the context of the two 
questions posed by this investigation: 
1. Can an indicator of a state’s political climate, defined by measures of its political 
ideology and its capacity to manage, improve our ability to predict future growth 
and development? 
2. Does the index of a state’s business climate correlate with changes in either 
economic growth or development?  
Table 4.22 provides a simplified method for interpreting these findings. Graphical 
symbols are used to summarize, at a glance, how well each variable predicts changes in 
each measure of the dependent variable. This table highlights how the individual and 
additive measures of political climate (PC_) and business climate (BC_) vary in their 
ability to predict changes in levels of economic growth in per capita income (EG_PCI), 
changes in economic growth measured as gross state product (EG_GSP), and changes in 
the level of economic development defined by the quality of life index (ED_QOL). The 
table gauges the explanatory power of each variable to predict the value of each 
dependent variable as either the five year average, or as the value assessed in the year 
2005. Table 4.22 also provides a glimpse of how the predictive power of the explanatory 
variables is influenced by the presence of economic development. The table highlights 
the ability of these variables to predict levels of economic growth and development when 
the level of economic development is high, top performing states, and when it is low, 
bottom performing states. 
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While the qualitative definitions of poor, fair, good or very good are arbitrary, the 
range assigned to each symbol is found by dividing the range of the R-square results 
presented in Tables 4.1 through 4.21 into quartiles. The R-square values used to create 
this table ranged from 0.091 to 0.582. All values receiving a rating above ‘poor’ 
possessed an R-squared value with significance at or above (p<.05). A few of the 
relationship rated ‘poor’ may not have satisfied that criterion.  
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Table 4.22  Relative Performance of Political Climate and Business Climate to Predict 
Changes in Economic Growth and Economic Development 
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PC_I_RS ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PC_I_GEMP ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PC_C_GPP ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PC_RS +_GEMP ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
PC_RS +_GEMP +_GPP ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
BC_BHI ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
BC_TAXF ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
BC_DRC_C ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
BC_DRC_P ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
BC_DRC_V ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
BC_DRC_C  
+_DRC_P  
+_DRC_V 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
?= Very Good, R-square values ≥ 0.451 ? = Good, R sq values from 0.301- 0.450 
? = Fair,  R sq values from 0.151- 0.300 ? = Poor, R sq values ≤ 0.150   
Note: values greater than ‘poor’ have (p<.05); R-square values at this significance ranged 
from 0.091 to 0.582 
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The interpretations of the results presented in Table 4.22 are fairly straightforward. 
As previously discussed, there are indications of spurious correlations between the 
measure of (BC_DRC_P), a measure of economic performance, and the measures used to 
create the composite QOL index used by this investigation. The influence of this value is 
depicted in the shaded regions of the table. Results in the shaded areas will not be 
discussed in the context of these findings.  
In terms of answering the questions posed by this investigation: 
• Does the index of a state’s business climate correlate with improvements in either 
economic growth or development?  
The ability of a business climate indicator to predict levels of economic growth or 
development was sporadic. Only two of the five tested in this investigation would seem 
be able to answer this question in the affirmative.   
The BHI, a measure of a state’s business climate, is able to measure aggregated 
changes in the economic development across the states ( R-squared ≥ 0.451). It also 
demonstrates the capacity to predict changes in growth when the growth is measured as 
per capita income (R-squared range from 0.151- 0.300). The BHI is unable to assess 
changes in GSP.  
Like the BHI, the measure of business climate defined by the DRC as capacity of 
the state to accommodate growth, (BC_DRC_C) is also able to predict levels of economic 
development and changes in economic growth expressed as per capita income.  This 
index of capacity does a slightly better job than the BHI at predicting economic growth 
measured as per capita income, and is a bit weaker than the BHI at predicting changes in 
the levels of economic development.   The ability of the Tax Foundations ranking to 
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predict changes in the levels of economic growth was limited to the incidents where 
growth was defined as the change in GSP in the states with a high level of economic 
development or when growth was defined as per capita income and the state exhibited a 
low level of economic development.  
• Can an indicator of a state’s political climate, defined by measures of its political 
ideology and its capacity to manage improve our ability to predict future growth 
and development? 
There are some surprises here as well. The much-touted relationship that suggests 
a political ideology of high taxation (PC_I_RS) inhibits levels of economic growth did 
not dominate these findings. Table 4.5, step 1 shows how, on an individual basis this 
indicator has the capacity to explain 11% of the variation in economic growth measured 
as GSP ( R-squared= 0.112, (p<.05)). The influence of taxation is only expressed when it 
is combined with the other measure of political ideology (employment in the public 
sector). Table 4.5 , step 4 shows how the additive effect of these two measures predicts 
changes in the level of economic growth measured as changes in the state’s GSP 
(adjusted R-square = 0.274, (p<.01)). When the measure of growth is per capita income, 
the combined affect is less pronounced (Table 4.2, step 4, adjusted R-square = 0.167 
(p<.01)). 
It is clear from these results that the levels of taxation are poor indicators of 
economic growth or economic development. The only time the level of taxation came 
into the picture was when the growth is measured as the level of per capita income. That 
influence is restricted to the states where the level of economic development is low. 
While the sample size was low (n=10) indicators are that a 1% increase in taxation 
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decreases earnings in those states by approximately $2,000 (Table 4.11. R-squared = 
0.574, (p<.01)).  
Equally surprising, the political climate variable used to gauge a state’s capacity 
to manage its affairs (PC_C_GPP) failed to demonstrate a capability to predict levels of 
growth or development.   
The overwhelming winner from these iterations was the political climate variable 
that defined ideology as the ratio of individuals employed in the public sector of a state. 
As seen in Table 4.22, this measure of a states’ political ideology was able to predict 
changes in the level of GSP across all states, GSP across the top 10 states, and it 
demonstrated the capacity to predict changes in the levels of growth as per capita income 
across all states and within the bottom 10. As was the case with the other measures of a 
state’s political climate, this measure of political ideology could not reliably predict 
changes in the level of economic development.  
It is worth noting that in cases where the measure of economic growth was per 
capita income, the value of the coefficient attached to the political ideology 
(PC_I_GEMP) was negative. However, recall that this measure is an index. The lower the 
value the more favorable the conditions are to economic growth. Therefore an increase in 
employment index increased its negative effect on growth. In the outputs where growth 
was defined by GSP the coefficient remained positive. This suggests that increasing 
levels of employment in the public sector increases the value of economic output from 
the state. In states where the level of economic development was high, increasing the size 
of government was a very attractive strategy (Table 4.14, step 2, R-square= 0.529, 
(p<.05)). However, the states with high levels of economic development have ratios of 
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employment in the public sector that is below the average for the data set. This 
conundrum will be explored in the final chapter.    
• When compared to a measure of business climate how well do these simple 
indicators of political climate stack up? 
How do they compare in terms of defining economic growth as a change in gross 
state product?  
In the category of predicting levels of economic growth as gross state product, 
Table 4.22 clearly indicates that measure of a state’s political ideology, defined as the 
ratio of public sector employees in a state (PC_I_GEMP), outperforms any of the other 
measures tested. The favorable predictions seen in the additive models can be attributed 
to the contribution of this variable. The only business climate measure able to predict 
levels of growth as gross state product was the ranking from the Tax Foundation. Yet that 
variable was only successful at defining changes in the GSP of states where the level of 
economic development was high (Table 4.16, step 2. R-squared = 0.474, (p<.05)). None 
of the variables selected by this investigation are able to predict change in the level of 
GSP for bottom-performing states. 
How do they compare in terms of defining economic growth as a change in per 
capita income? 
This same measure of political ideology (PC_I_GEMP) does a credible job of 
predicting changes in growth measured as per capita income (Table 4.1, step 2. R-square 
= 0.231, (p<.001)). Three out of the five measures of business climate, (BC_BHI), 
(BC_DRC_C), and (BC_DRC_ P), as well as the additive model from all the DRC 
indices, demonstrate explanatory powers for predicting growth as per capita income that 
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were at or above the level achieved with political ideology (PC_I_GEMP). Unlike the 
earlier test in which the models failed to predict changes in the level of performance for 
GSP in bottom performing states, here the variables are unable to predict changes in 
economic growth as per capita income in the top-performing states. In terms of predicting 
change in economic growth occurring in the bottom-performing states the measures of 
political ideology were rated ‘very good’. 
How do they compare in terms of defining economic development? 
As seen in Table 4.22 all of the tests used to define the capacity of a state’s 
political climate to predict changes in the level of economic development failed. The 
DRC’s measure of capacity (_C) and the BHI index of business climate were the only 
two measures of business climate suited to predicting changes in economic development. 
By far the best indicator for predicting levels of economic development is the BHI index; 
however, this same variable only rated fair in its ability to predict changes in economic 
growth measured as per capita income and was poor in predicting economic growth as 
changes in a state’s GSP. 
What measure should we use? 
A quick and easy way to assess these values is to assign each level of 
performance a numeric value. This can be accomplished by assigning  a “1” to a level of 
performance judged fair, a  “2” to performance judged good and a “3” to performance 
level judged very good. Under that scoring system, the state’s political ideology defined 
by its level of public sector employment (PC_I _GEMP) scores the highest, receiving a  
total of  8 points. The BHI and the Tax Foundation each receive a score of 6 and thus are 
in a tie for second.  
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When compared to the complex nature of the index used to define a state’s 
business climate, the measure of state’s political ideology, defined as the level of 
employment in the public sector, has greater explanatory power than any of the other 
variables tested. The attraction of this measure resides in its simplicity: it is easy to define, 
it exhibits the capacity to measure changes in economic growth occurring at both the 
macro level of the economy and the micro-level of the individual, it is easy to benchmark 
and it is well within auspices of lawmakers to control. Further refinements of these first 
pass models are warranted. The last section of this study ties these findings to the 
literature and suggests areas of further investigation. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND AREA OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
This investigation determined whether the measures of a state’s business climate 
or its political climate can predict changes in the levels of economic growth and 
economic development occurring in the American states. These findings also test, in a 
small and measured way, whether Schumpeter’s (1934) theory on the role that 
governments play in spawning growth can be applied to the economies of the American 
states.  
The following section should be viewed as a companion to the summary section 
that was provided at the end of the previous chapter. Rather than elaborating on the 
outputs from the analytical models, this section focuses on connecting the findings from 
this investigation to the theory and academic literature that integrates subjects of 
economic growth, economic development and politics.  
Business Climate as an Indicator of Economic Growth and Development 
Fisher’s (2005) investigations into the utility offered by business climate indices 
hinted at some of the shortfalls attached to these measures. Apart from their value as a 
marketing tool suited to helping promote the benefits of locating a business to a specific 
state, the publicized measures of a state’s business climate offer little additional value to 
policy makers and politicians.  The findings that these indices lack the ability to predict 
change in the levels of economic growth or economic development validates Fisher’s 
(2005) concern over using these indices as benchmarks to justify changes in economic or 
even social policy. While the literature hints at this lack of utility, the outputs from this 
investigation provide, perhaps for the first time, a quantifiable basis for rejecting these 
indices as benchmarks for altering policies of growth or development.  
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As presented in the previous chapter, the political ideology of a state, measured as 
its level of taxation, is also a poor indicator of changes in the level of economic growth 
occurring within the state. Recall that many of the business climate indices publish their 
findings from an ideological bias that positions lowering taxes and decreasing the size of 
governments as the prescription for increasing levels of growth. The finding that the level 
of state and local tax burden fails to indicate levels of economic growth erodes the 
ideological underpinning of many of these published reports. A key conclusion to be 
drawn from this investigation is that a policy prescription of lowering taxes and 
decreasing the size of government is not a universal cure for improving the conditions of 
economic growth.   
The findings from this study help expose a few of the reasons that business 
climate indices fail to predict changes in the levels of economic growth or development 
within a state: several of the variables used to create the index are designed to measure 
changes in economic growth; others are designed to measure changes in the levels of 
economic development. As pointed out by Vaughn and Bearse (1981) economic growth 
and economic development are related but they should not be considered the same thing.  
While the measures of business climate may have utility in other areas, their 
weakness in terms of predicting changes in economic growth or development can be 
traced back to how the variables are collected and how they are incorporated into these 
indices. The expansion of the indices of business climate into such complex structures 
speaks to the way these indices have embraced Blakely and Bradshaw’s (2002) expanded 
definition of what defines growth. However, they seem to have failed to consider how to 
design an index that: (a) segregates the causes of economic development or the cause of 
192 
 
economic growth from the effects of either condition, and (b) differentiates between the 
way economic forces and non-economic forces, or political forces, contribute to growth 
and development. In a sense, the findings from this investigation can simply be thought 
of as a way to get the topic of growth and development grounded. It bring us back to the 
basics of understanding how to define and measure growth separate from development 
and how to define and measure economic factors separate from non-economic influences.  
Political Climate as an Indicator of Economic Growth and Development  
Understanding how a state’s political climate influences its prospects for 
economic growth or development is best examined from within the context of how 
Schumpeter (1934) views incidences of growth. While most of the investigators that have 
analyzed Schumpeter’s work put him into the category of a laissez-faire economist, his 
suggestion that governments play a legitimate, albeit limited role in enhancing the 
prospects for economic growth exposes a chink in that armor. Schumpeter (1934) 
proposes that growth is optimal when governments limit their intervention in markets and 
only focus on policies that preserve, protect, or restore the quality of life enjoyed by 
society. The policy actions that Schumpeter considers to be a legitimate role of 
government parallel the measures of QOL this investigation uses to gauge the level of 
economic development in a state.   
Schumpeter never tested whether the benefits emanating from a cycle of creative 
destruction were impacted by the political ideology of government. A glimpse into how 
these interactions occur at the state level is revealed in the findings of this investigation. 
As noted earlier, the findings from this investigation suggest that variations in measures 
that define a state government’s political climate as excessive (Lowery and Berry, 1983) 
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measured here as a percent of personal income consumed by state and local taxes, 
actually has very little impact on the state’s propensity to grow or on its ability to 
improve the quality of life. Quite the opposite is true. States with high levels of taxation 
enjoy the highest levels of economic growth and have the best QOL. However, when the 
continuum from responsive government to excessive government is gauged from an 
ideology of government size we find states with smaller governments enjoying higher 
levels of economic growth and economic development (QOL).   
This seems to be telling us that the definition of what constitutes measures of 
responsive and excessive needs to be refined. It is difficult to justify how you would 
judge a state excessive because of high taxes and responsive because of its smaller 
government. The fact that many past investigations have made these determinations 
based on subjective measures of responsiveness, political factors with high temporal 
character (party control, interparty competition), appears to be one of the reasons the 
literature continues to wrestle with how such measures might be affecting the scale of 
government spending or the rate of its growth. Of course, measures of size and spending 
are used throughout the literature to gauge governments along the continuum of being 
either responsive or excessive (Kapeluck, 2001).  
It is because most governments tend to intervene with markets in limited ways 
that the forces of markets, not governments are credited with driving the cycles of 
innovation: creation followed by destruction. As these cycles work to cleanse the market 
of its least efficient producers, they spawn a rebirth in the economy. The end result is an 
increase in the levels of economic growth and the overall quality of life. In market based 
economies these cycles of stabilization and destabilization tend to be short lived. Since 
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market failures are rarely synchronized across all segments of an economy the impact 
that a single market failure has on society is usually quite small. In what we might call 
this ‘normal mode’ , the process leading to attrition creates an economic structure that is 
more agile; it moves faster, it has a greater capacity to adapt and rebound, and it can be 
sustained at a higher plateau for a longer period of time. However, the claim that 
capitalistic systems can reconstruct and create growth without intervention seems dubious.  
While markets can leverage innovation to reorganize production functions they do 
little to mitigate the social impact that occurs during a period of market destruction (Daly, 
1994, Milbrath, 1989).  During periods of market correction there are aspects associated 
with a government’s intervention that need to be better understood. This would include 
understanding the impact that various levels of intervention might have over the 
prospects for restoring a QOL. Likewise, it would be critical to forecast the impact 
coming from different types of intervention. Of course, the idea of timing is equally 
important: is intervention defined by a trigger point or is it one of continual vigilance? 
For example, if the level of intervention is too high the markets will be buoyed by an 
artificial sense of calm. Inefficient producers will be shielded from the fall-out, 
innovation will have been curtailed and in its wake, growth will have been slowed. If the 
type of intervention is not correct, say by offering broad-based financial incentives rather 
than focusing on expanding education, then the vector of economic prosperity will not 
have been changed. Finally, if the timing is wrong, here the competing scenarios of too 
little too late, or more help than needed both come to mind, then the evolutionary 
character that Schumpeter ascribes to economic change will be interrupted. In an attempt 
to identify the impact that the first element in this chain of events, the level of 
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intervention, might have on growth, this investigation highlights the value that a measure 
of political ideology has to predict changes in the levels of growth. It also shows how the 
influence of political climate varies between states that exhibit an inherently high level of 
economic development and those with low levels of economic development (defined by 
the proxy QOL). These tests were developed as a way to glean a bit of information about 
how the measure of political climate might be touching on Schumpeter’s cycles.  
The results of this study seem to be echoing Howland’s (1993) concerns over 
what happens to the prosperity of a region when the policies of growth are based on a 
misapplication of neoclassical economic theory. Certainly states such as Iowa would fit 
Howland’s definition of an economy where the economic output is derived from a fairly 
simple, market-based system. Under those conditions she finds the market-based systems 
more rigid and less able to conform to the rule of resiliency as it is stipulated in 
neoclassical economic theory.  This may explain why states that exhibit some of those 
same economic characteristics (small economies), may, from time to time, need to 
replace the normal course of growth as it would have otherwise been dictated by free 
market processes, creation and destruction, with a level of intervention that is defined by 
the political forces. These forces are those of the political culture that are embodied in the 
work by Elazar (1984) and are operationally defined in this study as measures of political 
climate: ideology and capacity to manage. This may offer a partial explanation for the 
finding that as the size of state government increases it continues to have a negative 
impact on economic growth measured as per capita income (larger governments impede 
growth and economic opportunity within the micro economy of the individual), yet that 
same increase within the public sector enhanced the level of economic growth defined at 
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the level of the macro economy of a state (Table 4.1, step 2 and Table 4.4, step 2). When 
the economy of the state is small and not very complex the effects of intervention would 
be expected to vary  
As shown in Figure 5.1, several states with high levels of economic development, 
high levels of growth and smaller governments have very complex economies (NJ, CT). 
Where the level of economic development is high this measure of ideology, government 
employment, ceases to be a reliable predictor of growth in per capita income and 
becomes a predictor of growth measured as GSP (Tables 4.10 and 4.14). Again, what is 
not revealed in these numbers is shown in Figure 5.1. Figure 5.1 depicts the way that 
measures of economic development (ED_QOL), economic growth in per capita income 
(EG_PCI) and the two measures of political ideology, taxation (PC_I_RS) and 
government employment (PC_I_GEMP) have behaved over time. The graph shows how 
the behavior of each measure varies with the level of economic development in a state. 
States where the initial condition is one of high levels of economic development appear 
in this graph in the darker lines. Those with the lowest levels of economic growth are 
shown by the lighter shaded lines. Each element of this graph represents the trend of 
between 15 and 20 years of data for each variable. For ease of examination these data are 
displayed with markers denoting the point of each 5-year average. The revelation here is 
that states with a high quality of life enjoy some of the highest levels of economic growth. 
These same states have an ideology that seems willing to spend more of their earnings to 
support the role of government, yet at the same time the size of the government is smaller 
when compared to its counterparts. 
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Figure 5. 1 Characterization of Top 10 and Bottom 10 States Ranked in Economic Development 
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While there is no indication that any of the measures used by this study to define 
the political climate of a state have the capacity to predict levels of economic 
development, a different story emerges concerning how well these variables can measure 
levels of economic growth. 
Across the states, a measure of the state’s political ideology, defined by the 
relative size of employment in the public sector, was able to account for between 20% 
and 25% ( p<.001) of the variation in economic growth measured as personal income. 
When this same independent variable was tested to predict levels of growth in GSP it 
remained significant, however, the explanatory power dropped to between 15% and 20% 
(p<.01). When tested against the data set that controlled for levels of economic 
development, the utility of the variable to predict changes in per capita income in states 
where the level of economic development was low, was doubled (Table 4.11, step 2, R-
squared = 0.523, (p<.05)). However, this same independent variable was unable to 
predict changes in the level of per capita income when the level of economic 
development was high.  
This distinction suggests that top tier states operate closer to the optimum point 
where the cycles of growth and development are being skillfully synchronized to foster 
cycles of creative destruction. Ideally these results should have been easy to tie back to 
Singleton and Griswold’s (1999) suggestion that a government’s quality and not its size 
is the most important factor for judging the nature of a policy environment. So while the 
literature indicates that these results should have highlighted the influential role that a 
state’s capacity to manage its affairs had over levels of growth or levels of development, 
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the tests to determine the utility of that variable failed to demonstrate any explanatory 
powers.  
Political Climate, Business Climate and Ways to Change the Level of Economic 
Prosperity 
While this study failed to reveal a universal prescription for enhancing the 
economic future of all states, it is clear that one non-partisan indicator of a state’s 
political climate helped to expose the source of a state’s outward bias towards fostering 
cycles of economic growth, economic development, or its willingness to languish in a 
state of economic stasis. The utility of this variable, the relative size of public sector 
employment, lies in its ability to demonstrate how the policies that expand government’s 
interaction in free markets limit the capacity of the individuals to improve their economic 
well being.  
While the models produced in this study provide policy makers with a set of 
metrics that are actionable, their real value is found in their utility as a starting point for 
manipulating variables under their control, the relative size of government and to a much 
lesser extent, the levels of taxation. The ability to understand how a push or pull on one 
of these levers impacts levels of economic growth is not something lawmakers currently 
possess. Certainly states such as Maine have high taxes, low levels of growth and enjoy a 
quality of life on par with the rest of the nation. In states such as these the levels of 
taxation may indeed be a lever that needs to be pulled. 
Consistent with the work of Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) it could be 
assumed that where the society is deemed liberal it would tend to be more liberal in the 
type of policy choices it makes. Under that scenario one expects to find states with higher 
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levels of QOL and higher levels of growth willing to see a higher percentage of their 
incomes used to expand the role of government. That behavior is seen in the examples 
where several of the states with high levels of economic development accept a condition 
of higher taxes. The conundrum arises when you look at Figure 5.1 and realize these 
same states have smaller not larger governments. The argument that Kapeluck (2001) and 
Garand (1993) make in suggesting that states with a political culture judged liberal 
increase the size of government in response to the citizens willingness to accept a broader 
role for government is not borne out of the findings from this investigation. In fact, a 
quick look at Figure 5.1 shows that the states with the lowest levels of economic 
development also have the largest governments. While this investigation deliberately 
avoids making any attempt to tie its findings to any of the more subjective variables of a 
conservative or liberal ideology, it is clear that the states in this category are generally 
considered some of the more conservative southern states: Louisiana , Alabama, South 
Carolina. The conclusion here is really a note of caution: looking at the economic policies 
that improve growth through a lens that defines governments as responsive or excessive 
is ill advised. Clearly, the complexity of the local political scene, the interaction of the 
politics with the local economy, and the size and structure of the economy of the state 
need to be taken into account. It seems growth may not be a factor amendable to being 
judged by the political ideologies when they are measured from within a party affiliation, 
interest groups, excessive or responsive governments and the like. 
The sense from this investigation is that the political factors of importance are 
those that express the capacity of the government to manage within the constraints of the 
size and complexity of its economy. In large complex economies the ability to measure 
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the importance of a government’s capacity to manage appears to be muted by the size of 
economy itself. That is not to suggest the capacity of a state’s government to manage is 
not important. What is being measured by Pew and others may not be capturing the 
significance elements that are important for each government to manage. While all states 
acknowledge the need to improve their capacity to manage, there is an uncertainty as to 
what it is they need to be managing. This may explain why the capacity to manage did 
not emerge from this investigation as a measure that supports economic growth or 
development. For example this study found that in states with large complex economies, 
New Jersey and Massachusetts, the critical mass needed to effectively manage the public 
sector is smaller than in states where the economy is less complex. One explanation for 
this is offered in neoclassical economic theory: the more complex the market the more 
resilient the economy. These markets create, in a Schumpeterian way, a level of growth 
that also accelerates the individual’s quality of life. Over time these complex economies 
‘learn’ and eventually become synchronized with or play a leadership role in the policy 
arena. Under these conditions government’s can focus on improving infrastructure and 
creating the type of social change that supports innovation and economic growth. 
Through this evolutionary process governments appear to have an opportunity to become 
more efficient when compared to states where the economies are small and the markets 
less resilient. The states with lower levels of economic diversity appear to have limited 
options for creating economic strategies. These less complex economic structures also 
minimize the opportunities for governments to outsource certain functions. The changes 
that occur within these less complex economies are readily explained by the public’s 
desire to open one of Kingdon’s (1984) policy windows. Changes in the levels of 
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economic growth may not be the result of market failures or even how they are handled: 
rather it may be the result of a misapplication of economic theory. Whenever the 
economic conditions prevent markets from managing growth and development it appears 
the only remedy is political intervention. 
While the findings support Schumpeter’s basic assumptions that smaller 
governments lead to more vibrant economies, they failed to highlight the role that a 
measure of a government’s capacity to manage, an indication of the quality of the 
institution, plays in sustaining economic growth. Like the conclusions from Dye’s (1980) 
works, this study asserts that the level of taxation has little influence over the incidences 
of economic growth.  
One of the most significant discoveries of this study was the finding that the 
politics deemed conducive to economic growth take nearly a decade to translate into a 
measure of growth. As such, a state’s economic policies must be able to weather the 
storms of several political seasons.  
Regardless of whether the failure to adopt a longer planning horizon is due to a 
change in political administrations, lack of political will, or the inability to manage the 
affairs of government the outcome is always the same: as citizens seek to reelect those 
candidates that have demonstrated an ability to improve the qualitative measures that 
improve their quality of life the political capital of that regime is retained.  The antithesis 
is also true; by failing to understand the benefit of enduring short term losses for the 
longer gains that accrue from periods of economic growth, the electorate routinely 
bypasses those candidates best qualified to orchestrate the cycles of change that are 
needed to rekindle growth. By default this leads to a dichotomy of ideologies; those 
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seeking to expand the role of government and those that view government as the 
facilitator of market forces.  
In summary, changing a state’s economic fortunes starts when the citizens express 
a willingness to abandon a monolithic approach towards electing politicians from within 
a party and begin electing politicians that demonstrate a pragmatic approach to 
governing: consensus building. Given the long time frames this investigation has 
assigned to the benefit streams of economic policies within a state, the capacity to work 
across party lines appears to offer the best opportunity for having continuity in these 
policies. 
Only then can we be assured that our elected officials will be effective and able to 
enact the economic strategies than benefit both the constituency and their progeny.  
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THEORIES
Summary of Economic Development Theories   
Theory Basic Categories Definition of 
Development 
Essential Dynamic Strengths and Weaknesses Application 
Economic Base  
 
Export or basic and 
non-basic, local or 
residentiary sectors  
Increasing rate of 
growth in output, 
income or employment 
Response to external changes in 
demand; economic base multiplier 
effects  
Most popular understanding of economic 
development in the United States and a simple tool 
for short-term prediction.  Inadequate theory for 
understanding long-term development  
Industrial recruitment and promotion for export expansion and 
diversification, expansion of existing basic industries, import 
substitution by strengthening connections between basic and 
non-basic industries, and infrastructure development for 
export expansion  
Staple  Exporting industries  Export-led economic 
growth  
Successful production and marketing 
of the export staple in world 
markets.  External investment in and 
the demand for the export staple  
Historical perspective on economic 
development.  Descriptive theory difficult to apply  
Build on export specialization.  State does everything possible 
to increase competitive advantage.  Character of economic 
base shapes political and cultural superstructure  
Sector  Primary, secondary, 
and tertiary sectors  
Greater sectoral 
diversity and higher 
productivity per worker
Income elasticity of demand and labor 
productivity in primary and secondary 
sectors  
Empirical analysis possible.  Categories are too 
general  
Promote sectoral shifts.  Attract and retain producers of 
income elastic products  
 
Growth Pole  Industries  Propulsive industry 
growth leads to 
structural change  
Propulsive industries are the poles of 
growth  
General theory of initiation and diffusion of 
development based on the domination effect  
Growth center strategies  
Regional 
Concentration and 
Diffusion  
Commodities and 
factors (Myrdal) or 
industries (Hirschman) 
Higher income per 
capita  
Spread and backwash effects (Myrdal) 
or trickle-down and polarization 
effects (Hirschman)  
Address the dynamics of development  Active government to mitigate backwash effects and reduce 
inequalities (Myrdal).  Location of public investments spurs 
development (Hirschman)  
Neoclassical Growth Aggregate (macro) or 
two-sector regional 
economy  
Increasing rate of 
economic growth per 
capita  
Rate of saving that supports 
investment and capital formation  
Supply-side model  Government should promote free trade and economic 
integration and tolerate social inequality and spatial dualism  
Interregional Trade  Prices and quantities 
of commodities and 
factors  
Economic growth that 
leads to greater 
consumer welfare  
Price adjustments that result in 
equilibrium terms of trade; price-
quantity-effects  
Unique emphasis on consumer welfare and price 
effects. Ignores the dynamics of development  
Government intervention should promote free trade. 
Infrastructure development, efficient local government  
Product Cycle  Products: new, 
maturing, or 
standardized  
Continual creation and 
diffusion of new 
products  
New product development; 
innovation  
Popular basis for understanding development among 
researchers  
 
 
Development strategies promote product innovation and 
subsequent diffusion  
Entrepreneurship  Entrepreneurs or the 
entrepreneurial 
function  
Resilience and 
diversity  
Innovation process; new 
combinations  
Mediated theory  Support industrial milieu or ecology for development  
Flexible 
Specialization 
Production regimes, 
industrial 
organization  
Sustained growth 
through agile 
production, innovation 
and specialization  
Changes in demand requiring 
flexibility among producers  
Detailed analysis of firm/industry organization; 
aggregate outcomes and relationships seldom 
specified  
Encourage flexibility through adoption of advanced 
technologies, networks among small firms, and industry 
cluster strategies  
Source: Malizia and Feser (1999). Understanding Local Economic Development. 
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APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: AVERAGE 2001 TO 2005 (EXCEPT AS NOTED *) 
Variable 
N of 
Cases Minimum Maximum Range Average 
Standard 
Deviation Note 
                
EG_PCI 50 23288.400 44185.200 20896.800 30894.988 4431.671 Dollars 
EG_GSP 50 2.006 9.524 7.518 5.314 1.377 Percent  
ED_QOL 50 1.210 4.000 2.790 2.416 0.715 
Index 1.0 to 
4.0 
PC_I_RS 50 0.066 0.133 0.067 0.103 0.012 Percent 
PC_I_GEMP 50 1.000 4.000 3.000 2.072 0.961 
Index 1.0 to 
4.0 
PC_C_GPP 50 69.667 92.000 22.333 81.207 5.023 1-100 
BC_BHI * 50 2.893 7.083 4.190 5.005 0.938  Index 1-10 
BC_TAXF 50 1.000 49.600 48.600 25.500 14.467 
Rank 1 to 
50 
BC_DRC_C** 50 50.000 97.000 47.000 76.986 12.984 50-100 
BC_DRC_P** 50 50.000 97.000 47.000 76.963 13.177 50-100 
BC_DRC_V** 50 52.143 97.000 44.857 77.197 11.766 50-100 
                
* The BHI average was for 3 years 
** The DRC average was over 7 years 
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APPENDIX C: CORRELATION TABLE 2005 DATA 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
                  ¦                                                              _2005_PC_I_G_E 
                  ¦ _2005_ED_QOL   _2005_EG_GSP   _2005_EG_PCI   _2005_PC_I_RS                MP   
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
_2005_ED_QOL      ¦        1.000          0.142         -0.606          -0.153             0.133   
_2005_EG_GSP      ¦        0.142          1.000         -0.115          -0.339             0.179   
_2005_EG_PCI      ¦       -0.606         -0.115          1.000           0.056            -0.023   
_2005_PC_I_RS     ¦       -0.153         -0.339          0.056           1.000            -0.079   
_2005_PC_I_G_EMP  ¦        0.133          0.179         -0.023          -0.079             1.000   
_2005_PC_W_GPP    ¦       -0.071         -0.023         -0.130           0.164            -0.098   
_2004_BC_DRC_P    ¦        0.082         -0.163         -0.076          -0.027            -0.484   
_2004_BC_DRC_C    ¦        0.026         -0.185         -0.171           0.054            -0.375   
_2004_BC_DRC_V    ¦       -0.068         -0.119         -0.038           0.214            -0.489   
_2005_BC_BHI      ¦       -0.653          0.049          0.466          -0.241            -0.197   
_2004_BC_TAXF_IDX ¦        0.035          0.366          0.070          -0.708             0.262   
                ¦                                                                                    
                  ¦ _2005_PC_W_GPP   _2004_BC_DRC_P   _2004_BC_DRC_C   _2004_BC_DRC_V   _2005_BC_BHI   
------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
_2005_ED_QOL      ¦         -0.071            0.082            0.026           -0.068         -0.653   
_2005_EG_GSP      ¦         -0.023           -0.163           -0.185           -0.119          0.049   
_2005_EG_PCI      ¦         -0.130           -0.076           -0.171           -0.038          0.466   
_2005_PC_I_RS     ¦          0.164           -0.027            0.054            0.214         -0.241   
_2005_PC_I_G_EMP  ¦         -0.098           -0.484           -0.375           -0.489         -0.197   
_2005_PC_W_GPP    ¦          1.000            0.137            0.324            0.211          0.246   
_2004_BC_DRC_P    ¦          0.137            1.000            0.509            0.090          0.071   
_2004_BC_DRC_C    ¦          0.324            0.509            1.000            0.553          0.081   
_2004_BC_DRC_V    ¦          0.211            0.090            0.553            1.000          0.089   
_2005_BC_BHI      ¦          0.246            0.071            0.081            0.089          1.000   
_2004_BC_TAXF_IDX ¦         -0.017           -0.202           -0.099           -0.183          0.261   
                  ¦ _2004_BC_TAXF_- 
                  ¦             IDX 
------------------+---------------- 
_2005_ED_QOL      ¦           0.035 
_2005_EG_GSP      ¦           0.366 
_2005_EG_PCI      ¦           0.070 
_2005_PC_I_RS     ¦          -0.708 
_2005_PC_I_G_EMP  ¦           0.262 
_2005_PC_W_GPP    ¦          -0.017 
_2004_BC_DRC_P    ¦          -0.202 
_2004_BC_DRC_C    ¦          -0.099 
_2004_BC_DRC_V    ¦          -0.183 
_2005_BC_BHI      ¦           0.261 
_2004_BC_TAXF_IDX ¦           1.000 
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